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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the effect of CEOs’ personal attributes on CEOs’ optimistic behaviour 
and further investigates their effect on corporate leasing and hedging decisions. We integrate 
behavioural finance with management, leadership and psychological approaches to provide 
a better understanding of the influence of personal attributes on CEO optimistic behaviour 
and decision making. By investigating 248 CEOs who worked with the UK FTSE 100 firms 
from 2000 to 2013, we find that CEO personal attributes (traits, skills & experiences, and 
networking) do cultivate CEOs’ optimistic behaviour (acquisitiveness in the Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) market). CEO personal traits that were examined in this study are age, 
gender, nationality and marital status. We find (chapter 2) that for CEO personal traits; 
younger, male, married and UK nationality CEOs are likely to be optimistic. CEO skills and 
experiences (e.g. their educational background (MBA, or PhD holder), founder status, 
financial literacy, duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments) have also been found to have 
significant positive relationships with CEO optimism. In the case of CEO networking 
attributes, we examine CEOs’ internal networking (tenure with the firm, and internal 
promotion), and CEO external networking ties (external directorships, and social networking 
prestige) and find that CEO networking ties have a significant positive influence on triggering 
CEO optimistic behaviour. In addition, we propose three personal attributes indexes, namely 
Traits Index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index (NI). Once 
again all the indexes have a significant influence on cultivating CEO optimistic behaviour. 
This thesis adds to the growing literature on behavioural finance by proposing an alternative 
proxy to managerial optimism (chapter 2) – the CEO Optimism Index (CEOOI) - and by 
investigating the influence of CEOOI on corporate decisions such as corporate leasing 
(chapter 3) and hedging decisions (chapter 4). This study uses manually collected information 
relating to Mergers and Acquisitions, Stock Option exercise behaviour, Insider Transaction 
and CEO personal attributes.  In addition, we also manually collected data on operating lease, 
finance lease and total lease for corporate leasing analysis (chapter 3) and the derivative 
instruments data for a study of corporate hedging (chapter 4). The results (chapter 3) suggest 
that optimistic CEOs tend to use more lease financing.  This finding is in line with the notion 
that optimistic CEOs are reluctant to raise external funding by issuing new equity as they 
believe that the capital market tends to undervalue their firms (Heaton, 2002). Additionally, 
since optimistic CEOs are highly confident of their own ability to bring in future earnings, 
they are unwilling to share the potential earnings with new equity holders and avoid this by 
choosing lease financing (lease is a type of debt). Hedging decisions results (chapter 4) 
indicate that optimistic CEOs employ more financial derivatives to hedge potential firm risks. 
Optimistic CEOs have high self-confidence, are committed to the firm’s good outcome and 
believe they themselves can control the firm’s future earnings; hence they use derivative 
instruments to control and reduce the firm’s cash flow volatility to deliver more predictable 
outcomes. Our findings provide evidence that CEOs’ personal attributes and optimistic 
behaviour affected corporate leasing and hedging decisions. Our study suggests that 
recognizing the presence and importance of CEO personal behaviour will help bridge the gap 
between the theory and practice of corporate decisions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Haugen (1999) pointed out that finance evolved from a single discipline into three schools 
of thought: old finance, modern finance (neoclassical finance)1 and new finance (behavioural 
finance). The old finance school emphasises analysis of corporate financial statements and 
focuses on the nature of financial claims. Modern finance focuses more on asset pricing 
valuation based on rational economic behaviour, assuming that the market is efficient. The 
doctrine of the new finance school, introduced in the 1990s, adopts behavioural models and 
the interaction in inefficient markets. 
 
Conventional finance theories assume that managers act rationally and consider all available 
information in their investment decisions (Vasile, Sebastian & Radu, 2012). Agency Theory, 
introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), marks a divergence from the traditional and 
conventional views of corporate finance by highlighting the conflict of interest among firms’ 
management and stakeholders and arguing that managers might make decisions that are 
favourable to themselves rather than benefiting shareholders. This view takes into 
consideration the role of managerial traits (managers’ beliefs, preferences, attitudes and prior 
experiences) in corporate policies and decision-making. 
 
Managers’ decisions do, in the real world, depend at least in part on individuals’ sentiments. 
As Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) mention, firms in the same country, same industry, of 
similar size and with similar investment opportunities behave differently. Hence, recently an 
increasing number of studies have been published on CEO personal characteristics and 
                                                          
1Statman (1999) calls neoclassical finance ‘standard finance’.  
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managerial behavioural biases and their impact on corporate activities (e.g., Heaton, 2002; 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005a, 2005b; Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier, Tate & Yan, 2011; 
Kaplan, Klebanov & Sorenson, 2012). 
 
Recent research has paid more attention to behavioural finance. Behavioural finance cannot, 
however, be treated as a standalone discipline but is, instead, a part of the main stream of 
finance (Ritter, 2003). Behavioural finance complements neoclassical finance by providing 
additional explanations of the impact of psychological perspectives on financial decisions in 
households, markets and firms (De Bondt, Muradoglu, Shefrin & Staikouras, 2015; Joo & 
Durri, 2015). 
 
1.1 Neoclassical Finance versus the Behavioural Finance Paradigm 
 
The main pillar of neoclassical (modern) finance is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
which proposes that financial asset prices reflect all available information as market 
participants are rational in processing the information. While behavioural finance applies 
psychology to explain market anomalies; allows for market inefficiency and market 
participants ‘cognitive biases (Ramiah, Xu & Mossa, 2015).  
 
1.1.1 The Neoclassical Finance Paradigm 
Ramiah, Xu and Moosa (2015) outlined the evolution of finance. The timeline of research in 
neoclassical finance starts with portfolio selection considered by Markowitz (1952). 
Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory, also known as the Modern Portfolio Theory, suggests that 
investments should be considered by looking at the assets in a portfolio instead of on a stand-
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alone basis. Markowitz’s Portfolio Theory suggests that investors diversify their portfolios 
by not affecting the portfolios’ expected return, whilst reducing their risk (they maximize 
investors’ returns and minimize the risks of the portfolio). Investors are always perceived as 
risk-averse; hence construction or selection of a portfolio of multiple assets with different 
degree of risk can help bring the maximum return for a given risk level, as investors will only 
take higher risk stocks or securities if they are compensated by higher returns. 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) introduced a foundation theory of firm valuation by 
proposing the Capital Structure Irrelevant Theory.  The Modigliani and Miller (M&M) 
capital structure irrelevance proposition assumes that the market is perfect without taxes or 
bankruptcy costs. In this view, changes in the composition of firms’ capital structure (debt 
or equity) have no effect on firm capital costs. In other words, the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) remains constant regardless of the changes in the company's capital structure;  
no tax benefit for debt financing (interest payments). Since financing decisions (debt or 
equity financing), have no effects, capital structure does not influence firms’ stock prices 
(firm value). Capital structure is therefore irrelevant to a firm's value. 
 
In the early 1960s, Treynor (1962), Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) 
developed the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to investigate the relationship between 
systematic risk and expected returns for assets. The model further served as a model for the 
pricing of risky securities. CAPM can be used to forecast the required rate of return for any 
firm with publicly traded stock. The reason why only a firm’s systematic risk is taken into 
consideration and priced by investors is that that particular risk cannot be eliminated by 
diversification. CAPM is less concerned about unsystematic risk because investors are able 
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to avoid such risk by holding diversified portfolios. The implications of the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model are that: investors are rational mean-variance optimizers who use the 
Markowitz Portfolio selection method to determine same set of efficient portfolios (risk-
averse investors will put most of their wealth in risk-free asset whereas risk-tolerant investors 
will put most of their wealth in risky assets); market portfolio is mean-variance efficient; and 
Security Market Line (SML) pricing holds for all assets and portfolios as the expected return 
on assets is fully determined by the  risk-free rate, market risk premium as well as the beta. 
 
Neoclassical investment models pay attention to the concepts of efficient market hypothesis 
and investor rational expectations (Coleman, 2014). Fama (1965) introduced the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH)2. According to this investment theory, investors cannot beat the 
market because the stock market efficiency reflects all the relevant information and 
incorporates it in the stock price.  In other words, once EMH holds, stocks are always traded 
at their fair value. Fama (1995) further discusses the Random Walk Theory and states that 
individual securities’ successive price changes are independent and stock price changes have 
no memory. This implies that the past stock price history cannot be used to forecast the future 
stock price. Fama points out that empirical evidence shows that the stock price changes may 
not be completely independent due to investors’ buy-and-hold strategy. For fundamental 
value analysis, if the market is efficient, stock prices will be traded at their intrinsic value at 
any point in time, hence, additional analysis is worthless unless the analysts have private 
information.  
                                                          
2Fama is often referred to as “the father of modern finance”. For details, kindly refer to a conversation between Eugene F. 
Fama and Joel M. Stern, June 23, 2016 “A look back at Modern Finance: Accomplishments and Limitations”. They discuss 
much about M&M theorems and corporate capital structure, behavioural finance, asset pricing and cost of capital, etc. 
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The evolution of neoclassical finance continues with Black and Scholes’ (1973) introduction 
of the First Option Pricing Model. Subsequently Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed the 
Agency Cost Theory, which postulates that in corporate finance, agency problems arise when 
there is a conflict of interest between a company's management and its stockholders. The 
Agency Cost Theory states that a firm’s optimal capital structure can be obtained when the 
agency cost that arises from the conflict between the stakeholders is minimised. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) proposed the Pecking Order Theory by outlining firms’ capital structure 
hierarchies. Firms prioritise their sources of capital based on the financing cost; internal funds 
are ranked at the highest preference, and when depleted, debt will be issued, with equity 
financing as the last resort. The Pecking Order Theory states the issue of asymmetric 
information: managers know their firm’s prospects, risks and firm true value better than 
outside investors.  
 
Another important capital structure theory suggested by Myers (1984) is the Trade-off 
Theory. This theory emphasises a balance between the choices of debt financing that provide 
tax saving benefits and reduce the agency costs but at the same time increase the use of debt 
and also expose the firm to a higher distress cost and bankruptcy risk.  Both the Pecking 
Order and the Trade-off Theory diverge from the Modigliani Miller Model (MM) perspective, 
which considers that a firm’s value is independent of the capital structure. The Pecking Order 
and the Trade-off theories suggest that capital structure does matter as the cost of capital 
varies among different types of financing resources. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) introduced the Market Timing Theory of capital structure.  This 
theory states that the choice of financing is based on the market conditions. Firms time their 
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equity issuing - issue new shares when the share price is perceived as overvalued and 
repurchase their own shares when they perceive their firm’s shares are undervalued. Hence, 
Baker and Wurgler concluded that stock prices movement will affect a firm’s capital structure 
decisions. Equity Market Timing either references rational managers and investors or 
irrational managers and investors and the perception of mispricing. Rational managers are 
expected to issue equity right after the release of positive information or news. This is aimed 
at reducing asymmetric information between firm management and shareholders, and thus 
increasing the stock prices. This rational perspective suggests that firms can create their own 
timing opportunities by issuing new equity to fulfil their financing needs. On the other hand, 
irrational managers issue equity when they are confident that the cost is irrationally low and 
perform share repurchases when they believe that the cost is irrationally high (Baker & 
Wurgler, 2002; Luigi & Sorin, 2009). 
 
In sum, the neoclassical finance paradigm is built on Markowitz’s (1952) Portfolio Selection 
Theory, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) arbitrage principle,  Sharpe's (1964) and 
Lintner’s (1965) Capital Asset Pricing, Fama’s (1965) Efficient Market Hypothesis, Black 
and Scholes’ (1963) Option Pricing Theory, Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) Agency Cost 
Theory and  Myers and Majluf’s (1984), Myers’s (1984) and Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) 
asset financing (Capital Structure) theories. According to Thaler (1990), these theories and 
principles make a most important assumption: that of rational behaviour. Neoclassical 
finance emphasises that an asset’s market value should reflect its fundamental (intrinsic) 
value, financial markets are efficient and interact quickly with new information, and stock 
prices follow a random walk pattern, hence no investor can consistently earn an abnormal 
return unless they take extra risk. However, following the global financial crisis, neoclassical 
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finance has been questioned and criticised, especially as regards the efficient market 
hypothesis and capital asset pricing model (Ramiah, Xu and Moosa, 2015).  
 
1.1.2 The Behavioural Finance Paradigm  
Ramiah, Xu and Moosa (2015) define behavioural finance as explaining market anomalies 
by using psychological perspectives and give a range of examples: representativeness bias, 
self-serving bias, overconfidence, status quo, herding behaviour, survivorship bias, money 
illusion, illusion of control, loss aversion, conservatism and narcissism. Hirshleifer (2015) 
states that behavioural finance is the application of psychology to finance (with emphasis on 
individual cognitive biases). De Bondt, Muradoglu, Shefrin and Staikouras (2015) suggest 
that behavioural finance comprises three main elements: sentiment, behavioural preferences 
and arbitrage limitations.  
 
Behavioural finance models allow for market participants’ cognitive errors in their valuation. 
Behavioural finance fundamental models assumptions are similar to those of neoclassical 
finance; the differences are that behavioural finance believes the market is not necessarily in 
equilibrium due to information imperfection; investors have different investment 
opportunities; and arbitrage opportunities do exist depending on market sentiment. Investors’ 
investment decisions do not solely depend on mean-variance configurations but other factors 
such as taste, preference and psychological elements do influence the decisions. 
 
One of the earliest behavioural finance research studies was that of Seldon (1912), 
concerning the psychology of the stock market. Seldon suggested that stock market 
movements depend to a considerable degree on the mental attitudes of market participants 
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and stated that: “Most experienced professional traders in the stock market will readily admit 
that in the minor fluctuations, amounting to perhaps five or ten dollars a share in the active 
speculative issues, are chiefly psychological. They result from varying attitudes of the public 
mind, or more strictly, from the mental attitudes of this person who are interests in the market 
at the time.” This idea was voiced long before behavioural finance emerged as a school of 
thought.  
 
The most important and significant contributions to the field of behavioural finance were 
those of Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974) who developed judgmental heuristics. Three 
heuristics were introduced namely, representativeness, availability and anchoring. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1979) advocated Prospect Theory3  which illustrates the decision making 
process by evaluating the probabilistic alternatives and the associated risk, and suggests that 
when people make decisions they are more likely to evaluate the potential value of losses or 
gains than the final outcome. This theory has been widely applied in economics, management, 
finance and sociology studies. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) introduced framing. They 
illustrated the perception that psychological principles govern decision problems and 
valuation outcomes; the same problem is framed in different ways, the prediction of 
preference may vary. 
 
Thaler (1980) proposed Tversky and Kahneman’s Prospect Theory as an alternative 
descriptive theory. Thaler argued that in certain situations consumers act in a manner that is 
inconsistent with economic theory and he proposed Prospect Theory as the basis for an 
                                                          
3 Prospect Theory is also known as Behavioural Economic Theory 
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alternative descriptive theory. Thaler suggestsed that different descriptive models should be 
developed for the novice, the intermediate player and the expert. For instance, consumer 
behaviour should be tested according to various classes otherwise exclusive dependence on 
the normative theory may lead to systematic, predictable errors in describing or forecasting 
consumer choices. He further pointed out that the orthodox economic model of consumer 
behaviour works as a robot-like expert’s model and performs poorly in predicting consumer 
behaviour. 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) originated behavioural finance with an investigation of stock 
market movements, discovering that market participants tend to systematically overreact to 
unexpected or dramatic news. This phenomenon resulted in the market been identified as 
having a weak form of efficiency. De Bondt and Thaler also introduced ‘mental accounting’, 
which outlines a set of cognitive operations that individuals or households use for the purpose 
of organising, evaluating and keeping track of their financial activities. Thaler (1999) made 
a comprehensive summary of the literature on mental accounting, which he concluded plays 
an important role in choice decisions. Barberis and Huang (2001) incorporated two forms of 
mental accounting, loss aversion and narrow framing - into two asset-pricing frameworks 
(individual stock accounting and portfolio accounting). They found that the individual stock 
accounting asset pricing framework was more successful with predictable power in the time 
series. 
 
Shiller (1981) illustrated how dramatically the stock market and the dividend appear to 
violate inequalities. Shiller argued that stock price volatility is far too high for it to be 
incorporated with new information about future real dividends. Hence he commented that 
10 
 
the neoclassical finance models of efficient market and random walk theory bear little 
resemblance to reality and haveless proven ability to capture stock prices movement. Shiller 
considers that markets are irrational and depend on fads. Poterba and Summers (1988), in a 
study on stock prices’ transitory components, found positive serial autocorrelation in returns 
over short periods and negative autocorrelation over longer horizons, and concluded that 
random-walk price behaviour cannot be rejected at conventional statistical levels. They 
suggested that their findings of significant transitory stock price components have important 
implications for financial practice; if stock price movements contain large transitory 
components, then the stock market may be less risky for long horizon investors. They further 
suggested that ‘noise trading’ by investors, whose demand for shares is determined by factors 
other than their expected return (e.g., risk factors, fundamental values, level of participation 
in investment clubs) may provide a plausible explanation for transitory components in stock 
prices. 
 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) mentioned that the nature of economic anomalies 
violates the standard theory and that there is no obvious way to amend the theory to fit the 
facts. They illustrated several experiments and validated that loss aversion and the 
endowment effect persistently affect the market. Hence they suggested that the endowment 
effect, status quo bias and the aversion to losses4 are both robust and important in explaining 
certain reference levels for particular analyses as they are fundamental characteristics of 
                                                          
4 Brief definitions of endowment effect, status quo bias, and loss aversion:  
Endowment effect: people often demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire 
it (Thaler, 1980).  
Status quo bias: a preference for the current state that biases the economist against both buying and selling (Samuelson 
& Zeckhauser, 1988).  
Loss aversion: the disutility of giving up an object is greater that the utility associated with acquiring it (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984) 
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preferences. In addition, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) explain loss aversion by presenting 
a reference-dependent model of riskless choice, and conclude that losses and disadvantages 
have a greater impact on preferences than gains and advantages. Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) suggested an advance in Prospect Theory, which they called Cumulative Prospect 
Theory. The new methodology uses cumulative rather than separable decision weights and 
allows different weighting functions for gains and for losses. They found a pattern in risk 
attitudes: namely risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses of high probability; risk 
seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses of low probability. 
 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) studied herd behaviour and investment, and examined the 
factors that can lead to herd behaviour in investment. They mentioned that managers who are 
concerned about their reputations may simply mimic other managers’ investment decisions 
and ignore substantive private information. They further discussed the effect of herd 
behaviour in corporate investment, the stock market and decision making within the firm. 
Money managers’ or investors’ herd behaviours may result in excessive stock market 
volatility by mimicking others’ behaviour (buying when others are buying and selling when 
others are selling). The same goes for firms’ decision making (investment project, capital 
budgeting): managers may exhibit herd behaviour by following the decisions made by other 
managers before them. Banerjee (1992) developed a simple model of herd behaviour and 
defines herd behaviour as ‘everyone doing what everyone else is doing, even when their 
private information suggests doing something quite different’.  
 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) questioned why there are investors who are willing to hold bonds 
which yield less than 1 percent, compared with the annual real stock return of about 7 percent 
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since 1926. They propose equity premium puzzle based on the empirical fact that stocks have 
outperformed bonds by a large margin, yet certain investors still choose to hold fixed income 
securities. To explain this phenomenon they suggest two behavioural concepts from the 
psychology of decision-making: loss aversion and mental accounting5. They concluded that 
the equity premium is created by an amalgamation of loss aversion behaviour and investors’ 
frequent portfolio evaluations strategy.  
 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) argued that the theory of observational learning, 
and mainly the informational cascades, can help explain many patterns of convergent 
behaviour such as stock market crashes, sharp shifts in investment and unemployment. They 
mentioned that humans learn by observing the actions of others in nature; within minutes of 
birth, human infants observe adults’ facial expression and as we grow older, we continue to 
mimic others’ decision making (herding). They concluded that observational learning though 
others’ past decisions can help shed light on puzzling phenomena in human behaviour, and 
this theory does contribute to economics and business strategy. 
 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) proposed a parsimonious model of investor sentiment 
that displays two families of pervasive regularities: under-reaction and over-reaction. 
Investors tend to under-react to stock prices on news such as earnings announcements, and 
over-react to stock prices on hearing a series of good or bad news items. Evidence shows that 
over 1-12 month horizons stock prices under-react to news, resulting in positive 
autocorrelation over these horizons as news is incorporated slowly into prices. Hence, current 
                                                          
5Mental accounting refers to the implicit methods individuals use to code and evaluate financial outcomes, such as 
transactions and investments (Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Thaler 1985). 
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good news is said to have power in predicting positive returns in the future.  Over longer 
horizons (3-5 years) evidence shows that stock prices over-react to consistent patterns and 
news in the same direction. Investors tend to overprice the securities that achieve a long 
record of good news. These views challenge the Efficient Markets Theory, as investors can 
take advantage of a market’s under-reaction and over-reaction to earn greater returns without 
bearing extra risk.  
 
Odean (1998) examined the investors’ disposition effect by analysing 10,000 accounts of 
investors’ trading records. Odean found that the investors showed a strong preference for 
holding losing investments too long while selling winning investments too soon. Odean 
(1999) mentioned that overall trading volume in equity markets was excessive, which might 
be caused by investors’ overconfident behaviour.  Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 
(1998) studied investor psychology and security market under- and over-reactions. They 
proposed a theory of securities market under- and over-reactions based on two well-known 
psychological biases: investor overconfidence and biased self-attribution. They concluded 
that overconfidence can help explain several empirical puzzles of security return 
predictability and investor behaviour. Motivated by the high rate of business failure, Camerer 
and Lovallo (1999) explored the plausible and predictable influence of optimistic biases 
towards an economic behaviour (entry into competitive games or markets). They found that 
business failure was a result of managers acting on optimism about the relative skills they 
exhibited in surveys and most survey participants think their own profit will be positive, 
while total profit earned by others will be negative. Their findings are consistent with the 
prediction that optimism and overconfidence leads to excessive business entry. 
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Barberis and Thaler (2003) mentioned that behavioural models usually assume specific forms 
of irrationality and economists perform extensive research on people’s preferences of beliefs 
and systematic biases (overconfidence, optimism and wishful thinking, representativeness, 
conservatism, belief perseverance, anchoring, and availability biases) 6 . According to 
Barberis and Thaler, behavioural finance has had some success in explaining investors’ 
behaviour; such as portfolio allocation. On the other hand, for corporate finance, although a 
firm may have its own mechanisms (e.g., stock options, debt saddling) to mitigate agency 
problems and keep manager focus on maximising firm value, these mechanism may not have 
much effect on irrational managers. Irrational managers think that they always maximise the 
firm’s value, since they perceive themselves as doing the best for the firm, hence stock 
options or debt mechanisms would not alter their behaviour.   
 
Managerial irrationality has been studied by Roll (1986). Roll introduced the ‘hubris 
hypothesis’. He examined firms’ takeover activities and found that managerial 
overconfidence, that is, when managers are overconfident in evaluating the takeover 
synergies, may cause no gains for takeovers. In the same way that overconfidence in investors 
may lead to excessive trading, overconfidence in managers may also lead to excessive 
takeover activities. Heaton (2002) studied managerial optimism and pointed out that 
optimistic managers tend to overestimate the firm’s future outcomes. Heaton posits that 
managerial optimism can explain the pecking order hierarchy for capital structure. Since 
managers are optimistic about the capital market, they believe that their firm is undervalued, 
                                                          
6 For more details of each of the biases defined, see Barberis & Thaler (2003) ‘A survey of Behavioural Finance’. 
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therefore they are reluctant to issue new equity unless their internal funds are depleted, or 
debt capacity is exhausted.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) tested Heaton’s model and found that firms managed by 
optimistic CEOs display greater investment sensitivity to cash flow compared with firms 
managed by non-optimistic CEOs. Subsequently, research on behavioural corporate finance 
has emphasised the effects of managerial traits on corporate actions. The importance of 
managerial traits, career experiences, education and their effect on corporate decision-
making have been discussed in detail by Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) who found that 
risk-tolerant CEOs make more acquisitions and optimistic CEOs use more debt.  Nicolosi 
and Yore (2015) examined the relationship between CEOs’ personal life restructuring 
(marriages and divorces) and their corporate decision-making. They found mergers, joint 
ventures, capital expenditure, and overall firm riskiness increase significantly with CEOs’ 
personal life restructuring. 
 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) found that CEOs’ personality traits, preferences and behaviours 
may translate to their firms’ strategies and corporate structure decisions. Psychological 
research has recognised that men are more prone than women to show overconfidence, 
whereas theoretical models predict that overconfident investors trade excessively. Barber and 
Odean (2001) concluded that men are more likely to be overconfident as they find that men 
trade 45 percent more than women and hence lessen their returns more than women do. 
Huang and Kisgen (2012) state that male directors are more likely to be overconfident than 
female directors in corporate decision-making and make relatively more aggressive decisions. 
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Hackbarth (2008) also finds that optimistic managers tend to employ a higher level of debt, 
especially when their firm experiences continuous earnings growth for consecutive years. 
 
De Bondt, Muradoglu, Shefrin and Staikouras (2015) mentioned that over the last few 
decades, the understanding of finance has achieved a great deal, yet countless questions still 
wait to be answered. In particular, the puzzles of the financial decision making process in 
households, markets and firms await solution using behavioural research results. The 
combination of neoclassical and behavioural finance approaches will replace unrealistic, 
heroic assumptions about individual behaviour. Policy makers who desire to make wise 
decisions must take the true nature of human behaviour into account in addition to keeping 
updated on the broader perspectives of economics and financial factors. As DeBondt and 
Thaler (1995) mention, a good psychological finance theory needs to be grounded on 
psychological evidence as to how humans actually behave. Hence we believe that such a 
theory is important in explaining firms’ behaviours, and in particular the corporate decision 
making of chief executive officers (CEOs). Hence, our study aims to investigate CEO 
personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences and networking) and shed light on how these 
attributes affect CEOs’ optimistic behaviour and corporate decisions. 
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1.2 Thesis Overview  
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis investigates the influence of Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs’) 
personal attributes on their optimistic behaviour. Most of the existing literature estimates 
managerial optimism based on actions (manager’s personal action and corporate actions). So 
far, there is little research on the role CEO personal attributes play in corporate decisions and, 
in particular, on the question of how CEOs’ personal traits, skills and experiences, and 
networking may potentially cultivate their optimistic behaviour.  The importance of 
managerial traits, career experiences, education and their effect on corporate decision making 
have been discussed in detail by Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013). Graham, Harvey and Puri 
find that risk-tolerant CEOs make more acquisitions and optimistic CEOs use more debt.  
Nicolosi and Yore (2015) examine the relationship between CEOs’ personal life restructuring 
(marriages and divorces) and their corporate decision-making. They found mergers, joint 
ventures, capital expenditure, and overall firm riskiness increase significantly with CEOs’ 
personal life restructuring. 
 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) find that CEOs’ personality traits, preferences and behaviours 
may translate in their firm’s strategies and corporate structure decisions. Huang and Kisgen 
(2012) document that male directors are more likely to be overconfident than female directors 
in corporate decision-making and make relatively more aggressive decisions. Hackbarth 
(2008) also finds that optimistic managers tend to employ a higher level of debt, especially 
when their firm experiences continuous earnings growth for consecutive years. 
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The CEO is the principal corporate decision maker. An understanding of the influence of 
CEO personal attributes in corporate decisions may, therefore, help in a better understanding 
of several important issues relating to the capital structure decision, payout policy, risk 
management policies, and investing & financing policies. Hence in chapter 2, we examine 
the effects of CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking ties) on 
their optimistic behaviour (as measured by mergers and acquisitions, stock options exercise 
behaviour and insider transactions). 
 
Our study examines CEOs’ traits from the aspects of their age, gender, nationality, and 
marital status. For skills and experiences variables, we examine the CEOs’ educational 
background (MBA, PhD), founder status, financial literacy, duality status, tenure as CEO, 
and emoluments. With regards to CEO networking ties, we examine their internal networking 
(internal promotion, and tenure with the firm) and external networking (external directorships, 
and social networking prestige). Our study shows that CEOs’ personal attributes do 
positively influence their optimistic behaviour.  
 
There is a growing field of research on the impact of managerial optimism (MO) on corporate 
decisions. For example some studies have examined the relationship between MO and 
investment cash flow sensitivity and overinvestment (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 
2005a; Huang, Jiang, Liu & Zhang, 2011), MO and corporate Investment (Malmendier & 
Tate, 2005b; Campbell et al., 2011), MO and corporate governance (Mohamed, Baccar, 
Fairchild & Bouri, 2012) and MO and corporate finance policies such as debt, mergers and 
acquisitions (Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013).  Yet, the potential impact of managerial 
optimism (MO) on corporate leasing decisions, and on corporate hedging decisions, has not 
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been fully explored. This may be due to data availability, as the data for leasing and hedging 
are hard to obtain, and need to be manually collected from firms’ annual reports. 
 
Therefore, to fill in this void in the literature, the second empirical chapter of this thesis 
investigates the relationship between CEO personal attributes and corporate leasing decisions. 
According to the ‘World Leasing Yearbook’ published by the White Clarke Group (2015), 
the UK is among the largest leasing market in the world. However, a limited number of 
studies examine the relationship between CEO personal attributes and firm leasing decision. 
Existing research suggests that the use of leasing can benefit the firm by mitigating the 
agency cost of debt and lowering the overall firm risk (e.g., Robicheaux, Fu & Ligon, 2008). 
In this study we examine the influence of CEO personal traits, skills and experiences, and 
networking ties on their corporate lease employment (including total lease, operating lease, 
and finance lease). Additionally, we also examine the impact of CEO optimism7on CEOs’ 
corporate leasing decisions. Consistent with the optimistic argument of Heaton (2002), we 
find that optimistic CEOs tend to use more lease financing. This finding may be due to CEOs’ 
optimistic beliefs that the capital market often undervalues their firms making them, therefore, 
reluctant to raise external funds. Lease financing is a good choice for optimistic CEOs as 
lease is a type of debt, optimistic CEOs are highly confident of their firm’s future earnings, 
hence with lease financing, they can avoid sharing potential profits with new equity holders. 
 
The third empirical chapter in the thesis examines the relationship between CEO personal 
attributes and firms’ corporate hedging decisions. Firm hedging strategy is one of the most 
                                                          
7 We constructed a CEO Optimism Index (CEOOI), which comprises the components of CEO personal traits, skills and 
experiences, and networking. For details, refer to Section 3.3.2 
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important corporate policies, especially for firms that are highly exposed to market risk. 
Many firms use a number of derivative instruments to hedge against credit risk, commodity 
price risk, foreign exchange risk, and interest rate risk. Our study finds that Optimistic CEOs 
tend to be more likely to employ derivative instruments as their hedging tool to hedge against 
potential firm risks. Our result is consistent with that of Alsubaie (2009) and Adam, Fernando 
and Golubeva (2015), who also find that optimistic CEOs exhibit positive relationships with 
the use of financial derivatives. Additionally, we find that the influence of CEO optimism on 
corporate hedging decision remains significant over different market conditions (calm or 
crisis period). 
 
This thesis comprises three empirical studies described in chapters 2, 3 and 4 (Figure 1.1). 
The following sections provide more detailed discussion of the research objectives, relevant 
literature, data and methodology used, and results and findings for each of the studies. The 
last chapter of this thesis summarises the main findings of the three empirical studies.  
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Figure 1.1 
Overview of the Thesis   
 
This thesis consists of three empirical chapters. We start our study by examining the relationship between CEO personal attributes (traits, skills 
and experiences, and networking) and managerial optimistic (MO) behaviour. Subsequently, we examine the CEOs’ personal attributes and 
their optimistic behaviour toward two corporate policies: corporate leasing decision (CLD) and corporate hedging decisions (CHD). This study 
also includes controls for firm and macroeconomic effects.  Our study examines the UK FTSE 100 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange 
for the period 2000-2013. 
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Chapter 2: CEO Attributes and Managerial Optimism 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the 1990s, behavioural finance was introduced as a moderate approach to complement 
traditional theory and especially as a way of clarifying the puzzle of financial markets. 
For instance, Vasile, Sebastian and Radu (2012) mention that behavioural corporate 
finance emphasises managers’ and investors’ behaviour in corporate decision-making. 
Behavioural finance has drawn the attention of researchers, as many of them (such as 
Heaton, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; and Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013) believe 
that behavioural finance can explain the optimism or overconfident behaviour of investors 
and managers. 
 
Recent research on behavioural corporate finance has shown that, theoretically and 
empirically, CEO optimism and overconfidence do explain corporate decisions; capital 
structure, investment, dividend, cash flow, and mergers and acquisitions. However the 
causes of CEO optimism have been less explored. Heaton (2002) suggests that optimistic 
managers believe that capital markets undervalue their firm, and hence may choose to 
forgo positive net present value projects that require external funding; on the other hand, 
optimistic managers overvalued their own investment projects, and hence invested in 
negative net present value projects, even though they are working in the shareholders’ 
best interests. The issues of underinvestment and overinvestment are closely related to 
manager optimism beliefs. Overconfident managers and investors tend to overestimate 
their ability and are confident that they are better than average (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 
2005b; Doukas & Petmezas, 2007; Hackbarth, 2008). In other words, overconfident 
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managers and investors are more likely to engage in high-risk projects or investments, as 
they tend to underestimate risk.  
 
The term overconfidence is used to address the cognitive bias in the finance literature 
(e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Ben-David, Graham & Harvey, 2007; 
Doukas and Petmezas, 2007); while the term ‘optimism’ has been used in studies by 
Heaton (2002), Wong and Zhang (2009), Campbell et al. (2011), Ma (2014) and Otto 
(2014). However, the proxy that was used in the managerial optimism studies somehow 
followed the measurement of overconfidence proxy proposed in Malmendier and Tate’s 
studies8. For instance, Campbell et al. (2011) and Ma (2014) use equity-based measures 
(CEO shareholdings/net stock purchase and option exercise behaviour) to proxy CEO 
optimism - two proxies - proposed by Malmendier and Tate to measure managerial 
overconfidence. Wong and Zhang (2009) use a modified version of overconfidence 
measure in Malmendier and Tate’s (2005a) insider-trading behaviour (buy more company 
shares than they sell) to capture CEO optimism. 
 
This study follows the rationale proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, and 
2008), and Doukas and Petmezas (2007) in measuring managerial overconfidence; 
overconfidence is based on CEOs’ behaviour of ‘better than average effect’, ‘illusions of 
control’ and ‘high degree of commitment to good outcomes’. Nevertheless, in this study, 
we will address CEOs’ behaviour as optimism instead of overconfidence as we consider 
the term “optimism” as more appropriate in describing CEO behaviour; overconfidence 
on the other hand tends to have a “negative” connotation (destroying firm value) and 
implies excessive optimism. In our study, we examine CEO personal attributes and beliefs 
                                                          
8Malmendier & Tate (2005b) quote Heaton’s (2002) idea of optimism as overconfidence in their paper “Does 
overconfidence affect corporate investment? CEO Overconfidence measures revisited.” 
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(Managerial Optimism); it is inappropriate to categorise these as overconfidence 
(“excessive” optimistic) based on their successful mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
activity (our main MO proxy in this study).  Successful M&As are more suitable to be 
used as proxy for CEO optimism; CEOs who are optimistic about the firm’s future 
prospects will tend to perform more takeovers, furthermore, successful M&A will 
enhance  their confidence level, resulting in higher levels of optimism. This idea is in line 
with the suggestion of Graham, Harvey and Puri’s (2013) in saying that CEOs who initiate 
more mergers and acquisitions are more risk tolerant and CEOs’ optimism is related to 
their corporate decisions. Our choice to use the term ‘optimism’ instead of 
‘overconfidence’ is also inspired by Campbell et al. (2011) and Otto (2014), who also 
address the overconfidence measurements9 by Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008) 
as optimism.  
 
In addition, Cambridge Business English Dictionary defines ‘optimistic’ as hopefulness, 
confidence, buoyancy, positiveness and the quality of being full of hope and emphasizing 
the good parts of a situation, or a belief that something good will happen.  Our main proxy 
of Managerial Optimism, which is successful mergers and acquisitions, will fit this 
definition. 
 
A large and growing body of literature has investigated the issue of managerial 
overconfidence and corporate decisions/outcomes. Overconfident managers are trapped 
in a psychological bias, and they tend to overvalue investment projects, use extensive 
debt financing, engage in more mergers and acquisitions, and believe that the market 
undervalues their firm (e.g., Ben-David, Graham & Harvey, 2007; Vasile, Sebastian & 
                                                          
9 Option exercise decision & net stock purchase 
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Radu, 2012). Several opinions exist as to the motives behind managerial overconfidence, 
the most commonly discussed being empire building behaviour, illusions of control, 
executive hubris hypothesis and risk taking behaviour (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2005b; 
Doukas & Petmezas, 2007). 
 
Despite the view that overconfident managers tend to destroy firm value (e.g., 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005a, 2005b; Fracassi & Tate, 2012), research by Hirshleifer, Low 
and Teoh (2012) argues that overconfident CEOs can benefit shareholders by investing 
in riskier projects with higher returns, investing more in innovation, obtaining more 
patents and thus encouraging a firm’s growth opportunities. Additionally, Bolton, 
Brunnermeier and Veldkamp (2008) use a leadership model in organization and show that 
a resolute (overconfident) leader who has precise information can benefit the firm by 
having a stronger commitment to achieve better coordination compared with a rational 
CEO. 
 
What drives CEOs to exhibit optimistic behaviour in corporations? Existing literature 
mainly debates whether an overconfident CEO’s behaviour destroys or enhances the firm 
value; however, little research provides insight into the causes of CEO 
overconfidence/optimism as mentioned by Petit and Bollaert (2012). Although previous 
studies confirmed the importance of leader’s attributes in managing a firm (e.g., Yukl, 
1982, 1989; Zaccaro, 2007), the relationship of a CEO’s personal traits, skills and 
experiences, and networking with his or her optimistic behaviour are relatively 
unexplored.  Therefore, a research question remains unsolved in the literature: how and 
to what extent do personal attributes vary among optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs? In 
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particular, this study investigates 248 CEOs of UK FTSE 100 firms between the years 
2000-2013 and aims to address the following questions: 
 
1. Do CEOs’ personal traits (e.g., age, gender, nationality, and marital status) have 
an impact on their optimistic behaviour?  
2. Do CEOs’ skills and experiences (e.g., educational attainments, founder status, 
financial literacy, duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments) influence their 
optimistic behaviour?  and 
3. Do CEOs’ networking ties (e.g., tenure with the firm, internal promotion, external 
directorship, and social networking prestige) affect their optimistic behaviour? 
 
2.1.1 Research Objectives 
 
A better understanding of the issue of managerial optimism (MO) in a corporation can 
enhance the firm’s value and hence benefit shareholders’ welfare (Hirshleifer, Low & 
Teoh, 2012). As mentioned by Puri and Robinson (2007), understanding the causes of 
moderate optimism and extreme optimism (overconfidence) may help to solve many 
financial economic puzzles.  Graham, Harvey and Puri (2012) mention that CEO traits 
are important in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities, and CEOs claim to be the 
dominant decision makers in firms’ M&A.  Unlike many studies which examine the 
corporate decisions made by overconfident/optimistic managers, this study investigates 
the potential factors that may associate with CEOs’ optimistic behaviour.  Thus, this study 
aims to provide an additional insight into the underlying factors of a CEO’s optimistic 
behaviour from the perspective of CEOs' personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences, 
and networking), firm and macroeconomic effects.  
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2.1.2 Contribution 
 
Few studies to date have specifically investigated CEO personal traits, skills and 
experiences and how these personal attributes may contribute to their optimistic 
behaviour. To our knowledge, there is only one relevant paper by Ben-David, Graham 
and Harvey (2007) which studies the determinants of managerial overconfidence of US 
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs), however these authors only study a limited number of 
personal attribute variables and the rest of the paper covers how overconfidence impacts 
investment behaviour.  Furthermore, the existing literature only looks at a few 
demographic factors or traits and generally these factors are used as control variables (e.g., 
Malmendier & Tate, 2005a; Güner, Malmendier, & Tate, 2008; Mohamed, Baccar, 
Fairchild & Bouri, 2012; Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013). This study fills the research gap 
by examining wider aspects of CEO personal attributes (CEO personal traits, CEO skills 
and experiences, and CEO networking) of 248 CEOs who worked in UK FTSE 100 firms 
from 2000 to 2013. This will be the first attempt to examine, for UK firms, CEO personal 
attributes which may contribute to their optimistic behaviour.  
 
Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) obtained data by asking CFOs to predict one and 
ten-year stock returns and used the narrowness of the confidence interval as a proxy for 
the CFOs’ overconfident behaviour. We take a contrasting approach and choose to 
examine the UK CEOs as they are the main decision-makers in the firm. In addition, the 
proxy of optimism that we used in the study is observed from their managerial optimism 
behaviour according to mergers and acquisitions frequency, CEO stock option exercise 
behaviour and their personal buying and selling of the firm’s stock.  
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The importance of the driver of MO has been mentioned in Ben-David, Graham and 
Harvey’s (2007) study, and Petit and Bollaert (2012) argue that existing management and 
finance literature does not discuss the causes of CEO hubris (which can be proxy for 
overconfidence or narcissism) and how it develops through time. Perhaps the lack of 
exploration of this issue is due to the data is hard to obtain. Hence, this study attempts to 
fill in this gap by using primary unique datasets, which are manually collected. The CEOs’ 
traits, skills and experiences, and networking are obtained from the data and information 
disclosed publicly from various sources10.  
 
Additionally, this study constructs new composite indexes, namely: CEO personal Trait 
Index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index (NI). These three 
indexes (TI, SEI and NI) may be used as an additional variable in explaining managerial 
behaviour. These indexes may also be used to study other issues such as corporate 
governance, capital structure, financing and investment decisions, mergers and 
acquisitions, and firm performance studies.  In addition, SEI and NI may be used as a 
competency comparison among skills and experiences, and networking ties of CEOs. A 
firm’s management and the board may assess the competency of their existing CEO, or 
of a new CEO during recruitment, to compare potential candidates’ skills and experiences, 
and their networking. 
 
Our study adopts a framework that explains managerial optimistic behaviour by 
examining CEO personal attributes, firm specific factors and macroeconomic factors. 
Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri (2012) mention that there is no well-established 
theoretical framework that explicitly expresses the link between CEO personal attributes 
                                                          
10 For main sources of data used in this study, refer to Table 2.2 in section 2.3 Data and Methodology. 
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and their optimistic behaviour. Motivated by the growing literature in management and 
leadership11, four leadership approaches are associated to support the importance of the 
CEO attributes chosen in this study. The integration of the leadership approaches (traits 
approach, power-influence approach, social exchange theory and social networking 
approach) with optimistic behaviour are used to examine the CEO personal attributes 
(CEO Traits, Skills and Experiences, and Networking). This is the first attempt to 
examine CEOs’ personal attributes, which derive from management perspectives, and 
their effect on managerial optimistic behaviour.  
 
 
2.1.3 Significance and Implications 
 
Our study provides an insight into managerial optimism from CEOs’ personal 
perspectives, firm characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. Goel and  Thakor (2000, 
2008), Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2011) and Banerjee, Dai, Humphery-Jenner and 
Nanda (2014) all consider that  top executives are expected to be overconfident and these 
overconfident executives are more likely to be promoted to CEO as the board believes 
this characteristic is important for leading the firm to grow in a competitive market. 
Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) conclude that high growth firms tend to appoint young, 
confident, and risk tolerant managers. The existing literature suggests that overconfident/ 
optimistic managers are more likely to destroy rather than enhance firm value.  
Nevertheless, we suggest that certain industries may need optimistic CEOs to help firms 
gain more investment opportunities. As Banerjee, Dai, Humphery-Jenner and Nanda 
(2014) suggest, large and low-risk firms tend to appoint overconfident CEOs and these 
                                                          
11Existing leadership studies concentrate on the relationship between leadership, organizational culture and leadership 
effectiveness (DeChurch, Hiller, Murase, Doty & Salas, 2010; Faris & Parry, 2011). For effective leadership research, 
the studies are done by obtaining the response from followers to understand leader integrity (Martin et al., 2013; Trichas 
& Schyns, 2012). 
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appointments are associated with improved performance. Thus, explicitly addressing the 
relationship between CEOs’ personal attributes and their optimistic behaviour can help 
the board to select their CEO based on their firm’s nature of business. 
 
Detecting the optimistic CEO is crucial in maintaining a firm’s sustainability and 
continuous success, as the CEO is the firm’s decision-maker. If optimistic CEO 
candidates can be identified, the board can develop an effective corporate governance 
mechanism. As Malmendier and Tate (2005a) suggest, the board can constrain the use of 
an internal fund to control the over-investment behaviour of the overconfident/optimistic 
CEO. Furthermore, Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2011) and Otto (2014) suggest dynamic 
compensation contracts can be designed for optimistic CEOs to sufficiently adjust and 
realign the incentives with the changes of managers’ attributes. Our study provides an 
additional insight into CEO personal attributes and relationships with the CEO’s 
optimistic behaviour. Hence, this study potentially offers to a firm’s management a 
method to assess their CEO based on his/her personal traits, skill and experiences, and 
networking to monitor his/her managerial behaviour by refining their board strategy 
accordingly. 
 
Our study provides useful information to investors, market participants and shareholders 
in forming their investment strategy. For instance, as previous research suggests, 
overconfident CEOs tend to take on more risky projects (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2005a, 
2005b; Doukas & Petmezas, 2007; Fracassi & Tate, 2012) and higher risk projects will 
increase the variability of profits. Additionally, Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) mention 
that optimistic CEOs are less risk averse. Therefore, if investors have a high-risk tolerance 
level, they may choose the firm that is managed by an optimistic CEO to opt for higher 
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expected returns. Alternatively, if they are risk averse they may choose to invest in the 
firm that suits their personal risk preference. In addition, we use information about CEOs’ 
of the UK FTSE 100 firms and show the influence of CEOs’ personal attributes towards 
their managerial behaviour. Knowing the characteristics of the optimistic CEO can help 
investors to plan properly for their investment, portfolio allocation and risk management. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
In the corporate business world, a manager has always been expected to manage the firm 
by maximizing shareholders’ wealth, thus acting in the stockholders’ best interests (Bettis, 
1983). Nevertheless, managing a firm is a challenging task and it is hard for a manager to 
meet every stakeholder’s preference or demand. Apart from the internal management, as 
a leader, he/she also needs to be involved in social activities, as they represent the firm 
and carry the firm’s image to current and potential investors. As the top person in the 
corporate hierarchy, they have the responsibility for all areas of corporate performance 
and their incentives are highly dependent on the firm’s performance (Aggarwal & 
Samwick, 2003). 
 
For day-to-day business, essentially a manager will need to make corporate decisions, 
which include the firm’s policies, investment and financing decisions, and merger and 
acquisition activities. To manage a firm, managers need power: the more power they have, 
the easier it is for them to finalize the decisions. Thus, it is a norm for managers to acquire 
personal power in a firm in order to achieve their strategic plan for the firm; as Adam, 
Almeida and Ferreira (2005) mention, powerful CEOs are more likely to influence 
corporate decisions in an organisation. However, the issue of agency problems arises 
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when the manager has too much power, in which situation the decisions made might not 
be in the stakeholders’ best interests, and the manager will be classified as overconfident 
or too optimistic if their actions seem to be too risky or intended to build their own empire 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005b). 
 
The issue of managerial overconfidence and managerial optimism has been passionately 
debated among researchers and academics. A growing literature documents the issue of 
managerial overconfidence/optimism. However, the reasons why a CEO behaves 
optimistically, and the characteristics of optimistic CEOs still remain an open question.  
 
2.2.1 Managerial Optimism versus Overconfidence 
 
In this section, we summarise the terminology that is commonly used in the literature to 
address managerial behaviour: Optimism, Overconfidence, Hubris, Narcissism, 
Miscalibration and Self-Attribution. Behavioural approaches based on human psychology 
or cognitive research gain attention as proven contributions to explain corporate decision-
making in addition to firm level and macroeconomic factors. The term hubris was first 
used in the field by Roll (1986) to describe the CEO who overestimates the value of the 
combined entity during the takeover action and tends to bid too high for the target firm, 
thus destroying the shareholder wealth of the acquiring firm. However, the hubris 
hypotheses have no directly testable measurement, and researchers found it hard to test 
the prediction of CEO hubris, hence they proposed related concepts to proxy hubris, such 
as narcissism and overconfidence (Petit & Bollaert, 2012). Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) suggest that as overconfidence is part of a narcissistic personality in psychology 
and management literature, narcissism leads to managerial hubris.  
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Barberis and Thaler (2003) review human’s beliefs in practice from psychological 
perspectives. They mention that extensive evidence shows people are overconfident in 
their judgments. For instance, people tends to assign a far too narrow confidence interval 
in estimating the Dow in a year. They also point out that people are poor in estimating 
probabilities. They further reveal that overconfidence may in part stem from the other two 
biases (self-attribution bias and hindsight bias). Self-attribution bias is referred as the 
tendency of people to claim any success to their own talents, while failure will be blamed 
due to bad luck, rather than on their incompetence. Self-attribution bias will lead people 
to conclude themselves as very talented by disregarding failure.  Gervais and Odean (2001) 
also mention an investors might become overconfident after several successful investing. 
While hindsight bias is a psychology term to explain people’s tendency to overestimate 
their prediction ability to an outcome that could not possibly have been predicted. If 
people think they have an ability to predict the past, they may also believe they can predict 
the future better than they actually can. 
 
Weinstein (1980) mentions that most people display unrealistically views of their abilities 
and their future life events. Barberis and Thaler (2003) acknowledge this belief as 
optimism or wishful thinking. They mention that people typically think they are above 
average in term of driving skills, able to mingle around with people and having sense of 
humour. In a study of managerial behaviour with corporate policies, Ben-David, Graham 
and Harvey (2007) try to distinguish overconfidence from optimism. By examining 
overconfidence as the prediction of CFO towards the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 stock 
return, for those narrowness confidence intervals will be identified as overconfident. In 
the case of optimism, their survey question asks the respondents to rate their optimism 
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about the US economy and their own firm’s financial prospects.  Furthermore, in their 
study they use the term miscalibration as synonymous with overconfidence.  
 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) suggest that overconfidence could be reinforced by self-
attribution; managers who suffer from self-attribution bias are more likely to be 
overconfident in their own judgement, as they believe that they have above average 
abilities compared with others. Thus, they propose that managerial overconfidence stems 
from self-attribution bias. To distinguish between managerial overconfidence and 
optimism, Park (2013) concludes that in the finance literature, ‘optimism’ is commonly 
used to refer to an overestimation of outcomes of exogenous events, and ‘overconfidence’ 
to an overestimation of one’s capability. Park indicates that the use of the terms 
overconfidence and optimism is sometimes blurred in the literature.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005b) propose an overconfident proxy by using CEOs’ press 
portrayals; they include the word ‘optimistic’ and ‘optimism’ in their overconfident proxy 
construction. Hence, it is hard to clearly differentiate the terms ‘overconfidence’ and 
‘optimism’ as the meanings somehow overlap. In their study, they define ‘overconfident’ 
as first the tendency to consider themselves ‘above average’ on positive characteristics, 
while ‘illusion of control’ expresses individuals who are more optimistic about outcomes 
that they believe they can control and optimistic about outcomes to which they are ‘highly 
committed’. Malmendier and Tate’s assumption of ‘overconfidence’ is consistent with 
the ‘optimism’ terminology used by Heaton (2002).  
 
The term ‘Managerial Overconfidence’ is more widely used in finance literature than 
‘Managerial Optimism’. Some researchers try to distinguish the definitions or concepts 
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behind the terms ‘managerial overconfidence’, ‘optimism’, ‘managerial hubris’, 
‘narcissism’, ‘miscalibration’ and ‘self-attribution’; but it is difficult to differentiate 
clearly among these terms as they all overlap somewhat in meaning.  Brennan and Conroy 
(2013) comment that the terms ‘hubris’, ‘overconfidence’ and ‘narcissism’ are 
intrinsically linked and scholars use these terms interchangeably. Our study chooses the 
term ‘optimism’ to address the behaviour of our CEOs. This follows the rationale 
proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, and 2008), Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) and Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013): ‘better than average effect’, ‘illusions of 
control’ and ‘high degree of commitment to good outcomes’.  
 
In general, optimism and overconfidence do share similar theoretical approaches in 
explaining the behavioural context. When a firm faces difficulty or underperforms, the 
CEO has always been the first one to be criticized for his/her misuse of power, and their 
optimistic behaviour will be blamed for destroying the firm’s value. There is much 
research on managerial optimism, most of which looks at the action and the corporate 
outcome (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2005a, 2005b, 2008; Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, 
Rutherford & Stanley, 2011; Malmendier, Tate & Yan, 2011). The most common 
optimistic behaviour arguments are empire building behaviour, illusions of control 
hypothesis, executive hubris hypothesis and risk taking hypothesis. 
 
2.2.1.1 Empire Building Behaviour   
 
In a firm, empire building behaviour is likely to be related to the action of the expansion 
of businesses. Recently, this behaviour has been widely described in addressing a firm’s 
merger and acquisition activities (e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2005b; Doukas & Petmezas, 
2007). According to Malmendier and Tate (2005b), CEOs with empire builder behaviour 
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are overconfident, they believe that they act in the best interest of the shareholders and 
tend to engage in quick and multiple mergers over a short period. This rationale of 
frequent merger and acquisition actions being categorized as optimistic behaviour is 
actually simulated by overconfident investors who tend to have high stock trading 
activities (Odean, 1998). Additionally, Graham, Harvey and Puri (2012) also suggest the 
link between CEO optimism with a firm’s merger and acquisition decisions. Noted that 
with respect to empire building behaviour, the aggressiveness in M&A activities might 
also cause by market timing issue; when company’s stock price is overvalued, firm can 
pay their M&A deals with ‘cheap’ currency (stock, as opposed to cash). 
 
2.2.1.2 Illusions of Control Hypothesis 
 
From a psychological point of view, optimistic managers tend to believe that future 
outcomes are under their control (Heaton, 2002).  Doukas and Petmezas (2007) mention 
that an overconfident CEO who is under the illusion of control is highly optimistic about 
the future and tends to underestimate the potential downside. Malmendier and Tate 
(2005a, 2005b,) argue that the effects of control and commitment have the potential to 
influence managers’ internal investment decisions as well. Specifically, a CEO with this 
kind of optimism about the prospects of his own firm may be reluctant to raise external 
capital12 to finance a takeover bid (Heaton, 2002). The increasing in the new equity 
proportion may dilute the management control. Malmendier and Tate (2008) mention that 
the managers who underestimate the downside of mergers and acquisitions due to the 
illusions of control believe they have above average ability and can control the outcome 
of mergers. 
                                                          
12 We acknowledge the possibility of managers reluctant to raise external capital might this also not be due to external 
capital financing having the ability to discipline management (e.g. the case of the bonding properties of debt). 
 
 37 
 
 
2.2.1.3 Executive Hubris Hypothesis 
 
Hubris hypothesis was introduced by Roll (1986): based on this hypothesis, managers 
who are engaging in mergers and acquisitions are over optimistic about their own ability 
to create firm value. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) use this hypothesis to explain the 
merger and acquisition motives of overconfident CEOs: they doubt the ability of the 
manager in evaluating the value when acquisitions have been carried out too frequently.  
 
2.2.1.4 Risk Taking Hypothesis 
 
From the investor’s perspective, if investors are overconfident they tend to underestimate 
risk and prefer to trade in more risky securities, and overconfidence also leads to higher 
trading activity in general. Chuang and Lee’s (2006) study on investors’ overconfidence 
and risk-taking mentioned that investors overestimate their own ability to predict firm-
specific risk and have aggressively higher volume trading in high-risk stocks. This 
implies that overconfident people are more risk tolerant. Puri and Robinson (2007) also 
mention that the optimistic individual is more tolerant towards financial risk, and the 
correlation between optimism and risk taking is positive and highly statistically 
significant. 
 
2.2.2 Managerial Optimism Measures 
 
Researchers try to find the most plausible proxy for optimistic behaviour. The most 
widely used proxies for managerial optimism look at the manager’s stock options exercise 
behaviour, the portrayal of a CEO in the news media, and merger and acquisition 
activities. 
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2.2.2.1 Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) use managers’ high merger and acquisition actions to 
identify overconfident and non-overconfident managers.  The rationale for a CEO’s 
frequency of acquisition as a measure of overconfidence is because such people are 
expected to be confident of their ability and believe greatly in their own instincts and 
skills. Their motivation is derived from Heaton (2002)’s study, who claims that optimistic 
managers will tend to undertake more projects. Malmendier and Tate (2008), and Ben-
David, Graham and Harvey (2007) find that overconfident managers are more likely to 
carry out mergers and acquisitions. Doukas and Petmezas identify a CEO as 
overconfidence if the CEO has successfully engaged in five or more acquisitions in three 
years (starting from the CEO’s first completed acquisition in the sample). However, we 
argue that the measurement of ‘successful’ mergers and acquisitions activities are more 
suitable to denote optimistic behaviour rather than overconfident behaviour, nevertheless 
the ‘unsuccessful’ M & A are more suitable to use as a proxy for overconfidence.  
 
Our study believes that ‘mergers and acquisitions’ is a good proxy to use in the UK studies, 
as the UK is the most active merger and acquisition market after the US, as mentioned by 
Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos (2010). The potential drawback for this proxy is the 
industry effects: i.e., certain industries might have more acquisitions compared to others. 
If a study uses this proxy, it is suggested that the researcher needs to be aware of, and 
control for industry effects. Hence, in this thesis, we follow this suggestion and control 
for industry effects in our subsequent analysis. 
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2.2.2.2 Stock Options Exercise Behaviour 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) were the first to use options exercise behaviour as a 
measure of overconfidence; they propose two overconfidence measurements, namely 
Holder 67 and Long Holder13. Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley 
(2011) use a modified version of overconfidence measurements; they classify CEO 
optimism across multiple levels of optimism. The Long Holder proxy measurement has 
also been used by Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos (2010) to study mergers and 
acquisitions in the UK. They classified managers as overconfident when they held their 
stock option until its expiration, as these managers believe their firm’s stock price would 
keep on increasing under their management. Campbell et al. (2011), Ma (2014) and Otto 
(2014) also use option exercise behaviour to proxy CEO optimistic behaviour.  
 
Although Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos (2010) use this proxy in their study in the 
UK, Ataullah, Vivian and Xu (2012) on the other hand argue that this proxy might not be 
suitable for the UK, where the structure of executive remuneration and regulation differs 
from that in the US.  Ma (2014) also points out that CEOs’ option exercise behaviour may 
be influenced by firm policies. Our remark on this proxy is that if a CEO works fewer 
than 10 years, it is hard to observe their exercising behaviour since executive options in 
UK firms normally have a lifespan of 10 years and not all UK firms have stock option 
schemes. We also acknowledge that exercising a stock option very often relies on market 
timing or even earnings manipulation. Nevertheless, this proxy is the most commonly 
used measurement in managerial overconfidence and managerial optimism studies. 
                                                          
13See Malmendier and Tate (2005a). Holder 67 is based on Hall & Murphy’s (2002) framework: a CEO who fails to 
exercise a 5 years option that is at least 67% in-the-money (at least 2 times in their tenure) and if a CEO persistently 
exercises options later than suggested by the benchmark, then the CEO will be classified as overconfident. Long holder 
classifies a CEO who holds an option until the last year of its duration as overconfident.  
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2.2.2.3 Net Buyer (Insiders Transaction) 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) use ‘net buyer’ as a proxy measurement for overconfidence: 
CEOs are classified as overconfident if they were a net buyer of company stock more 
years than they were a net seller during the first five years they appear in the sample. 
Hribar and Yang (2010) use equity purchase (net buyer) as one of the overconfidence 
proxies. The same proxy was also used in Germany by Glaser, Schäfers and Weber (2007). 
These authors gathered data on insider trades and corporate actions based on members of 
the executive and supervisory boards’ transactions on their personal accounts. More 
recently, to proxy CEO optimism, Campbell et al. (2011) use net purchase (purchase 
minus sales) of shares in the firm, Wong and Zhang (2009) use a modification of ‘net buy’ 
by Malmendier and Tate (2005b). Ma (2014) also employe CEO stock holding behaviour 
to proxy CEO optimism.  The concern in using this proxy is that other personal reasons 
which cannot explicitly be observed may drive the buying and selling stock owned by the 
CEO. 
 
2.2.2.4 Press-Based: Portrayal in the News Media 
 
The overconfident CEO proxy is based on the portrayal of the CEO in the news media. A 
count of the number of published articles using the terms ‘Confident’ and ‘Cautious’ has 
been used to identify the overconfident or non-overconfident CEO (e.g., Malmendier & 
Tate, 2005b, 2008; Hribar & Yang, 2010; Malmendier, Tate & Yan, 2011). If more 
articles use the confident than the cautious terms, then the CEO will be classified as 
overconfident. Ataullah, Vivian and Xu (2012) comment that this proxy might be biased 
due to differential coverage according to the total number of articles. Hribar and Yang 
(2010) also point out that a press-based measure of overconfidence is a noisy instrument 
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with which the true degree of CEO confidence is hard to measure.  Our study 
acknowledges that this proxy is too subjective and subject to media bias. 
 
2.2.2.5 Disclosure of Good News and Bad News 
 
According to Brennan and Conroy (2013), managers can use corporate reports to convey 
their personal advantages to shareholders. CEO letters to shareholders have been used in 
Chatterjee and Hambrick’s (2007) study to identify overconfident or non-overconfident 
CEOs by applying content analysis. Overconfident CEOs are identified as those that over-
emphasize good news and under-emphasize bad news. So far, content analysis is more 
widely used in accounting narratives research (e.g., Guthrie & Parker, 1990; Guthrie & 
Petty, 2000). The limitation of disclosure of good and bad news, as mentioned by Brennan 
and Conroy (2013), is the analysis of CEO letters is highly subjective and hard to replicate. 
The drawback of this measurement is that the content analysis is merely based on the 
researcher’s perceptions in their coding process and if the CEO’s or chairman’s report or 
statement is prepared by others it might fail to capture their personality. 
 
2.2.2.6 Earnings Forecast  
 
Otto (2014) studied US CEO optimism and incentive compensation using earnings per 
share (EPS) forecast to measure CEO optimism; a CEO is denoted as optimistic if the 
forecasts are higher than the actual EPS. Lin, Hu and Chen (2005, 2008) studied firms in 
Taiwan and defined the difference between the CEO's forecast and actual earnings as 
forecast error. If there are two positive forecast errors, then the CEO will be classified as 
optimistic. Huang, Jiang, Liu and Zhang’s (2011) study on China’s stock exchange-listed 
companies classifies the executive as overconfident if there is a greater number of over-
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forecasts than under-forecasts during the examined period. The data used by Otto and Lin 
Hu and Chen were gathered from the firms’ voluntary disclosure. The limitation of this 
proxy is data availability, as not all firms are willing to provide their earnings forecasts 
and earnings forecast is not legally obligated in most countries. In the UK, it is not 
mandatory for a firm to reveal such forecasts to the public. 
 
2.2.2.7 Other Proxies 
 
Barros and Da Silveira (2007) use entrepreneur’s bias as a measurement of 
overconfidence. They argue that firms managed by ‘entrepreneurs’ display 
overconfidence biases compared with those managed by professional managers or ‘non-
entrepreneurs’. On the other hand, Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and 
Stanley (2011) proxy CEO optimism by using firms’ investment, while Huang, Jiang, Liu 
and Zhang (2011) proxy overconfidence by executives’ salary. Meanwhile, Dittmar and 
Duchin (2013) group female CEOs as conservative. Their study argues that the 
measurement of overconfidence by ‘status as entrepreneur’, executive salary and gender 
are inappropriate, as these variables are more likely seen as drivers of 
optimistic/overconfident behaviour rather than direct measurements of optimism.  
 
Table 2.1 presents the summary of Managerial Optimism (MO) proxies that have been 
used in published studies. The MO proxies that are commonly used are mergers and 
acquisition (M&A), stock options exercise behaviour, net buyer (insider transactions), 
press-based measure (portrayal in the news media), disclosure of good news and bad news, 
earnings forecast, and other proxies such as entrepreneurs, firm investment, executive’s 
salary and gender. 
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Table 2.1  
Summary of Existing Managerial Optimism (MO) Proxies 
 
Proxy 
 
Previous studies 
 
Comments 
 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Doukas & Petmezas 
(2007)  
 Good proxy to use in the UK study as the UK 
is the most active merger and acquisition 
market after the US (Croci, Petmezas and 
Vagenas-Nanos, 2010)  
 Need to be aware and control for industry 
effects 
Stock Options 
Exercise 
Behaviour 
Malmendier &Tate 
(2005a), Wong & 
Zhang (2009) 
Croci, Petmezas & 
Vagenas-Nanos 
(2010), Campbell et 
al. (2011), Ma 
(2014) 
 
 This proxy is the most common measurement 
in managerial optimism / overconfidence 
studies 
 May be influenced by certain firm policies 
 Might not suitable for the UK study due to 
difference in structure of executive 
remuneration and regulation from US 
(Ataullah, Vivian & Xu, 2012)   
 Not all the UK firms have stock option 
schemes 
Net buyer (Insider 
Transactions) 
Malmendier & Tate 
(2005a), Glaser, 
Schäfers & Weber 
(2007), 
Hribar & Yang 
(2010)  
 
 Buying and selling of stock owned by the 
CEO maybe driven by other personal reasons 
Press-Based: 
Portrayal in the 
News Media 
Malmendier & Tate 
(2005b, 2008), 
Hribar & Yang 
(2010), Malmendier, 
Tate & Yan (2011) 
 Noisy instrument 
 Might be biased due to differential coverage 
according to the total number of articles  
 Too subjective and subject to media bias 
Disclosure of 
Good News and 
Bad News 
Guthrie & Parker 
(1990), 
Guthrie & Petty 
(2000), Chatterjee & 
Hambrick (2007)  
 
 Highly subjective and hard to replicate. 
 Based on the researcher’s perceptions in their 
coding process  
 The person’s personality, might fail to be 
captured if others prepare the report or 
statement 
Earnings Forecast Lin, Hu & Chen 
(2005, 2008)  
Huang, Jiang, Liu 
and Zhang (2011)  
 Data availability 
 Not all firms are willing to provide their 
earnings forecasts  
Other Proxies  
 Entrepreneurs 
 Firm’s 
investment 
 
 Executive’s 
salary 
 Gender 
Barros & Da 
Silveira (2007), 
Campbell, Gallmeyer, 
Johnson, Rutherford 
& Stanley (2011),  
Huang, Jiang, Liu & 
Zhang (2011),  
Dittmar & Duchin 
(2013)  
 These variables are more likely seen as 
drivers of overconfident behaviour 
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2.2.3 CEO Personal Attributes and Optimism 
 
Wong and Zhang (2009) consider that two perspectives can explain top executives’ 
likelihood of optimism. From a rational view, top executives are self-selected to be 
optimistic as they represent the image of the firm while dealing with customers, 
motivating employees and attracting potential investors; their optimistic behaviour hence 
benefits shareholders. Secondly, from the behavioural perspective, optimistic top 
executives tend to claim good outcomes for their own actions and relate poor outcomes 
to uncontrollable causes. 
 
Langabeer II and DelliFraine (2011) find that in management studies researchers find that 
optimistic individuals generally have better job performance and better social 
relationships. They also define optimistic people as tending to be more creative in 
problem solving, proactive, able to predict greater opportunities and more eager to face 
challenges. They concluded that optimistic executives perceived themselves to have 
superior decision making abilities along with the perceiving of favourable environmental 
conditions.  
 
Goel and Thakor (2000) address the issue of overconfident CEOs by looking back to the 
CEO’s promotion: the overconfident manager always stands out of the crowd compared 
to a rational manager if no one is aware of the overconfidence issue. When appointing a 
CEO, most firms prioritise self-confidence among the selection criteria. A top manager’s 
appointment is based on how well he/she can fulfil the ceremonial role of figurehead and 
leader (Yau and Sculli, 1990). Therefore, Goel and Thakor (2000, 2008) mention that in 
the CEO selection process, there is always a bias in favour of overconfident managers 
rather than ordinary or rational managers; overconfident managers are more risk tolerant 
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and tend to take on more risky projects, hence potentially outperforming the ordinary 
managers.  
 
Although some management studies show that optimistic managers tend to add value to 
the firm, most of the studies in the financial literature claim that the 
optimistic/overconfident manager tends to exhibit behavioural distortion which results in 
destroying the firm value. Such distortion may become apparent in investment decisions 
(e.g., Malmendier & Tate, 2005a, 2005b), mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier & Tate, 
2008) financing decisions (e.g., Malmendier, Tate & Yan, 2011), and earnings forecasts 
(Schrand & Zechman, 2012). However, recently, Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) argue 
that overconfident CEOs can benefit shareholders and increase firm value. Thus, a clear 
understanding of CEO attributes will help in a firm’s management and the recognition of 
managerial behaviour is worthwhile in creating firm value. 
 
Using survey design, Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) investigate the difference in 
behaviour and characteristics between -US and Non-US CEOs. Their study they included 
a CEO’s height, gender, age and educational background; they also use past working 
experience as a control variable. They showed that corporate policies are significantly 
related to CEOs’ personality traits; with younger CEOs being more confident and risk 
tolerant. This shows the importance of a CEO’s personal attributes in determining a firm’s 
policies, and consequently affecting firm growth and firm value. 
 
Yukl (1989) notes that from a management perspective an effective leader needs personal 
traits such as risk taking, initiative, achievement, power, self-confidence and emotional 
maturity. Hernandez, Eberly, Avolio, and Johnson (2011) suggest that despite the 
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traditional leadership perspective that views leaders as ‘locus of the leadership’; 
leadership should involve relationships among members in social networking and in the 
organization’s environment. Hence, in our study, CEOs’ optimistic behaviour will be 
examined through their personal traits, skills and experiences, internal networking and 
their external social networking to capture a more comprehensive view of ‘leadership’ 
attributes. 
 
Yau and Sculli (1990) distinguish between managerial traits and skills. Managers ‘traits’ 
are assumed to be inborn rather than ‘made’ and ‘skills’ refers to a manager’s having 
mastered a certain level of proficiency that needs to be maintained with continuous 
training and practice. These authors note that for top management selection, the main 
traits and skills will always be the possession of the necessary business and professional 
knowledge, relevant job experience, internal promotion, leadership skills, and the 
individual’s general social standing, business and trade links. We considered, for the 
purpose of this study, that these personal traits and skills in a CEO do influence their 
optimistic behaviour. 
2.2.3.1 CEO Personal Traits and Managerial Optimism 
 
Shavinina (1995) records that the earliest researcher to investigate the personality traits 
approach was Terman in 1925, whose pioneer study concluded that personality traits 
persistently drive a person’s integration, accomplishment, self-confidence and 
achievement. CEOs are leaders of their firms, who are both tasked with, and responsible 
for the firm’s main decision-maker (Adams, Almeida & Ferreira, 2005; Brennan & 
Conroy, 2013; Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013). In managing a firm, CEOs essentially need 
to equip themselves with good leadership skills. Yukl (1989) defines leadership as how 
an individual exhibits his/her traits in their management actions and their influence on 
 47 
 
their subordinates. Yukl also states that the evidence shows that leadership traits do 
influence a firm’s behaviour but there is still insufficient evidence to demonstrate direct 
measurement of a manager’s leadership behaviour.  
 
Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) mention that males’ and females’ confidence levels 
differ. They also found that younger CEOs may be bolder in risk taking; hence an 
executive’s personal traits may potentially influence a firm’s corporate decisions.  Our 
study followed this viewpoint in suggesting that CEOs’ personal traits do contribute to 
their optimistic behaviour. This study has adopted four CEO personal traits, namely age, 
gender, nationality and marital status, based on a review of the literature on CEO personal 
traits. 
 
2.2.3.2 CEO Skills and Experiences, and Managerial Optimism 
 
Our study looks at the CEO’s skills and experiences in term of their education, knowledge, 
position and dominance power. This study suggests that a CEO with more expertise and 
higher influence in the firm’s decision-making process will have his confidence level 
boosted and is more likely to become optimistic. 
 
Yukl (1989) states that French and Raven introduced the theory of power influence 
approach in 1959. Yukl (1982) later extended French and Raven’s research in studies of 
leadership effectiveness and how leaders use power to manage their employees. A chief 
executive needs power to manage a firm: power to influence subordinates, peers, and 
outsiders such as investors, customers and suppliers. Individual expertise is a source of 
personal power; this personal attribute can only be fully utilized when a person is given 
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the opportunity by being placed in the right place at the right time with the right resources 
(McCall, 1978 cited in Yukl, 1989). McClelland and Boyatzis (1982) find that a manager 
in a large and hierarchical firm will have a greater need for power, a fair need for 
achievement and a slight need for affiliation. 
 
Adam, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) suggest that interaction between CEO characteristics 
and organizational variables play an important role in affecting firm performance: they 
found that CEOs who are more powerful tend to have more decision-making power, 
thereby increasing the variability of firm performance. Fracassi and Tate (2012) measure 
CEO power by the consolidation of the titles CEO and chairman or president (duality) 
and CEO tenure. 
 
Adam, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) study CEO power and firm performance by 
examining Fortune 500 firms from 1992 to 1999. They use ‘concentration of titles’ in the 
hands of the CEO as a measure of CEO power. They use in the study a dummy variable, 
equal to 1 if the CEO holds titles of both chairman and president. Their argument is that 
if the CEO is not the chairman of the board, he/she will be less influential during strategic 
decision-making. They also use the status of the current CEO, who is also the firm’s 
founder, as a measure of CEO power: they use a dummy variable to indicate whether the 
CEO is also one of the company’s founders. Their rationale is that a CEO who is also a 
founder is more influential, especially in the decision-making process. They find that a 
CEO who is also the firm’s founder has a significant positive impact on the firm 
performance’s variability. In this study, we posit that a CEO’s power can be accumulated 
from their skills and experiences, wherein the more skills and experiences they have, the 
more powerful they will be. Our CEO skills and experiences are proxied by educational 
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background, status as founder, financial literacy, duality status, tenure as CEO, and 
emoluments. 
 
 
2.2.3.3 CEO Networking and Optimism 
 
Hernandez, Eberly, Avilio and Johnson (2011) look at locus with regards to an 
individual’s traits but also consider that leadership should incorporate multiple people 
(group of followers) and context (interaction with the environment). To understand the 
CEO’s internal networking ties, this study derives its perspective from Social Exchange 
Theory, proposed by Hollander and Julian (1969) and Jacobs (1970). According to this 
theory, a person who shows his/her loyalty to a group will receive higher status and trust. 
Social exchange theory stresses that the longer a person works with a firm, the greater the 
possibility for him/her to get a higher post. Furthermore, over a longer time frame a person 
will gain more confidence and stronger social relationships with their peers and 
subordinates and eventually achieve a higher position in the firm.  
 
Hernandez, Eberly, Avolio, and Johnson (2011) define the social exchange approach as 
being that any group member who uniquely contributes to his/her group’s goal will be 
more likely to receive higher status and esteem from fellow group members. Our study 
uses CEO tenure with the firm, and status of internal promotion, as proxies for internal 
networking ties. 
 
Our study also include the CEO’s external networking links. The earliest study on the 
behavioural approach (Stogdill, 1974) classified managerial behaviour by looking at how 
managers spent their time and their activity patterns. Yukl (1989) mentions that to 
understand managerial behaviour based on managers’ tasks is too abstract and suggests 
 50 
 
research on managerial behaviour should be more specific and focus on certain aspects 
such as networking behaviour, as proposed by Kaplan (1986). Kaplan, Klebanov and 
Sorensen (2012) define networking as ‘possesses a large networking of talented people’.  
 
Fracassi and Tate’s (2012) study on network ties and firm outcomes in the US creates a 
Social Network Index (SNI) for the network tie between a CEO and the firm’s directors. 
Fracassi and Tate use four types of connections: Current Employment (CE), Prior 
Employment (PE), Education (Ed) and other activities (OA). Their measurement for CE 
is external directorships in the same firm. PE is measured by overlapping prior 
employment in any previous firm. Ed connections are measured by whether the CEO and 
directors attended the same school and graduated within one year of each other, and OA 
is the connection with a common membership in organizations, clubs and charities. Our 
study uses CEO external directorship and the CEO’s social networking prestige to proxy 
his/her external networking ties. We posit that CEOs who have more and stronger 
networking ties are more likely to be optimistic.  
 
Although previous research on managerial optimism studies does include some CEO 
characteristics, the literature did not provide any theoretical support that CEO 
characteristics may cultivate managerial optimism. The current study will be the first 
attempt to use CEO personal attributes to explain the CEOs’ leadership qualities as 
possessing the potential to result in their optimistic behaviour. This study employs the 
Traits Approach to support the CEO personal traits (age, gender, nationality and marital 
status). A Power-Influence Approach was used to study, and support the importance of 
the influence of CEO skills and experiences (formal education, founder, financial literacy, 
duality, tenure as CEO and emoluments) on managerial optimistic behaviour. Another 
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theory used to describe CEO internal networking (tenure with the firm, internal promotion) 
is Social Exchange Theory; and lastly a Networking Behavioural Approach is used to 
support the CEO external networking ties (external directorship, social networking 
prestige). 
 
In summary, this chapter examines the relationship between the CEOs’ personal attributes 
(traits, skills and experiences, and networking ties) with their optimistic behaviour. Figure 
2.1 shows the CEO personal traits (age, gender, nationality and marital status) used to 
study effects on CEO optimism. In the case of CEO skills and experiences influencing 
optimistic behaviour we examine CEO education, founder, financial literacy, duality, 
tenure as CEO and emoluments.  
 
We also examine the influence of CEO networking (tenure with the firm, internal 
promotion, external directorships, and social networking prestige) on CEO optimism. Our 
study also controls for firm, industry and market effects. In this study, our main proxy for 
CEO optimism is successful mergers and acquisitions; additionally we use stock options 
exercise behaviour and CEO stock holding transactions as a test of robustness. 
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Figure 2.1 
Research Framework for First Empirical Chapter 
 
The diagram shows the research framework for this chapter. The main objective of this study is 
to examine the relationship between CEOs’ personal traits, skills and experiences, networking 
and their optimistic behaviour, while controlling for firm and market effects. 
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2.3 Data and Methodology 
 
This study focuses on the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the UK FTSE 100 firms, 
which are listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The study period is from 2000 to 
2013 and the total number of CEOs in the sample is 248. Earlier researchers have 
confirmed the importance of a chief executive in a firm; the CEO is the head figure of the 
firm who also takes responsibility as the main corporate decision-maker (Adams, 
Almeida & Ferreira, 2005; Brennan & Conroy, 2013; Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013).  
According to Forbes Magazine’s (2013) list of the world’s most powerful people, 24 of 
the 72 most powerful people are CEOs.  
 
This study uses a unique, manually collected dataset. More data became available from 
2000, and because we aimed to gather as much as data as possible, we chose to start our 
sample from that year. In addition, Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos (2010) mention 
that UK firms increased their merger activities in the late 1990s. , Our main proxy for 
CEO optimism in this study is based on the frequency of acquisition activities; hence, 
starting the sample period from 2000 enabled us to capture this optimistic behaviour of 
CEOs. 
 
2.3.1 Data 
 
This study focuses on 248 CEOs who worked with the UK FTSE 100 firms trading on 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) from 2000 to 2013. Most of the data were manually 
collected and other non-sterling (£) currencies stated in annual reports were converted to 
pounds sterling based on the average exchange rate for the respective year. Table 2.2 
presents the main sources that were used in this study. 
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Table 2.2 
Main Sources of Data Used in this Study 
 Sources  Data collected 
1 Annual Report 
 Thomson Research database  
 Company website 
 Northcote website 
CEOs’ biographies 
and some off-
balance sheet data, 
stock option data 
If a firm’s annual report was unavailable from the above sources, the firm was 
contacted and a copy of the annual report requested 
 
2 Thomson DataStream database Firms’ financial 
data 
 
3 Thomson ONE banker database Merger and 
acquisition 
transactions data 
 
4 Thomson ONE Ownership database Individual insider 
transactions data 
 
5 Lexis-Nexis database 
 
 Standard & Poor's Register of Directors and Executives 
 The Who's Who of Company Directors 
 Who's Who MediaMarketing GmbH. Who's Who In 
European Business and Industry 
 Marquis Who's Who LLC. The Complete Marquis 
Who's Who (R) Biographies 
 Debrett's People of Today 
 Reed Elsevier Inc.: Who's Who In International Banking 
 Content5 Persons (English) 
 US Executive Compensation Database - Executive 
Biographies 
 
CEOs’ personal 
data 
 
 
2.3.1.1 Dependent variables 
 
In this study we use frequency of successful mergers and acquisitions (M&A) as our main 
proxy for Managerial Optimism (MO); additionally we include two alternative proxies 
for our robustness test: stock option exercise behaviour, and buying and selling activities 
(insider transactions). 
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Proxy 1: Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) 
 
This study adopts Doukas and Petmezas’ (2007) proxy measurement for managerial 
overconfidence by using the frequency of mergers and acquisitions. However, our study 
differs from that of Doukas and Petmeza, as we argue that the measurement of ‘successful’ 
M&A activities fails to capture the overconfident behaviour, but the ‘unsuccessful’ ones 
are more appropriate to use as proxy for overconfidence. We focus on ‘optimism’ rather 
than overconfidence, as we consider the CEOs who successfully perform M&A at high 
frequencies are more likely to perceive themselves to have ‘better than average’ ability in 
decision making, ‘illusion of control’ of outcomes and to be ‘highly committed’ in terms 
of firm performance. This idea is in line with the position of Langabeer II and DelliFraine 
(2011), who mention that optimistic individuals generally have better job performance, 
are more proactive, face greater challenges and believe themselves to have superior 
decision making ability. 
 
The CEO is identified as optimistic if he/she successfully engages in five or more 
acquisitions in three years, starting from when the CEO in the sample completes his or 
her first acquisition. The period of three years is used as a benchmark for controlling 
managerial turnover. According to Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013), CEOs who like to 
make lots of acquisitions are the ones who are risk-loving. Risk loving CEOs are more 
likely to be the ones who are optimistic about future outcomes, hence, CEO optimism 
may also contribute in M&A activities. Fracassi and Tate (2012) also mention that more 
powerful CEOs tend to make more acquisitions.  
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Data selection for this study: 
 
1. Acquirer must be a UK FTSE 100 firm, not a subsidiary or parent company. 
2. Completed acquisition14.  
3. The deal value is one million dollars or more ($ mil)15.  
4. The acquirer owned at least 50% of the target firm after the transaction. (Rationale 
behind this: CEO can control the firm directly after the acquisition) 
5. Identify the firm that completes five or more acquisitions on different 
announcement days within three years of the first acquisition during the sample 
period (used by Doukas & Petmezas, 2007). 
6. Targets can be public or private firms operating in the UK and the rest of the world. 
Acquisition of subsidiaries is also included as the action of power concentration 
(centralization of power) by a CEO.  
 
Proxy 2: Stock Options (SO) 
In managerial optimism and overconfidence studies, this proxy is widely used to identify 
optimistic/overconfident CEOs if they hold stock options until the expiration date 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2005a & 2008; Wong & Zhang, 2009; Croci, Petmezas & Vagenas-
Nanos, 2010; Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford & Stanley, 2011; Malmendier, 
Tate & Yan, 2011; Dittmar & Duchin, 2013; Ma, 2014). 
 
This study follows the approach of Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos’ (2010) as their 
research was based on the UK market. They justify the existence of CEO optimistic 
                                                          
14 Excluded: Withdrawn, Pending, Status Unknown, Intended and Dis Rumor 
15 Ben-David, Graham & Harvey (2007) use a minimum size of $1 Million. For the UK study, see detail in Doukas & 
Petmezas (2007); they also mention that this one million dollars cut-off point has also been used in other studies (see, 
for example, Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004).  Reason: to avoid results being generated by very small deals. 
 57 
 
behaviour in executive stock options holding by looking at the exercising behaviour, as a 
CEO who has an opportunity to exercise at higher market price (during exercisable date) 
but give up the potential gain (as they optimistically believe the stock price will continue 
to rise) by holding until the expiration date and exercise at a lower market price. 
 
Data selection for this study: 
 
1. Option exercise behaviour is examined based on The Executive Share Option Plan 
(ESOP)/ Executive option scheme16 , which CEOs hold during their employment 
with the firm.  
2. Exclude Savings Related Share Option Scheme (period from exercisable to 
expiration normally within 6 months). 
3. Exclude Nil-price option (the optimistic behaviour unable to be identified from the 
exercising actions).  
4. Classify the CEOs as optimistic only if they hold their stock option towards its 
expiration date.17 
5. In certain cases, the CEOs hold until the expiration date and the option lapses, as 
market price is lower than exercise price. A double check is carried out to see if 
during the exercisable period there is a time when the market price is higher than the 
exercise price, and yet the CEOs gave up the potential gain and held until expiration: 
and if so, it is concluded that they are optimistic, although they did not exercise their 
option at the expiration date because the option lapsed. 
                                                          
16 In the UK, most of the executive stock options have a lifespan of 10 years with a vesting period of 3 years; the holder 
can exercise the option starting from year 3 to year 10 (approaching expiration). Some firms awarded their executive 
with options tied to firm performance, which is known as a performance share option. If the firm fails to achieve the 
target set, the stock option will not be vested, and it will lapse.   
17 To make sure that holding onto an option is not because market price is lower compared with the exercise price, this 
study makes sure that during the exercisable period there is a time when that market price is higher than exercise price, 
and yet the CEO still chooses not to exercise. 
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6. Classify the CEOs as optimistic in the respective year only when they have an 
exercisable option and hold towards the expiration date. Non-optimistic CEOs will 
be identified only when they have an exercisable option and they exercise it without 
waiting until close to the expiry date.  
7. In certain cases, this study allows a CEO’s behaviour to be noted as ‘cannot be 
determined’ (not applicable)18. 
 
Most research assumes that optimistic/overconfident behaviour is constant across time 
(e.g., Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013; Malmendier & Tate 2005a, 2005b). This study on 
the other hand, allows the classification of optimistic behaviour to change throughout the 
chief executive’s career life. This is because it is more sensible for a person to change 
their behaviour as environmental conditions change over time. Furthermore, Campbell, 
Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley (2011) also allow for a variation in a CEO’s 
optimism19 level from year to year. 
 
Proxy 3: Insider Transactions (I and II) 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) use ‘net buyer’ to identify the overconfident CEO. A CEO 
who was a net buyer of stock more years than he was a net seller during the first five years 
of the sample (his first five years) will be categorized as overconfident. If the CEO 
worked for more than 10 years in the sample, then his/her net buyer behaviour will be 
observed after his/her first five years.  Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and 
Stanley (2011) suggest that if, in a given year, the CEO’s net share purchase is positive 
                                                          
18 If no stock option is held by the CEO, or no option is exercisable during the particular year and if there is exercisable 
option but it has not reached the expiration date yet the CEO is leaving the firm.  
19Campbell et al. (2011) apply CEO optimism classification to each of the CEO each year in the sample based on 
their stock option exercise behaviour. 
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and if the share percentage change is in the top quartile of all the CEOs in the sample, 
then the respective CEO should be classified as optimistic.  In the UK study, Ataullah, 
Vivian and Xu (2012) use ‘net purchase ratio’ to determine a CEO’s overconfident 
behaviour. 
 
The rationale for observing the actions of CEOs who purchase shares in the firm where 
they work is from an investor’s viewpoint:  
o Firstly, CEOs are believed to have more information about the firm employing them 
than outside investors.  
o Secondly, as independent investors, they are free to invest in other securities for their 
own personal portfolio. A tendency to increase their ownership of stock in the firm 
they work for indicates that they are confident in their own ability to bring more profit 
to the firm and indirectly to increase their own wealth in their personal portfolio.   
 
Our study employs Malmendier and Tate’s (2005a) method to classify overconfident 
CEOs and non-overconfident CEOs. In addition, ‘Insider Transaction I’ follows 
Malmendier and Tate’s (2005a) method, ‘Insider Transaction II’ was created for this 
study and classifies a CEO as ‘optimistic’ if he/she was a net buyer in any respective year 
and ‘non-optimistic’ if he was a net seller in the particular year. The rationale for 
modifying the proxy measurement is that it is normal for a person to change their 
behaviour as their personal traits, skills and experiences, and the environment do change 
over time. The time varying optimistic behaviour was also used by Ma (2014). 
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2.3.1.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
 
CEO Personal Traits  
 
Our study aims to identify a manager’s personal traits that may associate with his/her 
optimistic behaviour. This study uses the traits approach and select four CEO personal 
traits (age, gender, nationality, and marital status) that have the potential to cultivate CEO 
optimistic behaviour.  
 
1. Age  
One’s personal risk-tolerance level will differ at different stages of life. Graham, Harvey 
and Puri (2013) mention that younger CEOs are more confident and risk-tolerant (risk-
taking) than older CEOs. Shefrin (2008) suggests a nonlinear relationship between age 
and risk aversion; risk aversion will increase as one moves from youth to maturity, but 
interestingly, after reaching 70 years, one’s risk tolerance will increase. Weinstein (1980) 
mentions that optimism is the tendency to overestimate future positive events while 
underestimating future negative events. Lachman, Röcke, Rosnick and Ryff (2008) find 
that older adults were less optimistic about their future than younger adults. Younger 
adults were found to have more positive expectations (expecting things to improve). 
 
Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley (2011) control for CEO age in 
their study of CEO optimism and forced turnover. Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri 
(2012) find that a CEO’s age is negatively correlated with their optimism bias. We believe 
that a younger CEO will be more likely to become optimistic, as young people are more 
risk-tolerant, as mentioned by Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013). Therefore, this study 
predicts a negative relationship between CEOs’ age and their optimistic behaviour. A 
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CEO’s age in this study is equivalent to the difference between the examined year and 
the CEO’s year of birth.  
 
2. Gender 
The cognitive psychology literature proposes that people are naturally show optimistic 
expectations about their future life (Lin, Hu & Chen, 2005). According to Deaux and 
Farris (1977), men tend to have positive expectancies, and they rate their ability greater 
than do females. Furthermore, males are more defensive about failure as they tend to 
maintain their self-image of competency.  On the other hand, women are prone to explain 
their performance, whether they succeed or fail, in terms of luck; and women are found 
to have lower expectations and can accept failure. From this point of view, males are more 
likely than females to have optimistic beliefs. 
 
Most previous research shows that males tend to be more overconfident than females 
(Barber and Odean, 2001; Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013; Huang and Kisgen, 2012; 
Bhandari and Deaves, 2010). However, Acker and Duck (2008), using a multi-period 
stock market game, show there is no evidence that males are more confident than females. 
Similar results were also obtained by Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2013) 
and Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) who find no significant difference between 
males and females in terms of overconfident behaviour. For this study, a male CEO is 
assigned as dummy variable 1; females are then dummy equal to zero: this study expects 
that male CEOs will be more likely to become optimistic than female CEOs. 
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3. Nationality  
Clarke and Hammer (1995) study the effect of intercultural effectiveness; they examine 
the intercultural success of managers who work aboard. They find managers need to have 
strong social skills in order to succeed when they work in different cultural working 
environments. According to Mendenhall and Odduo (1985), expatriate managers need to 
have the ability to interact effectively with their national hosts. In addition to technical 
competence, they also need to prepare themselves in terms of intercultural, perceptual 
and interpersonal ability. 
 
Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013), in distinguishing between US and non-US top 
executives, find that US-based CEOs and CFOs are more optimistic than their Non-US 
counterparts. Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos and Hoque’s (2013) study on drivers of 
buyback completion rates in the UK find a non-significant relationship between CEOs’ 
nationality and buyback program. 
 
Mendenhall and Odduo (1985) mention that managers from a non-host country are 
exposed to cultural toughness, whereby the host country’s political and legal system, 
socioeconomic and business environments differ from those of the home country. Derived 
from this dimension, this study proposes that a person who works in his/her home country 
tends to be more confident as he/she is more familiar with the home country’s rules and 
regulations, people, culture and working environment. Thus, this study predicts that UK 
CEOs will be optimistic compared to non-UK CEOs.  In this study, a dummy variable (1, 
0) is used; where a CEO of UK nationality is denoted as 1, and the other as zero. 
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4. Marital Status  
Stutzer and Frey (2006) consider that married people benefit from the continuous 
emotional support from their intimate relationship and that marriage also provides 
individuals with self-esteem by providing an escape from the stress in their life, in 
particular from their hectic job. According to Bloch and Kuskin (1978), marital status is 
a proxy for a personality trait suggesting positive individual attributes such as stability, 
maturity and responsibility. Judge, Cable, Boudreau and Bretz (1995) suggest that marital 
status should have a positive impact on an executive’s career success. Glenn (1975) finds 
that marriage does contribute happiness and benefits both husbands’ and wives’ 
psychological well-being. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) find that people who are 
married are more self-confident. Puri and Robinson (2007) point out that the optimistic 
individual is more risk tolerant, thus increasing his/her probability of remarriage. The 
greater risk tolerance makes them more willing to commit to a new, uncertain relationship. 
 
CEOs in the FTSE 100 firms are well known in UK business, as they are outstanding 
personalities, public figures and wealthy. Marriage would provide them with positive 
attributes, and these personality traits are more likely to make them become optimistic, 
which derives from the risk taking perspective. For these reasons this study anticipates a 
positive relationship between marital status and a CEO’s optimistic behaviour. The 
number of times married is used for marital status in this study. If a CEO is single, a 
dummy of zero is assigned; for a first marriage, a dummy of 1 is assigned, for a second 
marriage a dummy of 2 is used and so on. 
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Our study examines the effect of four CEO personal traits (age, gender, nationality and 
marital status) on CEOs’ optimistic behaviour. Table 2.3 summarizes the CEO personal 
traits measurements and the expected relationship with managerial optimism.   
 
Table 2.3  
CEO Personal Traits and Managerial Optimism 
Summary of the attributes used for the CEO personal traits approach and the expected relationship 
with managerial optimistic behaviour in this study 
 
Approaches Attributes  Measurements  Expected 
relationship 
Trait 
Approach 
 
1. Age 
 
The difference between the CEO’s year of 
birth and the examined year 
Negative 
 
2. Male Male CEO is assigned as dummy variable 
1; females are then dummy equal to zero 
Positive 
 
3. UK 
Nationality 
CEO of UK nationality is denoted as 1, and 
others as zero 
Positive 
 
4. Marital 
status 
If a CEO is single, a dummy of zero is 
assigned; if it is a first marriage, a dummy 
of 1 is assigned; if it is a second marriage 
then 2 is used and so on 
 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
CEO Skills and Experiences   
 
We examine the influence of CEOs’ personal skills and experiences on their optimistic 
behaviour, with the aim of eliciting which of the following skills and experiences 
(educational, founder status, financial literacy, duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments) 
are more likely to associate with CEO optimistic behaviour. Our hypothesis is derived 
from the idea that higher levels of skills and experiences will provide a CEO with more 
power. Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) state that a CEO who has power over the 
board will have greater influence on decision making in the organization. In other words, 
the sources of power are from the skills and experiences. Anderson and Galinsky (2006) 
mention that power increases an individual’s optimism in viewing risks, and thus 
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increases their tendency to choose a risker option. Thus, this study suggests that a CEO 
who has skills and experiences will be more likely to become optimistic as they have 
more power in controlling the firm, especially in the decision-making process. 
 
1. Education 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) investigate systematic risk-taking behaviour and find that 
fund managers with an MBA are more tolerant to systematic risk. Larwood and Whittaker 
(1977) mention that corporate executives and management students are particularly more 
likely to have self-serving bias; Malmendier and Tate (2005a) suggest that this self-
serving attribution reinforces overconfident behaviour.  Malmendier and Tate find 
finance education is positively correlated with overconfidence while technical education 
shows the opposite result. However, Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) show that MBA 
holders are significantly averse to sure losses. Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos and 
Hoque (2013) examine UK CEOs’ educational background and find no relationship 
between CEOs who did business studies and their share buyback program.  
 
In this study, CEOs with an MBA degree and CEOs with PhDs are identified. For these 
two variables, dummy 1 is assigned to those who hold an MBA and PhD respectively, 
and zero to those who hold neither. An MBA or PhD holder is expected to have a certain 
degree of knowledge and expertise, so this study expects that CEOs who have MBAs or 
PhDs are more likely to become optimistic than CEOs who do not have such a 
qualification.   
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2. Founder  
In management literature, Buyl, Boone, Hendriks, and  Matthyssens, (2011) point out that 
CEOs who are also founders of the firm own two sources of executive power; positional 
power, as they are also the firm’s CEO, and ownership power. Subsequent to the 
accumulation of these formal executive powers, the CEO becomes more dominant in 
decision making. In finance literature, Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) also use 
‘status as founder’ as an indication of CEO power. With power centralised in the hands 
of a CEO who is also a founder of the firm, the CEO tends to have more decision-making 
power, such that their opinion will be taken and translated directly into outcomes for the 
firm. 
 
Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2013) find a non-significant relationship 
between a CEO who is a founder of the firm with share-buyback completion rates. 
However, Barros and da Silveira (2007) use the CEO who is founder as a proxy for 
overconfidence and they find a significant positive relationship between a founder CEO 
and the use of leverage. Since CEOs who are also a founder of the firm have more 
experience and tend to have more decision-making power in the firm, this study expects 
them to be more prone to exhibit optimistic behaviour. Anderson and Galinsky (2006) 
note that people who have greater power would show more optimistic behaviour. In this 
study, if the CEO is also a founder of the firm, the dummy variable 1 is denoted, otherwise 
zero is assigned. 
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3. Financial Literacy 
Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) have used the term ‘financial expertise’ in 
examining an external director’s main employment related to finance20 and find that 
financial expertise significantly influences corporate decisions.  Graham, Harvey and Puri 
(2013) find that the CEO who has a financial or accounting background uses more total 
debt than CEOs who have no financial background. However, Bhandari and Deaves 
(2010) argue that if a person has greater knowledge than another, they will not become 
more overconfident than the average individual; they argue that overconfidence in people 
is due to insufficient knowledge. 
 
This study adapts Güner, Malmendier, and Tate’s (2008) definition by looking at a CEO’s 
past career path: if the CEO worked as a financial officer or controller, banker, accountant, 
treasurer lawyer, or academic who was involved in the field of economics, business, 
finance or accounting, he/she is categorized as financially literate. This study expects that 
financially literate CEOs will tend to become optimistic in managing a firm. Hence, the 
dummy variable 1 is used for a CEO who possesses financial literacy, otherwise zero is 
assigned. 
 
 
4. Duality  
In the UK there is a Combined Code principle A.221 that suggests assigning the positions 
of chairman and chief executive officer to two different individuals. The chairman is 
primarily responsible for the working of the board and the chief executive officer is 
                                                          
20For details of financial expertise, see Güner, Malmendier, and Tate’s (2008) paper ‘Financial expertise of director’. 
They study US public traded firm board members (1988-2001). This study uses the same method which is to manually 
collect all the biographical information. 
21 Combined Code principle A.2 states: There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company 
between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company’s business. No one 
individual should have unfettered powers of decision. 
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responsible for running the group’s business and implementing board strategy and policy. 
CEO duality is the situation where the same person holds the role of CEO and chairperson 
simultaneously.  
 
Adam, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) use ‘concentration of titles’ in the hands of the CEO 
as a measure for CEO power. They use dummy variables in the study; variable equals 1 
if a CEO holds titles of both chairman and president. Their argument is that if the CEO is 
not the chairman of the board, he/she will be less influential in strategic decision-making. 
Fracassi and Tate (2012) also use the consolidation of titles CEO and chairman of the 
board or president as a measure of CEO power. 
 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) find that the duality status of a CEO does not affect 
overconfident behaviour (long holder of stock option). Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and 
Bouri (2012) suggest a positive relationship between duality and an optimistic bias. They 
mention that if the CEO is also the firm’s chairman, then he/she will be at the same time 
a controller and a decision maker, and this would give the CEO the opportunity to apply 
his optimism bias if it exits. In this study, if a CEO holds the post of chairman at the same 
time, a dummy variable is allocated to the respective CEO as 1, otherwise zero is assigned. 
This study predicts that a CEO who also holds the post of chairman will tend to be 
optimistic as he/she has greater decision-making power.  
 
5. Tenure as CEO 
Brennan and Conroy (2013) hypothesize that the longer his/her tenure as CEO 
(expression of the power position), the more likely a CEO is to become hubristic. CEOs 
can strengthen their influence over the board, leading to an increase in a CEO’s power, 
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and thus his/her becoming more overconfident (Yim, 2013). Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild 
and Bouri (2012) explain that the longer CEOs work with a firm, the more knowledge 
they tend to gain, making them feel more comfortable when dealing with internal and 
external environments: thus, this will make them become optimistic. Campbell, 
Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley (2011) include CEO tenure as one of the 
CEO characteristics to study the relationship between CEO optimism and forced turnover. 
They find CEO tenure has a significant negative relationship with CEO confidence22. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005a) discover an insignificant result for the relationship between 
CEO tenure and their overconfident behaviour. In this study, the tenure of a CEO is 
counted from the year they start being designated CEO. This study suggests that the 
longer a CEO is with a firm, the more experiences and skills he/she will accumulate, and 
this will make him/her tend to become more comfortable with the environment, and hence 
become optimistic. 
 
6. Emolument  
Paredes (2004) studies the link between CEO pay and CEO overconfidence, and explains 
that high chief executive pay signals the success of a CEO. This positive feedback will 
tend to result in the CEO becoming overconfident. Brown and Sarma (2007) define CEO 
emoluments as a proxy for CEO dominance: they suggest that CEO remuneration is the 
best validation tool in recognizing CEO success. They use the natural logarithm of the 
ratio of CEO total annual remuneration to the firm’s total assets as a CEO dominance 
proxy.  A higher ratio of CEO emoluments to total assets indicates that the CEO has more 
decision-making power as the firm is more reliant on the CEO. Otto (2014) studies the 
relationship between US CEO compensation and optimism and finds that optimistic 
                                                          
22 Measured by net stock purchases 
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CEOs tend to receive lower compensation than their peers. Campbell, Gallmeyer, 
Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley (2011) include CEO compensation as a control to 
capture CEOs’ perceived ability in examining CEO optimism and forced turnover. They 
find that CEO salary shows a significant positive relationship with CEO confidence (net 
stock purchase, and investment rate) in firms with poor governance, while insignificant 
results were found in firms with good governance.  
  
The United Kingdom was the first country to implement the ‘Say on Pay’23, in 2002. This 
regulation stipulates the annual mandatory voting on executive pay by non-binding 
shareholders (Ferri and Maber, 2013). According to the requirements of the UK 
Companies Act 1985, the director’s total remuneration should include the base salary, 
annual cash award/ bonus, non-monetary benefits and other benefits. In this study, annual 
emoluments scaled by the firm’s total assets is used as a proxy for CEO dominance or 
‘power’. Our study predicts that CEOs who receive a higher emolument will tend to 
become optimistic as the pay received signals the ‘value’ of their skill, experiences and 
expertise to the firm. It is implied that the more they receive, the more important their 
presence in the firm. 
 
Our study examines the effect of six CEO personal skills and experiences variables 
(educational, founder status, financial literacy, duality, tenure as CEO, and emolument) 
on CEOs’ optimistic behaviour. Table 2.4 summarises the CEO personal skills and 
experiences measurements and the expected relationship with managerial optimism.   
 
 
                                                          
23 See Ferri and Maber (2013) who state that the motive of ‘Say on Pay’ is to overcome the problem of ‘fat cat’ pay 
and to improve the accountability and transparency of a firm’s management. 
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Table 2.4  
CEO Skills and Experiences and Managerial Optimism 
 
Summary of the attributes used for CEO skills and experiences and the expected relationship with 
managerial optimistic behaviour in this study 
 
Approaches Attributes  Measurements Expected 
Relationship 
Power-
influence 
Approach 
 
1. Educational 
Background 
 
Dummy 1 is assigned to those who 
hold an MBA or PhD  
Positive 
 
2. Founder 
 
If the CEO is also the founder of 
the firm, the dummy variable 1 is 
denoted, otherwise zero is assigned 
 
Positive 
 
3. Financial 
Literacy 
 
If the CEO worked as a financial 
officer or controller, banker, 
accountant, treasurer lawyer, or 
academic who was involved in the 
field of economics, business, 
finance or accounting, he/she is 
categorized as financially literate. 
Dummy variable 1 is denoted, 
otherwise zero is assigned. 
 
Positive 
 
4. Duality If a CEO holds the post of 
chairman at the same time, a 
dummy variable 1 is denoted, 
otherwise zero is assigned. 
 
Positive 
 
5. Tenure as 
CEO 
 
The tenure of a CEO is counted 
from the year they start to be 
designated CEO 
 
Positive 
 
6. Emolument 
 
Annual emolument scaled by the 
firm’s total assets 
 
Positive 
 
 
 
CEO Networking  
 
We examine the influence of CEO internal and external networking ties with their 
optimistic behaviour, motivated by Hernandez, Eberly, Avilio and Johnson (2011), who 
mention that in addition to focus on an individual’s traits, leadership should incorporate 
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multiple people and the interaction with the environment. Hence, our study looks at CEOs’ 
internal networking (tenure with the firm, and internal promotion) and external 
networking (external directorships, and social networking prestige) to examine the 
relationship of these networking ties with their optimistic behaviour. 
 
1. Tenure with the firm 
Long tenure of a CEO with a firm shows the CEO’s loyalty to the firm. Taking the 
example of Tesco Plc., CEOs Sir Terry Leahy and Mr Philip Clarke both worked for 
Tesco Plc. for more than 35 years. Their loyalty to the firm brought them success and led 
to their becoming top man in the company. However, Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos 
and Hoque (2013) find that the longer CEOs worked with a firm, the less likely they 
would become to engage in a share buyback program. Michael, Hou and Fan (2011) study 
the relationships among creative self-efficacy, optimism, and innovative behaviour of 120 
spa and beauty salon employees in Taiwan, and find that job tenure was insignificantly 
positively correlated with optimism. 
 
The longer CEOs work with a firm the more they will tend to gain respect, support and 
trust from their peers and subordinates: thus, they will be more prone to show optimistic 
behaviour, as they are comfortable and know a lot about the firm. On the other hand, there 
is also a possibility that longer tenure may associated with conservatism and less risky 
behaviour in the sense of securing their position. In this study, tenure with a firm is 
calculated from the year the respective CEO joined the firm until the examined year. This 
study anticipates a positive relationship between CEOs’ tenure with a firm and optimistic 
behaviour. 
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2. Internal Promotion 
A CEO who is internally promoted indirectly shows evidence of successful internal 
relationships in the firm. Top executives are expected to be optimistic as their promotion 
is based on their previous performance with the firm: they are more risk loving and 
because of their daring, they outperform their peers and are selected for top management 
(Goel & Thakor, 2008). Banerjee, Dai, Humphery-Jenner and Nanda (2014) use options 
exercise behaviour as a measure of overconfidence and find that overconfident executives 
are more likely to be promoted as CEOs. Additionally, Ahmed (2015) examines job 
satisfaction among teachers in Bangladesh private universities, and finds that optimism 
is significantly positively correlated with promotion. 
 
This study also expects the internally promoted CEOs will be more likely to become 
optimistic, as they will be full of pride because they have been selected over other 
managers. Moreover, if a CEO is internally promoted, he/she is expected to have stronger 
internal networking ties with the existing employees, board of directors and even main 
shareholders. In this study, if the CEO is internally promoted, a dummy 1 is assigned: 
otherwise zero is assigned.   
 
3. External Directorships 
Most FTSE 100 UK firms allow their chief executives to take up external appointments 
on condition that the CEO is a non-executive director and preferably appointed to a FTSE 
100 firm. External appointments are normally subject to the rules governing conflicts of 
interest and CEOs need to get approval from the board of directors. The reason a board 
allows a CEO to hold an outside appointment is that the board believes that such an 
appointment can broaden a CEO’s experience and knowledge, and thus benefit the group.   
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Masulis and Mobbs (2011) show that when an inside director of a firm holds outside 
directorships, it improves the firm’s performance. However, Güner, Malmendier, and 
Tate (2008) show that outside directorships tend to destroy a firm’s value. 
Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2013) find that CEO external directorships 
correlate positively and significantly with their share buyback completion rates. This 
study follows Güner et al.’s (2008) and Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos and Hoque’s 
(2013) measurements by using the number of external directorships held by a CEO. Our 
study posits that CEOs who are appointed by other firms as directors have their own 
expertise and especially good network ties in the industry. A CEO who has the skills and 
experience needed for an outside firm will tend to be more confident and this recognition 
of his/her expertise will tend to make him/her become optimistic compared to those who 
do not have an external appointment.  Hence, we expect a positive relationship between 
external appointments and a CEO’s optimistic behaviour. 
 
4. Social Networking Prestige 
A social network approach has been used in leadership research: Balkundi and Kilduff 
(2006) find these social ties can enhance a leader’s effectiveness. Brissette, Scheier and 
Carver (2002) mention that social networks provide social support and can influence 
psychological well-being. Thus the development of extensive and supportive social 
networks may lead to greater optimism.Fracassi and Tate’s (2012) study on CEOs’ 
networking ties with directors and find that powerful CEOs will have more network ties 
with the directors. Their observation of CEOs with more network ties is that they tend to 
have frequent acquisitions. As frequent acquisitions are an indication of overconfident 
behaviour (e.g., Doukas & Petmezas, 2007; Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013), this study 
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predicts that a CEO who has social networking prestige will be more likely to become 
optimistic. In our study, the networking behavioural approach is observed from a CEO’s 
social networking prestige/status especially CEOs’ networking in professional bodies, in 
fellowships or through official honours, particularly knighthoods. 
 
In our study, if a CEO holds any position or receives awards based on their social 
networking prestige as listed in Table 2.5, he/she is classified as dummy 1 and assigned 
zero if he/she does not hold, or has not received any of those mentioned below.  
 
Table 2.5  
Lists of CEO Social Networking Prestige 
The table shows the checklists used in this study to identify the social network prestige of CEO 
 
Social Networking 
Prestige 
Example  
Professional  Member of Chartered Institute of Taxation, Associate of Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England & Wales, Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotland, Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants, Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, CPA US, 
Chartered Accountants Australia. 
 
Educational University Adjunct Professor, Pro Chancellor, University Advisor, 
University Lecturer, Assistant Professor. 
 
Honours/ Awards 
(Recipient of a 
knighthood)  
 
Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE), OBE, 
Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (KBE, Sir). 
Fellowships Royal Academy of Engineering, Royal Geographical Society, Royal 
Society of Arts, Institute of Electrical Engineers, Chartered Institute 
of Bankers, Institute of Actuaries, Royal Aeronautical Society. 
 
Member of advisory 
board 
Advisory board member for council (The Financial Reporting 
Council) and foundation, member of the UK Prime Minister’s 
business advisory Group, Ministry of Justice, international advisory 
board member for industries and associations (Association of British 
Insurers), member of International Monetary Fund (IMF), member 
of Nasdaq board. 
 
Trustee Trustee of Darwin, Trust of Edinburgh, The Mayor’s Fund for 
London, Trustee of City Technology College, Birmingham, Trustee 
of the Royal Theatre, Northampton, Trustee of the Cambridge 
Foundation, trustee for charitable bodies. 
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Our study examines the impact of four CEO personal attributes from the aspect of their 
networking ties (tenure with the firm, internal promotion, external directorships, and 
social networking prestige) on their optimistic behaviour. Table 2.6 summarises the CEO 
personal networking ties measurements and the expected relationship with optimistic 
behaviour.   
Table 2.6  
CEO Networking and Managerial Optimism 
 
Summary of the attributes used for CEO networking, supported by the following approaches 
(Social Exchange Theory and Networking Behavioural Approach) and the expected relationship 
with managerial optimistic behaviour in this study 
 
Approaches Attributes   Measurements  Expected 
Relationship 
Social 
Exchange 
Theory 
1. Tenure with 
the firm 
 
calculated from the year the 
respective CEO joined the firm 
until the examined year 
 
Positive  
 
2. Internal 
promotion 
If the CEO is internally 
promoted, dummy 1 is assigned: 
otherwise zero is assigned   
 
Positive 
 
Networking 
Behavioural 
Approach 
1. External 
Directorships 
 
number of external 
directorships held by a CEO 
Positive 
 
2. Social 
Networking 
Prestige 
 
If a CEO holds any position or 
receives awards based on their 
social networking prestige as 
listed in Table 2.5, he/she is 
classified as dummy 1, 
otherwise zero s assigned 
 
Positive 
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2.3.1.3 Firm and Macroeconomic Effect  
 
Studies have shown that firm and macroeconomic conditions do play an important role 
in managerial behaviour: thus, these factors are included in this study as control variables. 
Firm characteristics such as corporate governance, leverage, profitability, firm size and 
growth opportunities have been widely used in finance studies (e.g., Ataullah, Vivian & 
Xu, 2012; Barclay & Smith, 1995; Brown, & Sarma, 2007; Deshmukh, Goel, & Howe, 
2013; Malmendier & Tate, 2005b). 
 
In this study, firm characteristics and macroeconomics variables are included as control 
variables as shown in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8. This study intends to examine the 
incremental explanatory power of a CEO’s personal attributes in addition to the 
conventional factors (firm and market levels). The reason for including the firm level and 
macroeconomic variables is that these variables have been widely found to have 
significant influence on managerial optimism. For example, as mentioned by Heaton 
(2002), the appointment of an independent board of directors can be an effective way to 
mitigate CEO optimism. Brown and Sarma (2007) proxy corporate governance by 
dividing the number of independent directors (non-executive directors) with the total 
board size (board of directors).  
 
Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) in their study suggest overconfident managers 
perceive their firm’s equity as undervalued: thus, they will choose to use more debt as a 
source of external financing. Their results show that leverage increases with executive 
overconfidence. Furthermore, Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) find that firms run by 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to use debt than equity.  
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Table 2.7 
Firm Level Variables 
The table presents the firm level variables that are included as control variables in this study. 
These variables have been widely used in previous research and are expected to have significant 
influence on Managerial Optimistic behaviour. In addition, we also control for industry effects. 
 
 
Variables 
 
Proxies measurement 
 
Used in previous researches  
 
Corporate  
Governance 
 
Number of Executive Directors and 
number of non- Executive Directors 
The proportion of independent directors 
on each firm’s board of directors is 
recorded. An independent director is 
defined as a non-executive director 
=  number of non- Executive Directors 
Board size 
 
Malmendier and Tate(2005b); 
Brown and Sarma, (2007)  
 
Heaton (2002) suggests that an 
independent board of directors 
may be an effective way to 
mitigate CEO optimism 
Industry  
Dummy   
10 sectors24 
(This study categorizes the firms into 
10 sectors) 
 
Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin 
(2011) 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of the book value 
of total assets  
= log(Total Assets)   
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999); Malmendier 
and Tate (2005b); 
Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin 
(2011); Ataullah, Vivian and Xu 
(2012); Elsayed and Wahba 
(2013) 
 
Leverage 
 
Debt Ratio 
=  Total debt 
   Total assets  
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999); Hackbarth 
(2004);  Gungoraydinoglu and 
Öztekin (2011); Ataullah, 
Vivian and Xu (2012); Graham, 
Harvey and Puri, (2013) 
 
Growth 
Opportunities  
Market to Book Ratio (MTB) 
=  Market Value of Assets 
     Book Value of Assets 
Smith and Watts (1992) ; 
Barclay and Smith (1995); 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999); Malmendier 
and Tate (2005b); 
Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin 
(2011); Ataullah, Vivian and Xu 
(2012); Deshmukh, Goel and 
Howe (2013); 
 
Profitability  Return on Assets (ROA) 
= Profits before taxes  
       Total assets 
 
Lin, Hu and Chen (2008); 
Elsayed and Wahba (2013)   
                                                          
24 Details for industry classification, see Appendix I 
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Ataullah, Vivian and Xu (2012) use net purchase ratio as a proxy for overconfidence and 
find that overconfident CEOs have a positive effect on the use of long-term debt financing. 
When using the measurement of value-based net purchase ratio (NPR) of executive 
directors, they find firm size and market-to-book ratio are significantly negatively 
correlated with NPR. On the other hand, Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) use firm size 
to control for stability and firm growth.   
 
Li and Tong (2012) conclude that overconfident managers often work in high growth 
firms (market-to-book ratios) and in industries with high stock volatilities, while non-
overconfident managers often work in low market-to-book ratio firms and in low stock 
volatility industries. Additionally firm level data are also widely used in other corporate 
finance studies, for instance, firm-specific variables such as profitability, firm size, and 
market to book are used in Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto’s (2004) and  Frank and 
Goyal’s (2003) studies on firm’s capital structure. 
 
 
Ben-David, Graham and Harvey’s (2007), in a study of US firms’ manager 
overconfidence behaviour, use S&P 500 as a proxy for market returns and find that CFOs 
are more confident following high stock market returns. Gungoraydinoglu and Öztekin 
(2011) studying firms’ capital structure, include country level factors of GDP and 
inflation rate besides firm characteristics. Korniotis and Kumar’s (2010) study show that 
investors’ behavioural biases adversely affected the local macro-economy (GDP, stock 
market, housing collateral ratio and industry differences). 
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Table 2.8  
Macroeconomic Factors 
To control the economic effects, a few major macroeconomic factors are included in this study as 
control variables: GDP, Stock Index, and Consumer Confidence Index. 
 
 
Variables 
 
Used in previous research  
 
Gross Domestic 
Product(GDP) 
Afshar, Arabian and Zomorrodian (2011); Gungoraydinoglu and 
Öztekin (2011); Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar (2012); Julio and Yook 
(2012) 
 
Stock market return Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007); Afshar, Arabian and 
Zomorrodian (2011) 
 
Consumer Confidence 
Indicator (CCI) 
 
Afshar, Arabian and Zomorrodian (2011) 
 
 
Our first empirical chapter examines the effects of CEOs’ personal attributes on their 
optimistic behaviour. Table 2.9 summarises all the proxies used in this empirical research 
and also the justifications for inclusion of these variables in our study.   
 
Table 2.9  
Summary of Proxies Used in this Study 
The table presents the summary of all the proxies used in this study. For Panel A, three proxy 
measurements are used for Managerial Optimism, namely mergers and acquisitions, stock options 
and insider transactions. In addition, Panel B shows the management and leadership theory that 
have been used in this study to explain and support the use of traits, skills and experiences, and 
networking variables of CEOs in this study. The justifications for using these proxies are included 
in the table.  
 
 
Panel A: Managerial Optimism Proxies 
 
Perspectives Proxy  Justification 
 
Empire Builders’ 
Behaviour   
Executive Hubris 
Hypothesis  
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
Merger and acquisition activities of a firm are 
one of the actions of business expansion 
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Illusions of Control 
Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk Taking 
Hypothesis 
 
 
 
Stock Options 
 
 
 
 
 
Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
 
Insider 
Transactions  
Managers believe that they can always 
perform better; they will tend to hold their 
stock option until the last expiration period 
although during the exercisable period they 
might gain higher profit   
 
Managers believe they can control the 
outcome of mergers. 
 
CEOs confident of their own ability believe 
that the firm under their control will 
outperform others; hence they tend to add 
more of their own firm’s shares to their 
personal investment portfolio. 
 
Panel B: CEO Personal Attributes (Traits, Skills and Experiences, and Networking) 
 
Approaches CEO Personal 
Attributes  
 
Justification  
Trait Approach  
(CEO Personal Traits) 
 
Age 
Gender  
Nationality 
Marital status 
 
These are all traits and 
characteristics/qualities of CEOs that 
potentially influence their personal behaviour 
Power-Influence 
Approach  
(CEO Skills and 
Experiences) 
Formal education 
Founder  
Financial literacy 
Duality  
Tenure as CEO 
Emolument 
 
Firm founder, higher education, financial 
expert, role as simultaneous CEO and 
chairman, longer tenure as CEO and higher 
emoluments are gain based on their skills and 
experiences and believed to provide a CEO 
with power 
Social Exchange 
Theory 
(CEO Internal 
Networking) 
Networking 
Behavioural approach  
(CEO External 
Networking ties) 
Tenure with the 
firm,  
Internal promotion 
 
Tenure with the firm is the measurement of 
loyalty and internal promotion is the evidence 
of successful relationships in the firm 
External 
directorship 
Social networking 
prestige 
 
These two variables show the CEOs’ external 
networking ties  
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2.3.2 Methodology 
 
Descriptive statistics are used to summarise the basic features of the dependent variables 
(managerial optimism) and the explanatory variables (CEO personal traits, skills and 
experiences, and networking) using the data collected from the UK FTSE 100 firms. 
Additionally, we also examine our data using correlation coefficient analysis and produce 
a correlation matrix to identify the degree of correlation (correlation coefficients) among 
all the variables used in this study.  
 
Our study uses dummy variables to address the optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs: by 
using these ‘proxy’ variables, the CEOs are grouped (into 1, 0) to compare any significant 
differences between these two groups. For univariate analyses, independent Sample T-
test is used to determine whether there is any statistical difference in the managerial 
optimism for CEO personal traits, skills and experiences. For this study, a two-sided t-
test is employed and the hypothesis is examined as below:  
 
Null Hypothesis testing: The means for CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and 
experiences, and networking) are the same for optimistic CEOs and non-optimistic CEOs. 
 
We also use non-parametric tests to determine whether there is any statistical difference 
in the managerial optimism for CEO personal traits, skills and experiences, and 
networking. Mann-Whitney U test is used to examine the following hypothesis: 
 
Null Hypothesis Testing: The distribution for CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and 
experiences, and networking) is the same across optimistic CEOs and non-optimistic 
CEOs. 
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For the multivariate analyses, we use logistic regression to examine the influence of CEOs’ 
personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking) towards their optimistic 
behaviour. We construct CEO personal Traits Index, Skills and Experiences Index, and 
Networking Index, using two methods: Binomial method and Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA).  
 
We employ Fracassi and Tate’s (2012) method; these authors create a Social Networking 
Index (SNI) using the aggregate measure of all networking connections: the sum of 
current employment, prior employment, education and other activity connections. From 
this binomial method, we construct a Binomial Traits Index (B-TI), a Binomial Skills and 
Experiences Index (B-SEI), and a Binomial Networking Index (B-NI). In this study, 
indexes are created by classifying all the variables into dummy variables (1, 0) and we 
follow Fracassi and Tate’s (2012) method by aggregating the sum of CEO Traits, the sum 
of CEO Skills and Experiences, and the sum of CEO Networking respectively.  
 
We also construct indexes using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is used to 
reduce the dimensionality of a data set that consists of inter-correlated variables by 
extracting the most important information (Wood, 2009; Abdi & Williams, 2010). PCA 
is widely used in economic and finance studies to create indexes (e.g., Filmer & Pritchett, 
2001; Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Chau & Deesomsak, 2014). Since this study includes a 
large number of variables for CEO personal traits, skills and experiences, and networking, 
principal component analysis (PCA) is employed to reduce the large number of variables 
to obtain a smaller number of variables while keeping most of the information from the 
large set of variables. By using the PCA method, we create a PCA Traits Index (PCA-TI), 
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a PCA Skills and Experiences Index (PCA-SEI), and a PCA Networking Index (PCA-
NI). 
 
For this analysis, some data are transformed into binary form before constructing a new 
index. For CEO age, the younger CEO is denoted as 1 and older CEO is assigned dummy 
zero. The classification of younger and older CEOs is based on the average age of the 
CEO in the sample, below average age CEOs being considered as a young CEO. For 
marital status, the data are transformed to dummy variable (of 1, 0) to indicate a married 
CEO as 1, a single CEO as zero.  
 
Before creating a Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), all data are transformed into binary 
data (1, 0). For tenure as CEO, if the CEO has worked in the current position for longer 
than the average year in the sample, then they are noted as 1. Additionally, if the CEO 
has above average emoluments compared with all the CEOs in the sample, he or she is 
assigned dummy 1; those CEOs who have been paid lower than the average in the sample 
are noted as dummy zero.  
 
To construct a Networking Index (NI), data are transformed: CEOs who work longer than 
the average years with the firm compared with other CEOs in the sample are noted as 1; 
if they work fewer than the average years with the firm compared to others, then dummy 
zero is assigned. The external directorship data are transformed into binary form: CEOs 
who hold outside appointments are denoted as 1, otherwise zero is assigned.  
 
This study investigates 248 CEOs who worked with UK FTSE 100 firms from 2000 to 
2013 by looking at the effect of their personal traits, skills and experiences, and 
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networking toward their optimistic behaviour. This study uses a unique dataset, whereby 
the data were manually collected from various sources. Our main proxy for managerial 
optimism (MO) is Mergers and Acquisitions (MA), while stock options and Insider 
Transactions are used as sensitivity tests. Logistic regression is used to examine the 
incremental power of the Traits Index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and 
Networking Index (NI) after controlling for firm and macroeconomic effect.  
 
The specification of the regressions models are as follows: 
Model I     : 𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model II  : 𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝐼(𝑇𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model III    : 𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝐼(𝑆𝐸𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model IV : 𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝐼(𝑁𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
Model V   : 𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝐼(𝑇𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝐼(𝑆𝐸𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑁𝐼(𝑁𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
 
Whereby, 
MO = Managerial Optimism (Proxy by Mergers and 
Acquisitions, M&A) 
 
Z = Vector of control variables (Firm, macroeconomic factors, 
and industry dummies) 
 
TI (Traits Index) =  Index of CEO personal Traits (age, gender, nationality, and 
marital status) 
SEI (Skills and 
Experiences Index) 
= Index of CEO Skills and Experiences (MBA holder, PhD 
holder, Firm Founder, Financial Literacy, Duality, Tenure 
as CEO, and Emolument) 
 
NI (Networking 
Index) 
= Index of CEO Networking ties (Tenure with the firm, 
Internal Promotion, External Directorships, and Social 
Networking Prestige) 
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2.4 Results and Discussion 
 
This section presents and discusses the results obtained from the data analysis. In this 
study, Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) is used as dependent variable to proxy 
Managerial Optimistic (MO) behaviour. The study comprises explanatory variables to 
represent CEO attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking) and control 
variables of firm, industry, and macroeconomic effects. The results reported in this 
section consist of summaries of statistics, correlation coefficients, univariate analyses of 
CEOs’ personal attributes for overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs, and lastly, the 
panel logistic regression results to examine the explanatory power of the independent 
variables (Traits Index, Skills and Experiences Index, and Networking Index) on 
managerial optimism. For this study, 248 CEOs from the UK FTSE100 firms are 
examined and the study period was from 2000 to 2013. 
 
2.4.1 Summary Statistics 
Based on the data collected from the UK FTSE 100 firms, the descriptive statistics 
presented in Table 2.10 include the dependent variable, explanatory variables and control 
variables used in this study. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is used as a proxy for 
managerial optimism in this study, the final sample consists of 1061 observations with 
17.34% of the CEOs in the sample having been identified as optimistic. By using stock 
options as a proxy for overconfidence, Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos (2010) study 
private firms in the UK and find that 30% of CEOs in their sample are overconfident. 
Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) study CEO optimism and firm’s innovation growth 
find their sample consisted of 8.12% press based optimistic CEOs and  61.08% option 
based measure optimistic CEOs. 
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Table 2.10 
Descriptive Statistics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the study. This study covers 
UK FTSE 100 firms from 2000 to 2013. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for Mergers and 
Acquisitions (MA), which is used as the dependent variable to measure managerial optimistic 
(MO) behaviour. Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for explanatory variables: CEO 
attributes (Traits, Skills and Experiences, and Networking), and Panel C shows the firm and 
macroeconomic factors which are included in this study as control variables. 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable (Managerial Optimism) 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
Mergers and Acquisitions (MA) 0.1734 0 1 0 0.3787 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables (CEO Attributes) 
1. CEO Personal Traits      
 Mean Median Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
Age (AGE) 52.6239 53 77 31 5.6908 
Gender (GEN) 0.9575 1 1 0 0.2016 
Nationality (NAT) 0.6776 1 1 0 0.4675 
Marital Status (MS) 1.0169 1 3 0 0.3157 
Binomial Traits Index (B-TI) 0.7726 0.75 1 0.25 0.1910 
PCA Traits Index (PCA-TI) -0.0004 0.4844 1.7984 -4.3989 1.0697 
2. CEO Skills and Experiences 
 Mean Median Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
MBA holder (MBA) 0.1922 0 1 0 0.3942 
PhD holder (PHD) 0.1215 0 1 0 0.3269 
Firm Founder (FOU) 0.0574 0 1 0 0.2328 
Financial Literacy (FL) 0.5061 1 1 0 0.5001 
Duality (DUA) 0.0386 0 1 0 0.1928 
Tenure as CEO (TCEO) 5.9359 4 34 1 5.1693 
Emolument (EMO) 0.0047 0.0020 0.1125 0 0.0086 
Binomial Skills and Experiences  Index (B-SEI) 0.2315 0.2857 0.5714 0 0.1489 
PCA Skills and Experiences Index (PCA-SEI)  0.0005 -0.4043 4.0153 -1.8397 1.1853 
3. CEO Networking 
 Mean Median Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
Tenure With the Firm (TWF) 14.8492 12 43 1 10.5950 
Internal Promotion (IP) 0.7304 1 1 0 0.4439 
External Directorships (ETD) 0.9217 1 15 0 1.5017 
Social Networking Prestige (SNP) 0.6116 1 1 0 0.4875 
Binomial Networking Index (B-NI) 0.5841 0.5 1 0 0.2678 
PCA Networking Index (PCA-NI) -0.0001 0.0982 1.4790 -2.068 1.2434 
Panel C:  Control Variables 
1.  Firm level data 
 Mean Median Max. Min. Std. Dev. 
Corporate Governance (CG) 0.6453 0.6428 1 0 0.1320 
Firm Size (FS) 15.9343 15.7819 21.4412 11.3161 1.8932 
Leverage (LEV) 0.2305 0.2192 1.6723 0 0.1627 
Market to Book Ratio (MTB) 3.1582 2.44 202.32 -540.14 23.2287 
Profitability (PRO) 0.0884 0.0781 0.6353 -0.8357 0.0966 
2. Macroeconomic Factors 
 Mean Median Max.  Min.  Std. Dev. 
Log GDP 14.1093 14.1643 14.2938 13.8025 0.1473 
Log Stock Market Return (SMR) 8.5842 8.6532 8.7560 8.2371 0.1572 
Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) -10.1884 
 
-6.1 
 
-1.88 
 
-21.35 
 
7.2197 
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We summarise all the explanatory variables (CEO personal attributes) used in this 
empirical chapter in Table 2.11. The table shows that most of the CEOs in the UK FTSE 
firms are male; only 4.25% of the CEOs are female. The same phenomenon occurs in the 
US, for instance Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) also report the appointment of a high 
proportion of male CEOs (92.3%). In contrast, 34.9% of the CEOs in Graham, Harvey 
and Puri‘s sample possess an MBA degree, while in our sample, only 19.22 % of the 
CEOs hold an MBA degree. As the UK market is considered one of the mature markets, 
only 5.74 % of the CEOs are firm founders.  
 
Table 2.11 
Summary of CEOs’ Attributes  
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the explanatory variables used in this study (CEO 
Personal Traits, CEO Skills and Experiences, and CEO Networking); the CEOs personal 
attributes data were gathered from UK FTSE100 firms from 2000 to 2013. 
1. CEO Personal Traits 
Age Youngest CEO is 31 years old, eldest is 77. Average is 53 years old. 
Gender 95.75 % of CEOs are male, 4.25 % are female 
Nationality 67.76 % of CEOs hold UK nationality, 32.24 % CEOs hold non-UK 
nationality  
Marital Status Maximum number of times married = 3. Average is 1.02 times. 
2. CEO Skills and Experiences 
MBA holder 19.22 % of the CEOs hold an MBA degree 
PhD holder 12.15 % of the CEOs have a PhD 
Firm Founder 5.74 % of the CEOs are firm founders 
Financial Literacy 50.61 % of the CEOs possess financial literacy 
Duality 3.86 % of the CEOs hold the post of chairman at the same time 
Tenure as CEO Average tenure as CEO is 5.94 years, the longest is 34 years 
Emolument Average CEOs receive 0.47 % of the value of the firm’s total asset as 
their pay. 
3. CEO Networking 
Tenure with the 
Firm 
Average CEOs work with the firm for 14.85 years. The longest service 
period is 43 years. 
Internal Promotion 73.04 % of the CEOs are internally promoted. 
External 
Directorships 
Average CEOs hold less than 1 directorship in other firms (0.92). 
Social Networking 
Prestige 
 
61.16% of the CEOs have external social networking ties. 
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Since the main purpose of this study is to examine managerial optimistic behaviour, In 
addition to looking at the summary of total sample statistics, we categorised the optimistic 
CEOs in our sample according to sub-groups. The sub-group statistics provide a closer 
outlook at optimistic CEOs in different group based on their personal attributes (traits, 
skills and experiences, and networking). As the statistics in Table 2.12 show, for the sub-
group statistics for CEO personal traits, our optimistic CEOs fall in the age range of 41-
60 years, and the CEOs in this age range represent 89.68% of the optimistic CEOs 
observations in our total sample.  
 
Our final sample consists of 1061 observations. Of the CEOs in the sample 184 are 
identified as optimistic, all of which are male. Our sample shows that none of the 
optimistic CEO is female. This might be due to the small number of female CEOs in UK 
FTSE100 firms: there are only 45 observations of female CEOs during our 14-year 
sample period.  
 
Within the sub-group, CEOs holding UK nationality are found to have a higher 
percentage of optimistic classification (19.05%) than non-UK nationality CEOs (13.74%). 
In our total sample, 74.46% of our optimistic CEOs hold UK nationality while 25.54% 
hold non-UK nationality. As for marital status, our results show that none of our single 
status CEOs are optimistic; all of our optimistic CEOs observations come from CEOs 
who have been married once or twice. 
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Table 2.12 
Summary of Optimistic CEOs in Sub Group and Total Sample 
 
The table presents the number of optimistic CEOs (Op CEO) in different sub-groups and the 
percentage of the observations in the sub-group and in the total sample. The summary statistics 
for optimistic CEOs are based on their personal attributes (CEO Traits, Skills and Experiences, 
and Networking). The final sample consists of 1061 observations from 248 CEOs who worked 
with UK FTSE 100 firms from 2000 to 2013. 
 
 
Panel A: The number of optimistic CEOs based on their personal traits  
 
 Sub-group No. of 
observations 
No. of 
Op 
CEOs 
% of 
Op CEOs in 
sub-group 
%  of 
Op CEOs in  
Total Sample 
Age 31-40 years old 16 0 0.00% 0.00% 
 41-50 years old 366 74 20.22% 40.22% 
 51-60 years old 608 91 14.97% 49.46% 
 61-70 years old 67 19 28.36% 10.33% 
 71-80 years old 4 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Gender  Male 1016 184 18.11% 100.00% 
 Female 45 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Nationality  UK nationality  719 137 19.05% 74.46% 
 Non-UK nationality 342 47 13.74% 25.54% 
Marital  
Status 
 
 
Single 41 0 0.00% 0.00% 
1st marriage 964 162 16.80% 88.04% 
2nd marriage 53 22 41.51% 11.96% 
3rd marriage 3 0 0.00% 0.00% 
     
 
Panel B: The number of optimistic CEOs based on their personal skills and experiences 
 
 Sub-group No. of 
observations 
No. of 
Op 
CEOs 
% of 
Op CEOs in 
sub-group 
%  of 
Op CEOs in 
Total Sample 
MBA holder Holder  204 23 11.27% 12.50% 
 Non-holder  857 161 18.79% 87.50% 
PhD holder Holder  125 24 19.20% 13.04% 
 Non-holder 923 160 17.33% 86.96% 
Firm Founder Founder 61 14 22.95% 7.61% 
Non-founder 1000 170 17.00% 92.39% 
Financial 
Literacy 
Yes  537 104 19.37% 56.52% 
No  524 80 15.27% 43.48% 
Duality As CEO and 
chairman 41 5 12.20% 2.72% 
 Holding only CEO 
post  1020 179 17.55% 97.28% 
Tenure as 
CEO 
1- 5 years 640 81 12.66% 44.02% 
6-15 years 364 85 23.35% 46.20% 
More than 15 years 57 18 31.58% 9.78% 
Emolument Less than sample 
mean  734 116 15.80% 63.04% 
More than sample 
mean  327 68 20.80% 36.96% 
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Panel C: The number of optimistic CEOs based on their personal networking 
 
 Sub-group No. of  
observations 
No. of  
Op 
 CEOs 
%  of 
Op 
 CEOs in 
sub-group 
%  of  
Op 
 CEOs in Total  
Sample 
Tenure With 
the Firm 
Less than 15 years 615 78 12.68% 42.39% 
15 or more years 446 106 23.77% 57.61% 
Internal  
Promotion 
Internally promoted 775 156 20.13% 84.78% 
New recruitment 286 28 9.79% 15.22% 
External  
Directorships 
No external 
appointment 
478 
 
62 
 
12.97% 
 
33.70% 
 
1 external 
directorship 393 79 20.10% 42.93% 
2 external 
directorships 122 33 27.05% 17.93% 
3 or more external 
directorships 
68 
 
10 
 
14.71% 
 
5.43% 
 
Social  
Networking 
Prestige 
Yes 649 113 17.41% 61.41% 
No 412 
 
 
71 
 
 
17.23% 
 
 
38.59% 
 
 
 
 
For CEO Skills and Experiences indicators, the statistics show a higher percentage of 
optimistic CEO observations among PhD holders, however more optimistic CEOs fall in 
the non-holder of MBA sub-group. A higher percentage of optimistic CEOs can be 
observed among the firm founder CEOs. A higher percentage of CEOs who possess 
financial knowledge are classified as optimistic compared with the group of CEOs who 
are identified as financial non-literate. However, CEOs who simultaneously hold the post 
of chairman show lower percentages of optimistic observations among themselves and 
also in the total sample. The observations of CEOs who also hold the post of firm 
chairman are relatively few: 3.86% in our study. The statistics also show that the CEOs 
who worked in their current position for more than six years (average CEO tenure is 5.94 
years) have the highest percentage of optimistic CEOs observations. Additionally, we 
also find a higher percentage of optimistic CEOs categorised in the high emolument group.  
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Results for CEO networking show that the group of CEOs who worked with the firm for 
more than 15 years (average CEOs work with the firm for 14.85 years), internally 
promoted CEOs, CEOs who hold more external directorships, and CEOs with social 
networking prestige tend to have more observations classified as optimistic. These 
statistics show that CEOs who have more networking ties are more likely to become 
optimistic than those who have fewer such ties. 
 
2.4.2 Correlation Coefficients 
 
Correlation coefficients among the variables used in this study are presented in Table 2.13. 
Our dependent variables are significantly correlated with most of the explanatory 
variables. Panel A in Table 2.13 presents the correlation coefficients among all the 
variables including dependent variables (managerial optimism proxy by Mergers and 
Acquisitions) and explanatory variables (CEO personal traits, skills and experiences, and 
networking). The table shows that male, UK nationality, and married CEOs tend to have 
a significant positive correlation with managerial optimism (MO). In terms of CEOs’ 
skills and experiences, CEOs’ financial literacy, tenure as CEO, and emoluments show 
significant positive correlations with MO. In addition, CEO’s tenure with the firm, 
internal promotion and external directorship appointments also exhibit significant 
positive correlations with MO.  
 
Our results show that the CEO attributes that we examined in this study do correlate with 
their optimistic behaviour to a certain extent. Human complexity would suggest that 
investigating the combination of CEOs’ attributes may help us to quantify a more 
complete composition of human behaviour than examining the effect of single attributes 
on their behaviour. Hence we compose a CEO personal traits index (TI), Skills and 
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Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index (NI), and aim to capture more 
comprehensive behaviour. Each of the indexes is constructed using binomial method and 
principal components analysis (PCA). Fracassi and Tate (2012) use the aggregate sum of 
binomial variables and for PCA, we follow Filmer and Pritchett’s (2001) index 
construction method. The correlation results show that these two methods may be used to 
complement each other.  For instance, the Binomial Traits Index (B-TI) shows a 
significant correlation with the Principal Component Analysis Traits Index (PCA-TI) 
(0.849) at the 99% confidence interval. The Binomial Skills and Experiences Index (B-
SEI) shows a positive correlation with the PCA Skills and Experiences Index (PCA-SEI) 
(0.704) significant at the 99% confidence interval. Lastly, the Binomial Networking Index 
(B-NI) also exhibits a positive correlation with the PCA Networking Index (PCA-NI) 
(0.644) significant at the 99% confidence interval. Hence, we suggest that the Binomial 
and PCA index construction method in our study are substitutable. In sum, all of our 
indexes (B-TI, B-SEI, B-NI, PCA-TI, PCA-SEI, and PCA-NI) show significant positive 
correlations with MO at the 99% confidence interval. 
 
Panel C of Table 2.13 presents the correlation among managerial optimism and the 
control variables used in this study. Corporate Governance (CG), firm size (FS), and GDP 
are found to have significant negative correlations with MO, while Leverage (LEV), 
market to book value (MTB), and firm profitability (PRO) exhibit significant positive 
correlation with MO. 
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Table 2.13 
 Correlation Coefficient Analysis 
 
Panel A presents the correlation coefficients among all the variables including the dependent variable (managerial optimism proxy by Mergers and 
Acquisitions) and explanatory variables (CEO personal traits, skills and experiences, and networking). Panel B shows the correlation coefficients among 
the dependent variable (Mergers and Acquisitions) and the indexes (Traits Index, Skills and Experiences Index, and Networking Index). Lastly, Panel C 
presents the correlation coefficients among managerial optimism and the control variables used in this study. The correlation coefficients presented are 
analysed using Spearman’s rho test. 
 
 
Panel A: Correlation coefficients among managerial optimism with CEO personal traits, skill and experiences (dependent variable and 
explanatory variables) 
 
 
MO 
 
AGE 
 
GEN 
 
NAT 
 
MS 
 
MBA 
 
PHD 
 
FOU 
 
FL 
 
DUA 
 
TCEO 
 
EMO 
 
TWF 
 
IP 
 
ETD 
 
SNP 
 
MO 1.000                
AGE -.029 1.000               
GEN .096*** .036 1.000              
NAT .066** -.031 .135*** 1.000             
MS .159** .177** .010 -.034 1.000            
MBA -.078** -.054* .031 -.216*** -.071** 1.000           
PhD .012 .162*** .035 -.175*** -.093*** .038 1.000          
FOU .037 .144*** .052* -.072** -.012 .106*** -.055* 1.000         
FL .054* -.098*** -.021 .182*** -.148*** -.130*** -.140*** .179*** 1.000        
DUA -.027 .108*** .042 -.050 .123*** -.085*** .060* .098*** -.134*** 1.000       
TCEO .178*** .316*** -.015 .073** -.001 -.071** .023 .328*** .052* .114*** 1.000      
EMO .104** -.111** -.069* -.026 -.016 -.076* -.049 .157** -.205** .083** .277** 1.000     
TWF .143*** .205*** .171*** .104*** .023 -.087*** .016 .209*** -.030 .053* .430*** .002 1.000    
IP .121*** -.036 .304*** .090*** .062** .000 -.040 .150*** .054* -.021 .096*** -.061** .640*** 1.000   
ETD .103*** .201*** -.126*** -.009 -.039 -.056* .161*** .033 .071** .094*** .129*** -.022 .046 -.076** 1.000  
SNP .002 .042 .024 .261*** -.020 -.009 -.029 .130*** .377*** .059* .203*** -.175*** .103*** .039 .035 1.000 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel B: Correlation coefficients among managerial optimism with all the indexes used in the study (Traits Index, Skills and Experiences 
Index, Networking Index) 
 
  
MO 
 
B-TI 
 
B-SEI 
 
B-NI 
 
PCA-TI 
 
PCA-SEI 
 
PCA-NI 
 
MO 1.000       
B-TI .112*** 1.000      
B-SEI .095*** -.089*** 1.000     
B-NI .173*** .074** .263*** 1.000    
PCA-TI .097*** .849*** -.025 .148***    
PCA-SEI .129*** .015 .704*** .298*** .071** 1.000  
PCA-NI .104*** .127*** .156*** .644*** .165*** .234*** 1.000 
 
 
Panel C: Correlation coefficients among managerial optimism with control variables (firm and macroeconomic factors) 
 
 
 
 
MO 
 
CG 
 
FS 
 
LEV 
 
MTB 
 
PRO 
 
GDP 
 SMR 
 
CCI 
 
MO 1.000         
CG -.083*** 1.000        
FS -.082*** .291*** 1.000       
LEV .067** -.042 .037 1.000      
MTB .066** -.012 -.289*** .111*** 1.000     
PRO .074** .053 -.381*** .021 .507*** 1.000    
GDP -.079*** .353*** .183*** .002 .008 .043 1.000   
SMR -.010 .033 .044 .001 .128*** .042 .235*** 1.000  
CCI  .033 -.264*** -.156*** -.004 .074** .023 -.698*** -.125*** 1.000 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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2.4.3 Univariate Analyses 
 
For univariate analyses, we use both parametric and non-parametric tests to examine the 
difference in means and distribution across optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs. 
Independent sample t-test is used for equality of means; the compare means is carried 
out to determine whether there is any statistically significant difference between 
optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs in terms of their personal attributes (traits, skills 
and experiences, and networking). In addition to the CEO attributes, we also examine 
whether there are any significant differences for Traits Index, Skills and Experiences 
Index, and Networking Index between optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs. Meanwhile, 
as some of our data are in binary form, we employ a non-parametric test - the Mann-
Whitney U test - to analyse the distribution across optimistic (Op) and non-optimistic 
(Non-Op) CEOs. The results for univariate analyses are reported in Table 2.14. 
 
Table 2.14 presents the univariate analyses for optimistic (Op) and non-optimistic CEO 
(Non-Op) in our sample. The univariate results show that age of a CEO does not 
significantly differ between optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs in UK firms. Our result 
is inconsistent with that of Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013), who mention that younger 
CEOs are risk-tolerant and more confident compared to older CEOs, while Mohamed, 
Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri’s  (2012) result shows younger age in CEOs is positively 
correlated with CEOs’ optimism bias. 
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Table 2.14 
Univariate Analyses for Optimistic and Non-optimistic CEOs 
 
The table shows the compare means results and Mann-Whitney U test results for managerial 
optimistic proxy by Mergers and Acquisitions with CEO personal attributes (Traits, Skills and 
Experiences, and Networking). For compare means analyses, the results presented here are based 
on the significant difference of means between optimistic (Op) and non-optimistic (Non-Op) 
CEOs, while for the Mann-Whitney U test, this is our hypothesis testing: The distribution is the 
same across Op CEOs and Non-Op CEOs. 
 
 
Panel A: CEO Personal Traits 
 Parametric test : 
 Compare means 
 
Non parametric test: 
Mann-Whitney U test 
 
 Op CEO Non-Op CEO Significant difference Significant difference 
AGE 52.4510 52.6602   
GEN 1.0000 0.9486 *** *** 
NAT 0.7445 0.6636 ** ** 
MS 1.1195 0.9954 *** *** 
B-TI 0.8179 0.7631 *** *** 
PCA-TI 0.2053 -0.0430 *** *** 
 
Panel B: CEO Skills and Experiences  
 Parametric test :  
Compare means 
 
Non parametric test: 
Mann-Whitney U test 
 Op CEO Non-Op CEO Significant difference Significant difference 
MBA  0.1250 0.2063 *** ** 
PhD 0.1304 0.1197   
FOU 0.0760 0.0535   
FL 0.5652 0.4937 * * 
DUA 0.0271 0.0410   
TCEO 7.9728 5.5085 *** *** 
EMO 0.4351 0.4849  *** 
B-SEI 0.2647 0.2246 *** *** 
PCA-SEI 0.3320 -0.0696 *** *** 
 
Panel C: CEO Networking 
 Parametric test :  
Compare means 
 
Non parametric test: 
Mann-Whitney U test 
 Op CEO Non-Op CEO Significant difference Significant difference 
TWF 17.9402 14.2006 *** *** 
IP 0.8478 0.7058 *** *** 
ETD 1.3260 0.8369 *** *** 
SNP 0.6141 0.6111   
B-NI 0.6807 0.5638 *** *** 
PCA-NI 
 
0.3554 -0.0745 *** *** 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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The results obtained show a significant difference at the 99% confidence level across the 
Op and Non-Op CEOs in terms of CEOs’ gender. From the compare means results, male 
CEOs are more likely to become optimistic, a result that finds support in Deaux and 
Farris’s (1977) study, whose authors mention that males tend to have higher expectancies 
of their own ability compared with females, and from this viewpoint they are more likely 
to have optimistic beliefs. Our finding is consistent with those of Barber and Odean 
(2001), Bhandari and Deaves (2010), Huang and Kisgen (2012) and Graham, Harvey and 
Puri (2013), However, our finding differs from those of Ben-David, Graham and Harvey 
(2007), Acker and Duck (2008) and Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2013), 
who find no significant difference between males and females with overconfident 
behaviour.  
 
Our univariate analyses show that CEOs’ nationality is significantly different at the 95% 
confidence interval across Op and Non-Op CEOs: Op CEOs have higher mean values 
compared with Non-Op CEOs.  Our findings support those of Mendenhall and Odduo 
(1985) and Clarke and Hammer (1995), who indicate that expatriate managers who work 
in a different cultural working environment are exposed to cultural-toughness. Foreign 
CEOs may also be less privy to local network, therefore may have less information 
compare with UK nationality CEOs. From this, we may conclude that non-UK nationality 
CEOs will need to put in more effort to be able to interact effectively with their national 
hosts, hence they are less likely to become optimistic compared to UK nationality CEOs 
who are more comfortable working in their home country. Our finding is consistent with 
that of Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013), who study the optimism between US and non-
US top executives and find that US-based CEOs and CFOs are more optimistic than their 
Non-US counterparts.  
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In the case of CEOs’ marital status, our results show that optimistic and non- optimistic 
CEOs are significantly different at the 99% confidence level, the higher means for 
optimistic CEOs show that the married CEOs are more likely to become optimistic. Our 
finding supports the idea of marital status as a positive personal trait that indicates 
stability, maturity and responsibility (Bloch and Kuskin, 1978; Judge, Cable, Boudreau 
and Bretz, 1995), hence married CEOs are more likely to become optimistic, as shown in 
our findings. Our findings are consistent with those of Puri and Robinson (2007) and 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009). 
 
The Traits Indexes also show significant difference at the 99% confidence interval in 
compare means and distribution across optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs. For the 
Binomial Traits Index (B-TI), optimistic CEOs show a higher value (0.8179) than non-
optimistic CEOs (0.7631), while PCA Traits Index (PCA-TI) also shows the same result: 
Op CEOs have a positive mean index value of  0.2053, while Non-Op CEOs have a 
negative mean index value (-0.0430).  Thus, we may conclude that the traits indexes (age, 
gender, nationality, and marital status) of an optimistic CEO are significantly different 
from the traits of non-optimistic CEOs  
 
In the case of CEO Skills and Experiences, CEOs holding a MBA degree, Op CEOs and 
Non-Op CEOs show significantly different means, and Non-Op CEOs show higher means 
values compared to Op CEOs. This implies that CEOs who hold a MBA degree are less 
likely to become optimistic, a finding consistent with that of Graham, Harvey and Puri 
(2013), who found MBA holders are significantly averse to sure losses. Our findings are 
inconsistent with those of Chevalier and Ellison (1999), who found that fund managers 
holding an MBA are more risk tolerant. Our univariate analyses show there is no 
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significant difference in term of becoming optimistic between Op and Non-Op CEOs who 
hold a PhD degree.  
 
Although we expect the CEO as a firm founder will be more likely to become optimistic, 
the univariate analyses show no significant difference between Op and non-Op CEOs in 
terms of CEO was also a firm founder. This may be because our study sample includes 
only a few founder CEOs. The study by Andriosopoulos, Andriosopoulos and Hoque 
(2013) find a non-significant relationship between CEOs who are founders of a firm with 
the share-buyback completion rates.  
 
From the aspect of financial literacy, we find significant differences of means and the 
distribution of Op and Non-Op CEOs. The higher means in Op CEOs show that CEOs 
with financial knowledge will be more likely to become optimistic. This finding supports 
that of Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) who note that directors who have financial 
expertise significantly influence corporate decisions (in our study we use high frequencies 
of merger and acquisition activities as MO proxy).  Our finding contrasts with that of 
Bhandari and Deaves (2010), who argue that a person with greater knowledge is less 
likely to become overconfident.  
 
In the case of CEO duality, our results show no significant difference between Op and 
Non-Op CEOs, a finding consistent with that of Malmendier and Tate (2005a), who find 
that the duality status of CEO does not affect his/her overconfident behaviour. However, 
our finding is inconsistent with that of Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri (2012), 
who suggest a positive relationship between duality and an optimistic bias. Our non-
significant univariate result may be due to most of the CEOs in our sample not holding 
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the post of chairman at the same time, as suggested by the Combined Code principle A.2, 
stating that UK firms should separate the positions of chairman and CEO. 
 
CEOs who work longer at their current position are found to be more likely to become 
optimistic.  There is a significant difference between the Op and Non-Op CEOs, wherein 
the Op CEOs work an average of 7.9 years while Non-Op CEOs work an average of 5.5 
years. Our findings are consistent with those of Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri 
(2012), Brennan and Conroy (2013), and Yim (2013), who suggest a positive relationship 
between CEO tenure and optimistic/overconfident behaviour. However, our finding is 
inconsistent with that of Malmendier and Tate (2005a), who find a non-significant result 
for the relationship between CEO tenure and CEO overconfident behaviour.  
 
When we use compare means analysis, the results show no significant difference between 
Op and Non-Op CEOs in term of emolument. Our finding is inconsistent with that of 
Paredes (2004) who suggests that high chief executive pay tends to result in CEOs 
becoming overconfident. However, using a non-parametric test we found there is a 
significant difference in emoluments across the Op and Non-Op CEOs.  
 
The Skills and Experiences Indexes (B-SEI and PCA-SEI) show a significant difference 
at the 99% confidence interval between optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs. The B-SEI 
of Op CEOs shows a mean of 0.2647, while that of Non-Op CEOs have a mean value of 
0.2246. In the case of PCA-SEI, Op CEOs show a positive mean value (0.3320) while 
Non-Op CEOs a negative mean value (-0.0690). The significant difference in Skill and 
Experiences Indexes between Op and non Op CEOs may imply that CEOs who have more 
skills and experiences will be more likely to become optimistic. 
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The results for CEO networking show that CEOs’ tenure with the firm, internal promotion 
and external directorship have significant differences in means for Op and Non-Op CEOs.  
The results show that Op CEOs tend to work in the same firm for an average longer period 
(17.9 years) compared to Non-Op CEOs’ tenure (14.2 years). This implies that the longer 
a CEO works with the firm, the more likely it is that he/she will become optimistic.  
 
Internally promoted CEOs also tend to show optimistic behaviour with higher means 
compared to those of non-optimistic CEOs. This finding supports that of Goel and Thakor 
(2008), who suggest that the internally promoted manager is more risk loving; Banerjee, 
Dai, Humphery-Jenner and Nanda (2014) also find that overconfident executives are 
more likely to be promoted as CEOs. We find that Op CEOs tend to have more external 
directorship appointments than Non-Op CEOs. Optimistic CEOs held an average of 1.326 
external directorships while non-optimistic CEOs held an average of only 0.8369 such 
directorships. However, our results shows that there is no significant difference in social 
networking prestige between Op and Non-Op CEOs. This finding is inconsistent with that 
of Lucey, Plaksina and Dowling (2013), who find a negative relationship between CEOs’ 
social status and merger activities. 
 
In sum, the CEO Networking Index (B-NI and PCA-NI) shows significant differences in 
means and distribution across optimistic and non-optimistic CEOs at the 99% confidence 
interval. The B-NI means value for Op CEOs is 0.6807, whereas that for Non-Op CEOs 
is 0.5638. The PCA-NI for Op CEOs shows a positive index value of 0.3554, while that 
for Non-Op CEOs shows a negative index value (-0.0745). The networking indexes 
explain that the more networking ties the CEOs have, the more likely they are to become 
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optimistic. This finding is consistent with that of Fracassi and Tate (2012), who observe 
that the CEOs with more network ties tend to have frequent acquisitions. 
 
2.4.4 Multivariate Analyses  
We use five models to observe the incremental power of each of the indexes and the joint 
effect for these indexes on managerial optimism. Model I is used as a control model by 
including the control variables of firm, macroeconomic factors and industry effects. 
Model II is for CEO traits index (B-TI, and PCA-TI), model III for Skills and Experiences 
index (B-SEI, and PCA-SEI), and model IV for networking index (B-NI, and PCA-NI). 
These three models are used to enable us to observe the explanatory power of each of the 
indexes. Lastly, in Model V, includes CEO personal attributes (Traits Index, Skills and 
Experiences Index, and Networking Index) in order to observe the combination 
incremental power of these CEO personal attributes indexes on managerial optimistic 
behaviour.   The results are reported in Table 2.15. 
 
Table 2.15 presents the panel logistic regression results of our five models. The first 
model is the control vector model; the results show that when we control for firm, industry 
effect and macroeconomic factors our model has an R2 of 11.06%. In model I, firm level 
factors (corporate governance and firm size) show a significant negative relationship with 
managerial optimistic behaviour. The corporate governance variable used in this study is 
derived from the number of non-executive directors divided by board size. Hence, our 
result indicates that a greater number of non-executive directors than executive directors 
on the board may effectively control the optimistic behaviour of CEOs. Furthermore, 
CEOs who work with smaller firms tend to increase their likelihood to become optimistic.  
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Table 2.15 
 Results for Managerial Optimism (MO) and CEO Personal Attributes Indexes    
 
The table presents the results for Managerial Optimism proxy by merger and acquisition activities with the five models, which consist of firms and 
macroeconomic variables, industry dummies, CEO Traits Index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index (NI). Panel A presents 
the result for binomial indexes, Panel B shows result of PCA indexes. The results presented are based on the five models as below: 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑰: 𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀, 𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑰𝑰: 𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑇𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀,𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑰𝑰𝑰:  𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑆𝐸𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀, 
𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑰𝑽: 𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑁𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑴𝒐𝒅𝒆𝒍 𝑽:  𝑀𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑍)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑇𝐼)𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3(𝑆𝐸𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑁𝐼)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀, Z-Statistics are 
reported in parentheses and *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Baseline Model 
 
 
Panel A: Binomial Index 
 
 
Panel B: PCA Index 
Model 
 
Model I 
 
Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
C 17.0242 16.7951 18.7327 15.4059 16.0566 17.7191 17.1765 15.7031 16.4524 
 (1.4633) (1.4309) (1.5986) (1.2863) (1.3323) (1.5141) (1.4518) (1.3172) (1.3671) 
Corporate Governance (CG) -1.9087** -1.4556* -1.9321** -1.8216** -1.5190* -1.4073* -1.8423** -1.2881* -1.1466 
 (-2.5337) (-1.8628) (-2.5173) (-2.2927) (-1.8578) (-1.7900) (-2.3744) (-1.6495) (-1.4117) 
Firm Size (FS) -0.2331*** -0.2295*** -0.1789*** -0.3195*** -0.2744*** -0.2561*** -0.1540** -0.3005*** -0.2430*** 
 (-3.9944) (-3.9243) (-3.0206) (-5.0973) (-4.1454) (-4.2682) (-2.5169) (-4.8895) (-3.7064) 
Leverage (LEV) 0.8086 0.6223 1.0248* 1.1256** 1.0655* 0.5656 1.0191* 1.0507* 1.0283* 
 (1.5175) (1.1613) (1.8956) (2.0217) (1.9078) (1.0245) (1.8865) (1.9028) (1.8254) 
Market to Book Ratio (MTB) 0.0018 0.0020 0.0018 0.0010 0.0013 0.0017 0.0018 0.0015 0.0015 
 (0.3407) (0.3721) (0.3199) (0.1832) (0.2296) (0.3233) (0.3241) (0.2844) (0.2781) 
Profitability (PRO) -0.8667 -0.6311 -1.2340 -1.3331 -1.1885 -0.7681 -0.8609 -1.8489** -1.5592* 
 (-0.9730) (-0.7002) (-1.3666) (-1.4381) (-1.2718) (-0.8541) (-0.9483) (-2.0032) (-1.6643) 
Log GDP -1.0378 -1.1453 -1.2591 -0.9210 -1.1180 -1.0895 -1.1640 -0.8642 -1.0192 
 (-1.2626) (-1.3770) (-1.5175) (-1.0852) (-1.3033) (-1.3163) (-1.3890) (-1.0219) (-1.1908) 
Log Stock Market Return (SMR) -0.0883 -0.0549 -0.0856 -0.1326 -0.1030 -0.0769 -0.0581 -0.1424 -0.1005 
 (-0.1647) (-0.1015) (-0.1583) (-0.2398) (-0.1852) (-0.1427) (-0.1068) (-0.2600) (-0.1818) 
Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) -0.0168 -0.0187 -0.0169 -0.0162 -0.0179 -0.0165 -0.0168 -0.0107 -0.0121 
 (-1.0156) (-1.1259) (-1.0110) (-0.9487) (-1.0442) (-0.9924) (-1.0056) (-0.6287) (-0.7132) 
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Traits Index (TI)  1.4383***   1.1457** 0.2467***   0.1287 
  (3.0135)   (2.2750) (2.6570)   (1.2956) 
Skills & Experiences Index (SEI)   2.2258***  1.0088  0.3324***  0.2283*** 
   (3.4090)  (1.4071)  (4.2273)  (2.7641) 
Networking index (NI)    2.4145*** 2.1346***   0.4595*** 0.3693*** 
    (6.4901) (5.3169)   (5.6150) (4.1862) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1106 0.1203 0.1227 0.1590 0.1656 0.1186 0.1287 0.1465 0.1556 
Incremental R2 - 0.97% 1.21% 4.84% 5.50% 0.80% 1.81% 3.59% 4.50% 
Observations  1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 1061 
Dep = 0 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 877 
Dep = 1 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
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To examine the incremental power of different indexes independently, we test each index 
in different models (panel A for binomial indexes and panel B for PCA indexes). For 
instance, Model II is aimed to test the incremental power of traits index (TI) in the control 
model I; the results show an increase of 0.97% of the TI in the binomial index model, and 
0.80% for the PCA index model. Both of the CEO personal traits indexes show a significant 
positive relationship with CEO optimistic behaviour at the 99% confidence interval.  
 
In the case of Model III, we include CEO Skills and Experiences indexes (SEI) in the model 
I to examine the incremental power of these indexes. The binomial model for SEI shows an 
increase of 1.21% and the PCA model of SEI shows a slightly higher incremental power of 
1.81% compared to the control Model I. Both of these indexes show a significant positive 
relationship with managerial optimistic behaviour at the 99% confidence interval. 
 
We test the networking indexes in Model IV, Binomial Networking Index (NI) in panel A 
and PCA Networking Index (NI) in panel B. Both binomial and PCA networking indexes 
show a significant positive relationship with CEO optimistic behaviour at the 99% 
confidence interval. 
 
Model V is used to investigate the joint effect of all the CEO attributes indexes, i.e. to 
examine the combination of the overall effect of CEO Personal Traits Index, CEO Skills 
and Experiences Index and CEO Networking Index. The results shows that by using 
binomial indexes the incremental explanatory power of the indexes is increase by 5.5% 
while the combination of PCA indexes contributes 4.5% additional explanatory power 
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The significant positive coefficients between the indexes (Traits Index, Skills and 
Experiences Index, and Networking Index) with CEO optimism implies that the CEO who 
has higher Traits Index, Skills and Experiences Index, and Networking Index values is more 
likely to become optimistic. Hence, we may conclude that CEO personal attributes do 
contribute to CEO optimistic behaviour. Additionally, the regressions for Binomial Index 
and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) index yield identical results, suggesting that 
these two methods of constructing an index are substitutable.  
 
The panel logistic regression results confirm our prediction that CEO personal traits do 
increase the likelihood of CEOs’ optimistic behaviour.  Hence, based on our Traits Index 
result, we may conclude that younger CEOs, Male CEOs, UK nationality CEOs, and 
married CEOs tend to be more likely to become optimistic. Our result is consistent with 
that of Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013), who study the US market and mention that 
younger CEOs, male CEOs and US nationality CEOs are more risk-tolerant (risk-taking) 
and more likely to become optimistic. Furthermore, Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri 
(2012) also find that CEOs’ age is correlated with their optimism bias (younger CEOs have 
a greater optimism bias). However, our finding is inconsistent with those of Andriosopoulos, 
Andriosopoulos and Hoque (2013), and Yim (2013), who find that older CEOs tend to have 
a positive relationship with their decision-making.  
 
In the case of CEOs’ gender differences, our finding is consistent with those of Barber and 
Odean (2001), Bhandari and Deaves (2010) and Huang and Kisgen (2012) who suggest 
that males tend to be more overconfident than females. However, our result differs from 
that of Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007), who found no significant difference 
between males and females with regard to overconfident behaviour. Our results show that 
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married CEOs tend to have an increased likelihood of becoming optimistic, a finding 
supporting  Puri and Robinson’s (2007) and Grinblatt and Keloharju’s (2009) position that 
married people are more self-confident and more risk tolerant.  
 
Based on the traits index result, CEOs with higher traits index values will have an increased 
likelihood of becoming optimistic. A plausible reason is that younger and male CEOs are 
more risk loving and self-confident. According to Deaux and Farris (1977), males claim to 
have greater ability to perform tasks than do females.  In addition, they also tend to maintain 
their self-image of competency; hence, they are more likely to be optimistic. Moreover, UK 
nationality CEOs are found to be more likely to become optimistic, maybe because they 
are not exposed to cultural-toughness compared with their non-UK counterparts, as they 
are acquainted with the UK’s political and legal system and socioeconomic and business 
environment. A plausible reason why married CEOs are found to be more likely to become 
optimistic in our study is that married status is a positive attribute combining stability, 
maturity and responsibility as Bloch and Kuskin (1978) suggest. Additionally, Judge, Cable, 
Boudreau and Bretz (1995) mention that marital status has a positive impact on an 
executive’s career success: and indeed the study results show that UK FTSE 100 firms’ 
married CEOs tend to become optimistic than the single CEOs. 
 
The Skills and Experiences Index (SEI) constructed in this study suggests that the higher 
the skills and experiences a CEO has, the more likely he/she will become optimistic. This 
index comprises the following constituents: holder of MBA or PhD, firm founder, 
financially literate, duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments. Hence, our result is consistent 
with those of Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Larwood and Whittaker (1977), and 
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Malmendier and Tate (2005a) who suggest that a corporate executive that holding a MBA, 
or management studies is positively correlated with optimism.  
 
Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) and Buyl, Boone, Hendriks and Matthyssens (2011) 
suggest that CEOs who are also firm founders tend to have more influence / power in the 
firm’s decision-making process. Furthermore, Adam, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), 
Fracassi and Tate (2012) and Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri (2012) suggest that 
CEOs who hold the post of chairman at the same time are more dominant in decision 
making as they hold more power. Our results confirm the premise that founder and duality 
CEOs tend to have more power, and show that this power will lead the CEOs to be more 
likely to become optimistic. Also, we find that CEOs who possess financial knowledge are 
more likely to become optimistic, a finding consistent with that of Güner, Malmendier, and 
Tate (2008) and Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013), who find that financial expertise 
significantly influences corporate decisions.   
 
The significant positive relationship between Skills and Experiences Index with CEOs’ 
optimistic behaviour suggests that the longer a CEO works in his/her their current position 
and the higher emoluments he/she receives, the more likely they will be to become 
optimistic. The longer a CEO’s tenure, the more he/she tends to become more influential 
over the board (Yim, 2013), and the more knowledge he/she gains, the more comfortable 
he/she will feel when dealing with the working environment (Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild 
and Bouri, 2012). Emolument received by a CEO is a proxy for CEO dominance (Brown 
and Sarma, 2007). Our results suggest that CEOs who receive above average pay compared 
to other CEOs are more likely to become optimistic. Our finding is consistent with that of 
Paredes (2004).  
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A plausible reason for the higher Skill and Experiences Index value of CEOs tending to 
increase their likelihood to become optimistic is because all the positive qualities of skills 
and experiences will provide them knowledge, dominance and power in their management 
decision making. Hence it is sensible for a CEO who has more skills and experiences will 
become optimistic. 
 
The CEO Networking Index also exhibits a significant positive relationship with CEOs’ 
optimistic behaviour. The networking constituents are tenure with the firm, internal 
promotion, external directorships, and social networking prestige.  Our results show that 
CEOs who have stronger networking ties (internal and external) tend to increase their 
likelihood to become optimistic. In the case of internal networking, when a CEO works 
with the firm for a longer period and when he/she is internally promoted to become CEO, 
he/she will tend to gain trust, respect and support: hence, he/she will have a stronger 
network with his/her peers and subordinates. This may be the reason why they become 
optimistic, as they are comfortable with the firm and know it well.  
 
In the case of external networking, a CEO who has external appointments and who has 
social networking prestige, especially linked with professional bodies, fellowships or 
official honours (knighthoods), tends to increase his/her likelihood to become optimistic. 
Our findings are consistent with that of Malmendier and Tate (2009), who also stated that 
prestigious awards might cultivate CEOs’ overconfident behaviour. CEOs who are 
appointed by outside firms or have social prestige are believed to have expertise and good 
external networking ties. Hence, recognition by such external firms may make them feel 
esteem and possibly make them more likely to become optimistic.  
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2.4.4.1 Additional Robustness Tests 
 
For a sensitivity test we use CEOs’ stock options (SO) exercising behaviour as proxy for 
managerial optimism (MO). The result for stock options25 shows that Trait Index (TI), 
Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index (NI) do increase their 
explanation power in CEO optimism. For the indexes joint effect, the results show an 
increase of 1.29% and 1.18% for binomial indexes and PCA indexes respectively.  
 
The results are robust with Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) used as proxy, except for 
Traits Index. Traits Index shows non-significant results for MO that uses stock options 
exercise behaviour as proxy. Our Skills and Experiences Index and Networking Index show 
identical results for both M&A and SO proxy. We acknowledge that, for this study there 
are differences between the observations for these two proxy measurements. For the study 
period (2000-2013), we have 1061 observations for M&A proxy, but for stock options 
exercise behaviour we only obtain 507 observations.  
 
Furthermore we also use insider transactions26 as a proxy for managerial optimism; both 
Skills and Experiences Binomial and PCA Indexes show significant negative effect on MO, 
other indexes are found to have insignificant effect on MO. The results obtained contradict 
those for the other two MO proxies: Mergers and Acquisitions and Stock Options. Hence, 
we conclude that the choice of the MO proxy may capture different aspects of insider 
transactions. Insider transactions involving stock purchases by CEOs in UK firms might be 
                                                          
25 The result is reported in Appendix II 
26 Due to data availability for insider transactions, we use the sample data from 2009 to 2013 for both managerial optimism 
proxies: Mergers and Acquisition, and Insider Transaction I and II. The same sample period is chosen in order to obtain 
comparable result. (The result is reported in Appendix III) 
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due to compliance with the minimum threshold27 for the position held as we find that the 
CEOs with lower skills and experiences levels tend to buy more than shares of the firm 
they work with than they sell. Additionally, for insider transaction II, we discover that the 
buying and selling of the firm’s stock is more likely associated with the macroeconomic 
conditions. The results for stock options and insider transactions are reported in Appendix 
II and III. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Corporations are concerned about the issue of managerial optimism (MO), especially its 
effect on the corporate performance. As Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) mention, 
understanding the issue of managerial optimism (MO) in a corporation can increase the 
firm value and hence benefit shareholders. The existing studies mainly examine the 
corporate decisions made by optimistic managers, but the causes of optimism have been 
less explored. Hence in our study, we aim to answer the question of what drives CEOs to 
exhibit optimistic behaviour in corporations. 
 
Our study fills a research gap by examining more comprehensively aspects of CEO 
personal attributes (CEO personal traits, CEO skills and experiences, and CEO networking) 
of 248 UK FTSE 100 firms’ CEOs from 2000 to 2013. In addition, we also propose four 
indexes; Personal Trait Index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), Networking Index 
(NI) and CEO Optimism Index (CEOOI) 28 . Our Optimism Index can be used as an 
                                                          
27 Example of share ownership guidelines for CEO:  AMEC plc requiring their CEO to hold 250% of base salary of 
targeted shareholding, while Legal & General Group Plc expects their CEO to build a personal shareholding valued at 
twice salary. 
28 CEOOI index will be used in Chapter 3 
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alternative proxy to measure CEO optimism29. The other three indexes (TI, SEI and NI) 
may be used as an additional variable in explaining other corporate issues.  
 
In the case of CEO personal traits, univariate analyses results show optimistic CEOs have 
lower mean age and higher means for male gender, UK nationality and married status. The 
panel logistic regression results confirm the positive relationship between the Traits Index 
and Managerial Optimism which suggests that younger, male, UK nationality, and Married 
CEOs are more likely to become optimistic. 
 
As for CEO skills and experiences, the sub-group statistics show that a higher percentage 
of optimistic CEOs are found in the following sub-groups: PhD holder, firm founder, CEOs 
who possess financial knowledge, CEOs with longer tenure, and higher pay CEO. In the 
case of length of tenure as CEO, the univariate result also confirm that optimistic CEOs 
have higher means (have worked for more years) than non-optimistic CEOs. In terms of 
the Skills and Experiences Index, the univariate analysis shows the optimistic CEOs tend 
to have a higher index value, while non-optimistic CEOs have a lower index value. These 
results are confirmed by the logistic regression, which also shows that the higher a CEOs’ 
Skills and Experiences Index the greater the likelihood that they will become optimistic.  
 
In the case of CEO networking, from the sub-group analysis we find that optimistic CEOs 
are better represented in the groups which are internally promoted, have worked longer 
with the firm (tenure more than 15 years), who have external directorship appointments and 
social networking prestige. Similar results are also obtained from univariate analyses: we 
find that optimistic CEOs tend to have higher mean tenure (years worked) with the firm, 
                                                          
29Existing studies proxy optimism by using stock option, insider transaction, press based measured, M&A etc. 
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have been internally promoted, hold external directorships and have social networking 
prestige compared with non-optimistic CEOs. Optimistic CEOs show a higher Networking 
Index value do non-optimistic CEOs. Once again, the logistic regression results confirm 
that CEOs who have a higher Networking Index value are more likely to become optimistic. 
 
Overall, the individual or jointly of CEO personal Traits Index, Skills and Experiences 
Index, and Networking Index that we constructed in this study do show significant 
relationships with CEOs optimistic behaviour. In summary, we may conclude that CEO 
personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking) do contribute to the 
likelihood that their behaviour will be optimistic.  
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Chapter 3: CEO Personal Attributes and Corporate Leasing Decisions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The traditional or neoclassical view suggests that a firm’s corporate policies are mainly 
determined by technology changes in the business and product market conditions; the 
managers’ roles are less important as their characteristics are treated as homogeneous with 
the firm’s factors. This is because the neoclassical approach considers that a single person 
can hardly contribute to significant effects in firm policies. However, with the growing 
literature on behavioural corporate finance, the role of managers is seen to be increasingly 
important, especially concerning decision making; a manager’s sentiments and beliefs are 
found to have an impact on corporate policies (Beber & Fabbri, 2012). 
 
Leasing decision is one of the important corporate policies. The benefits of leasing have 
been widely mentioned in the literature, most of which suggests that leasing can mitigate 
agency cost (Smith & Warner, 1979; Stulz & Johnson, 1985). Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon 
(2008) suggest that leasing can reduce agency cost of debt by easing the conflicts between 
debt-holders and shareholders. Managers acting in the shareholders’ best interests would 
try their best to minimize agency cost of debt. One of the solutions is to introduce covenants 
to the bond by using lease. Zhou (2014) mentions that lease financing can reduce agency 
cost (both cost of equity and cost of debt) by mitigating conflict of interests between 
shareholders and managers, and between shareholders and bondholders. Lease financing is 
associated with periodical non-cancellable payments (rental commitments), therefore 
potentially limits free cash flow in a firm whilst reduces agency cost of equity by providing 
better alliance of interest between managers and shareholders. On the other hand, motivated 
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by prior literature that suggests debt covenants, short term debt, secured debt and 
convertible debt can reduce agency cost of debt,  Zhou tests on convertible debt and leases 
and finds both mechanisms are significantly positively affect CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity. Hence Zhou concludes that firms use both mechanisms to reduce conflict of 
interest among shareholders and bondholders by mitigating agency cost of debt.  
 
Zhou (2014) further concludes that firms prefer to use leasing as a mechanism to reduce 
agency cost of debt than convertible debt. The possible reasons are convertible debt may 
dilute firms’ earnings per share thus shareholders may take control over the firm, whereas 
leasing does not have such effect; borrowing long-term convertible debt is cost more 
(issuing cost, flotation cost) than to lease, as leasing is a private deal between a lessor and 
a lessee; operating leases have off-balance sheet benefit. Zhou’s data sample shows that on 
average, 90% of the lease financing is taken in the form of operating lease. Zhou concludes 
that leasing is a better tool compared with secured debt in reducing agency cost of debt; 
leasing has a higher priority of in claim than secured debt in the occurrence of bankruptcy. 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) also suggest that firms facing high financing costs may employ 
more leases to mitigate information asymmetry, and reduces agency costs associated with 
monitoring and underinvestment. Previous research has shown that optimistic managers 
tend to prefer debt to equity30; however, the relationship between managerial attributes and 
a firm’s leasing decisions is less explored. As a lease is considered a type of corporate debt, 
we believe that optimism may also favour using lease financing if a company needs to 
finance a new asset. 
 
 
                                                          
30 Optimistic managers are unwilling to issue shares to finance new assets as they tend to consider that the market 
undervalues their firm (Heaton, 2002) 
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Our second chapter demonstrated that CEOs’ personal attributes do influence their 
optimistic behaviour. We now investigate further, as to how and to what extent CEOs’ 
personal attributes affect firms’ corporate leasing decisions. In our previous chapter, we 
have shown that younger, male, UK nationality, married CEOs tend to be more optimistic, 
and CEOs who have higher skills and experiences levels (MBA holder, PhD holder, firm 
founder, with financial knowledge, longer tenure as CEO, and receive higher pay than 
average CEOs) are more likely to become optimistic. Additionally, CEOs who have more 
networking ties (longer tenure with the firm, internally promoted, holds external 
directorships, and has social networking prestige) are also found to be more likely to 
become optimistic. From these findings we construct a CEO Optimism Index31 (CEOOI), 
which is proposed to be an alternative CEO optimism measurement. This new measure will 
be used to examine the linkage between CEO optimism and firm asset financing, 
specifically corporate leasing decisions.  
 
Our study is based on the UK FTSE 100 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
Leasing plays an important role in the UK market. According to Leaseurope32, among the 
European countries, UK had the highest new leasing volumes in 2013 (48.5 billion euro), 
followed by Germany (46.9 billion euro) and France (37.5 billion euro). From 2012 to 2013, 
the European leasing market was the second largest, with an annual volume of US$ 333.6 
billion, ranked second only to North America (US$335.1 billion), with the total world 
annual volume of the leasing market being US$ 883.96 billion. UK and Germany are the 
dominant players in the global leasing market, accounting for 42.3% of the European 
                                                          
31  Our Optimism Index is constructed based on CEO personal attributes that potentially cultivate their optimistic 
behaviour, which is different from the previous research (see example: Stock options exercise behaviour (Malmendier & 
Tate, 2005a), Merger and Acquisition activities (Doukas & Petmezas, 2007), speech content analysis (Brennan & Conroy, 
2013) 
32 Leaseurope is an organisation that consists of 46 member associations in 34 European countries representing the leasing, 
long term and/or short term automotive rental industries. It is estimated that Leaseurope represented approximately 92% 
of the European leasing market in 2013. 
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market and 16% of the world market (White Clarke Group Global Leasing Report, 2015). 
Figure 3.1 shows the equipment leasing rate in the few main leasing markets. The UK 
equipment leasing market exhibits upward trends from 2000 until 2013. This may imply 
that the decision to lease equipment has become increasingly important among corporate 
decisions by UK firms.   
Figure 3.1 
Comparison of Equipment Leasing Markets (2000 to 2013) 
 
A comparison of the rate of equipment leasing market penetration (%) from 2000 to 2013. The 
Global Leasing Report presented the rate of equipment leasing market penetration by taking leasing 
as a proportion of all fixed investments in plant and equipment 
 
 
Sources: World Leasing Yearbook (White Clarke Group Global Leasing Report, 2015)  
 
Subsequently, we discuss the fundamentals and characteristics of lease contracts (operating 
lease and finance lease) and the implication on financial reporting in UK firms.  A lease is 
an agreement between a lessor and a lessee. A lessor is the one who leases the asset 
(property, plant, and equipment, PPE) to the lessee for a stated period and provides the 
lessee with the right to use the asset. In the corporate world, leasing is a source of firm 
financing. In making a decision whether to buy or to lease an asset, a firm will need to 
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evaluate the costs and benefits of these choices. If the firm chooses to buy the asset, then it 
will obtain the right to use and to sell the asset at any future date. However, if the firm 
chooses to lease the asset, it will have the right to use the asset for a specific period, and 
may have the option to buy the asset based on the lease agreement. 
 
In the leasing market, lessors offer a wide range of assets and leases that can be tailored to 
meet clients’ (lessees) needs. Table 3.1 lists the common assets that are available in the 
leasing market. 
Table 3.1 
Commonly Leased Assets in Leasing Market 
Commercial vehicles Cars, trucks & trailers, coaches & buses, forklifts, cranes and 
other yellow goods 
 
Computers and 
Business machines 
Software applications, computers and other IT infrastructure, 
security equipment, faxes and photocopiers, office furniture 
Machinery and 
industrial equipment 
Containers, agriculture and construction machinery, machine 
tools, vending and catering equipment,  production plants, 
printing equipment, medical equipment, aircraft, ships, rail and 
rolling stock, infrastructure and utilities 
Buildings and facilities Retail premises, office buildings, industrial buildings, hotels and 
other leisure facilities 
 
 
 UK firms report their leasing activities using The International Leasing Standard (IAS 17 
“Leases”). Generally, there are two types of lease, namely financial lease and operating 
lease. A financial lease is also known as a capital lease in U.S standard (SFAS 13). The 
main different between a financial lease and an operating lease is that the financial lease is 
capitalised and stated on the balance sheet, while the operating lease is off-balance sheet, 
and reported as rental commitments. The agenda to bring the operating lease onto the 
balance sheet started in the late 90’s with the formation of the Group G4+1, (which 
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comprises Australia, New Zealand, the U.K, the U.S and the standard setting bodies33) 
which shall develop a leases approach and proposal34. However, the proposal to change the 
accounting for leases is challenging and to date there is still no implementation date. The 
main impact of the proposed standard will be that the lessee will need to include both 
financial leases and operating leases onto the balance sheet. Bringing the operating leases 
onto the balance sheet thus will increase the respective firm’s assets and liabilities.  
 
Finance leases and operating leases have different lease contracts. Finance leases might 
provide the option to purchase the asset at the end of the lease term; while in the case of 
operating leases, the lessor retains ownership during and after the lease period. An 
operating lease does not have an option to transfer the ownership rights. A firm will 
normally choose a finance lease if the lease term is equal to or exceeds 75% of the expected 
asset’s useful life. To be categorised as a finance lease, the present value of the lease 
payments should be equal to, or exceed 90% of the total original cost of the asset; while for 
an operating lease the present value of lease payments is less than 90 % of the asset's fair 
market value. 
 
In terms of risks and benefits, a finance lease contracts transfer of the maintenance fees, 
insurance and taxes to lessees; though for an operating lease, lessees only obtain the right 
to use the assets; the risks and benefits remain with the lessors and the lessee pays the 
maintenance costs. For accounting reporting purposes, a finance lease is considered an asset 
(leased asset) and a liability (lease payments); hence, the payments are shown in the balance 
sheet. An operating lease’s lessee has, on the other hand, no ownership rights or risks, so 
the payments (rental commitments) are treated as operating expenses and reported in the 
                                                          
33Financial Accounting Standards Board, FASB, and the International Accounting Standards Board, IASB 
34 For details see Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson (2000) 
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income statement. For tax purposes, lessees are considered the owner of the leased assets 
under finance leases; therefore they can claim depreciation expenses and interest expenses. 
In the case of operating leases, the lessee is considered to be renting the asset, thus the lease 
payment is categorised as a rental expense. Our empirical results show that UK firms tend 
to use operating leases more than finance leases; hence a better understanding of the 
differences between these two types of lease contracts may help us explain the preferences. 
 
3.1.1 Contribution 
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, to our knowledge, no 
research has been carried out to examine the effect of CEO personal attributes on corporate 
leasing decisions. Given that leasing is a main source of financing for firms in the UK 
market, identification of “who” uses leases in their daily business operations is important 
for a firm’s financial planning and monitoring.  Our study provides a linkage between CEO 
traits, skills and experiences, and networking towards their leasing decisions. In addition to 
using existing finance theories, we also try to explain the CEOs’ personal attributes from 
sociological and psychological points of view, in order to understand the influence of CEO 
optimism on the choice of lease financing. 
 
Secondly, our study also complements existing UK corporate leasing studies. Earlier 
research on corporate leasing focuses on the determinant of firms’ lease employments 
(Drury & Braund, 1990; Adedeji & Stapleton, 1996; Adams &Hardwick, 1998; Beattie, 
Goodacre &Thomson, 2000; and Goodacre, 2003). We notice that since these studies, no 
study has examined corporate leasing decisions in the UK market. As already mentioned, 
the UK leasing market is among the largest in the world. Our study provides the overview 
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of the UK leasing market development from 2000 to 2013 and this will help lessee firms to 
gain a clearer picture regarding the financing resources available in the market. 
Understanding market trends and needs, lessor firms can design and provide their clients 
with better service / offers.  
 
Thirdly, the limited research on leasing decisions is most probably due to the fact that lease 
data needs to be manually extracted from firm annual reports. For this study, we manually 
collected unique data sets (Total Lease, Operating Lease, and Finance Lease) from firms’ 
annual reports. Analysis of these manually collected data will help us shed light on why 
and how firms employ leases and who in the firm does so. Besides complementing the 
existing literature on the determinants (firm and market level) of corporate leasing decisions, 
our study adds new information on the impact of CEO personal attributes on UK firms’ 
corporate leasing decisions. 
 
3.1.2 Research Objectives 
 
Previous research has mainly investigated how firm and macroeconomic conditions explain 
“why” and “when” firms choose to use a lease. Yet, the question of “who” uses a lease is 
less explored. In this study, we try to shed light on who uses a lease by examining the effect 
of CEO personal attributes towards his/her corporate leasing decisions after controlling for 
conventional leasing determinants. We aim to address the following questions: 
 
1)    How and to what extent do personal attributes influence the firm’s leasing decisions? 
2)    How and to what extent does this impact vary depending on the types of leasing? 
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
In real life, it is common for a person to rent a car or an apartment for a short period. Firms 
in the corporate business world usually rent for longer terms. Firms lease farming 
machinery, computers, trucks, aircraft, cars, ships, buildings and other plant, property and 
equipment. Leases that are short-term or cancellable during the contract are generally 
known as operating leases, while those that extend over most of the estimated economic 
life of the leased asset and cannot be cancelled (or the lessor will be compensated for any 
losses) are called capital leases, financial leases or full-payout leases. Taking out a lease 
contract is like borrowing money. In the business world, firms treat leasing and borrowing 
as financing alternatives; a lease is a long-term rental agreement and it is a type of corporate 
debt (Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2014). 
 
When firms face financial constraints they may choose to lease rather than purchase the 
asset with debt financing to avoid being in default of debt. Leasing has become a popular 
financing tool among corporations. Fülbier, Lirio and Pferdehirt (2008) point out that the 
most common set of motivations underlying the lease-versus-buy decision is that utilizing 
leasing can minimize transaction costs that arise when a firm expects the life of equipment 
to exceed its prospective usefulness for a certain project (e.g., Flath, 1980; Smith & 
Wakeman, 1985). 
 
In this study, we intend to examine which of the CEO personal attributes may affect 
corporate leasing decisions. According to Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008), lease 
financing is a well-known mechanism to reduce agency cost of debt; leasing can be used 
as a corporate governance tool in mitigating agency conflict between debt holders and 
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shareholders, and hence lower the overall risk of the firm. A look at the existing literature 
does not provide a direct link between the leasing decision and managerial attributes;   
therefore, we can only discuss related approaches that may help us better understand a 
firm’s corporate leasing decisions. , We try to make a linkage between corporate leasing 
approaches and CEO optimism. 
 
Financing Perspective (Debt versus Leasing) 
 
 
Gombola and Marcuikaityte (2007) note that when managers are optimistic about future 
investment outcomes, they prefer to finance the project with debt financing rather than 
equity, as they are confident about the future incomes. This makes them unwilling to share 
the potential profits with new equity holders.  
 
In the corporate world, firms treat leasing and borrowing as financing alternatives. As 
Brealey, Myers and Allen (2014) mention, finance leases are a source of debt financing; a 
lease contract is like borrowing money and lease is a type of corporate debt. From a 
financing perspective, if a firm decides to own an asset for its production, it can choose to 
use debt financing or to have the asset under lease (finance or operating lease). Heaton 
(2002) suggests that optimistic managers tend to believe that the market undervalues their 
firm, and they are reluctant to issue shares to finance new assets. Hence, from the CEO 
optimism perspective, we may expect an optimistic CEO to be more likely to employ a 
finance lease, as lease is a type of debt. 
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Investing Perspective (Buy or Lease Decision) 
 
 
From a firm’s investing perspective, when the firm plans to purchase an asset (asset 
investment) for production or operational purposes the firm can finance the asset with 
equity capital or debt financing. Nevertheless, the firm may also have an option to rent the 
respective asset by using an operating lease. The firm’s decision to own the asset rather 
than renting it using an operating lease (as rental commitments) can be defined as risk-
taking behaviour. If the firm chooses to purchase the asset, it will be exposed to the potential 
risk of asset’s obsolescence and the risk of engaging more debt or liabilities in their 
financial statement, which investors may consider unfavourable. 
 
If, on the other hand, the firm is willing to make periodical payments (rental commitments) 
instead of purchasing the PPE, we may see the manager as risk averse. Risk aversion 
behaviour can be explained by the fear of the risk of asset obsolescence and accounting 
reporting reasons. Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008) consider that lease financing can lower 
a firm’s overall risk. The difference between buy and lease is that if the asset bought by the 
firm becomes obsolete, the firm still has the obligation to pay off the debt and may also 
incur additional costs to dispose of the asset. Conversely, if the asset is under lease 
agreement, then when the asset becomes obsolete, the firm can cancel the contract. 
 
Although leasing can lower a firm’s risk (risk of asset obsolescence), lessees may be need 
to pay higher charges or costs to the lessor, who bears the risk. If the firm still chooses to 
lease, based on this argument, the lessees are willing to pay higher charges on leased assets 
to avoid the potential risk of an asset’s obsolescence as ownership of the rented asset 
remains with the lessor. This indirectly shows that the leasing decision may connote a 
firm’s risk adverse behaviour.  
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Accounting Disclosure Approach 
 
 
This perspective is only applicable for operating leases, which are treated as off-balance 
sheet. Finance leases are reported by the same method as is debt. Hirshleifer and Teoh 
(2009) propose the Psychological Attraction Approach (PAA); having investigated 
accounting disclosure they find that firms seem better pleased to have a “clean balance 
sheet”, hence, a firm may prefer to take up an operating lease rather than a finance lease or 
purchase the asset. By using an operating lease, a firm can remove the debt from the balance 
sheet and less debt appearing in the balance sheet will make the firm more attractive to 
investors.  
 
Black (1993) also suggests that if a firm makes too much information available to the public, 
this can reveal valuable proprietary information to competitors. Hence, from this 
perspective, risk-averse CEOs would be expected to have more operating leases as they try 
to avoid positioning their firm as a high debt enterprise, therefore they will take advantage 
of off-balance sheet treatment for operating leases. 
 
CEO Power Perspective 
 
 
This approach can be used to explain the argument that the more skills and experiences, 
and networking ties a person has, the more power the person will attain.  We use two 
different theories to explain the relationship between power and risk-taking behaviour. The 
first theory, the Prospect Theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), posits that 
an individual is more risk seeking in the domain of losses and more risk averse in the 
domain of gains. Powerless people have less to lose, thus individuals with low power might 
be more risk seeking as they are willing to try any available opportunity regardless of risk 
considerations to get them out of the position of disadvantage (Anderson and Galinsky, 
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2006). Based on this theory, power should have a negative relationship with individual risk-
taking behaviour. From this perspective, we expect the CEO who possesses more skills and 
experiences, and networking ties, to have more lease employment, as leases can lower the 
firm’s risk and at the same time secure its CEO’s position. 
 
The second theory, the converse of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory, is 
Anderson and Galinsky’s (2006) Approach/Inhibition Theory. This theory suggests that 
power increases with optimism when perceiving risks, which may increase the propensity 
for risk taking. When people have power, they have more access to material sources 
(financial, physical comforts) and social resources (prestige, positive attention) (French and 
Raven, 1959). Furthermore, people with power are less constrained in pursuing rewards 
and making decisions. On the one hand, people with little power are more likely to avoid 
risks as they are subject to more material and social threats. People with a higher sense of 
power had more optimistic perceptions about the future in the case of controllable events, 
and this optimistic perception extended to events that seemed outside of their control. 
People with high power positions are more likely to choose riskier options compare to 
people with neutral or low power positions. From this perspective, we expect that the CEO 
who possesses high skills and experiences, and networking ties, will take more risks, and 
will consider using leases less, as leases are known as a conservative financing tool. 
 
Cain and Mckeon (2016) analyse the relationship between CEO personal risk-taking (CEO 
with pilot’s licence), corporate risk taking and firm’s total risk. Their results show that risk-
tolerant CEOs has explanatory powers in corporate project selection (debt financing, 
mergers and acquisitions). They conclude that leverage increases firms’ risk, CEOs who 
possess risk-taking behaviour tends to show a positive relationship with leverage ratios, 
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and CEOs’ risk-taking increases his/her propensity for making acquisitions. Cain and 
Mckeon suggest that shedding light on the myriad behavioural characteristics that lie 
behind risk-taking behaviour in corporate policies can lead to better corporate decision-
making. 
 
3.2.1 The Determinants of Corporate Leasing 
 
Earlier corporate leasing research has focused on tax incentives as the main reason a firm 
would use a lease. More recently, researchers have focused on firms’ financial constraints, 
and whether the lease is used to complement or substitute debt35. Most of the studies were 
carried out in the US (Sharpe & Nguyen, 1995; Beatty, Liao & Weber, 2010; Schallheim, 
Wells & Whitby, 2013). The UK leasing market has been studied by Drury and Braund, 
(1990), Adedeji and Stapleton (1996), Adams and Hardwick (1998), Beattie, Goodacre and 
Thomson (2000), and Goodacre (2003). In addition, Cosci, Guida and Meliciani (2013) 
study lease financing in Italian firms and Fülbier, Lirio and Pferdehirt (2008) investigate 
German firms’ leasing decisions. 
 
3.2.1.1 Leasing and Tax Benefits  
 
Theoretical leasing models initially focused on the tax benefit between lessee and lessor. 
Croci, Guida & Meliciani (2013) note that earlier researchers suggested that tax incentives 
are the main reason a firm would lease. Smith and Wakeman (1985) and Graham, Lemmon 
and Schallheim (1998) show that low tax rate firms gain net tax benefits from leasing; 
lessees tends to gain more compared to the lessor. However, Croci, Guida and Meliciani 
                                                          
35 Empirical evidence for Substitution Relationship: see e.g., Beattie, Goodacre & Thomson (2000), Schallheim, Wells & 
Whitby (2013), Cosci, Guida & Meliciani (2013), Adedeji & Stapleton (1996) 
Empirical evidence for Complementary Relationship: see e.g., Ang & Peterson (1984), Adam & Hardwick (1998), Garrod 
(1989) 
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(2013) summarise that empirical evidence shows mixed results for the relationship between 
leasing decision and firms’ tax positions. 
 
Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) note that capital lease payments are divided into 
interest expenses and capital lease amortization. They also mention the “true lease” issue, 
and argue that true leases may have a negative relationship with tax rate, while a non-true 
lease (like debt) shows a positive relationship with tax rate. They further conclude that 
operating leases, which are predominantly true leases, will negatively correlate with tax 
rate, whereas capital leases might show an ambiguous relationship with tax rate as capital 
leases are mixed true and non-true leases.  
 
Much previous research mentions tax-related incentives as the main reason for leasing, but 
Smith and Wakeman (1985) state that taxes only provide a limited explanation as to why 
assets are leased rather that owned. According to Smith and Wakeman, if the same tax rates 
were applied on both lessor and lessee, then there would be no tax advantage in leasing an 
asset.  
 
3.2.1.2 Leasing and Financial Constraints  
 
When a firm faces financial constraints, leasing may be an important source of finance 
especially for firms lacking prior history and reputation (Lasfer & Levis, 1998; Neuberger 
& Räthke-Döppner, 2013). Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) find that non-dividend paying, and 
cash-poor-firms, use leasing more. More recently, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) suggest that 
financially constrained firms would lease more of their capital assets than less constrained 
firms. Barclay and Smith (1995), meanwhile, claim that firms with greater growth 
opportunities rely more heavily on lease financing.  
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High debt firms may face financial constraints. If a firm is highly leveraged, this will affect 
its choice of financing in new asset investment. Differences in selection of financing 
sources will affect the firm’s cost of capital. Earlier studies find that the relationship 
between debt and lease is positive if debt and lease complement each other; while a negative 
relationship between debt and lease shows that these financing sources are substitutable. In 
the UK, Adams and Hardwick (1998) study 100 UK based listed firms and find that 
leverage is positively correlated with propensity to lease. Garrod (1989) finds that debt and 
lease are in a complementary relationship. However, Adedeji and Stapleton’s (1996) study 
of UK firms find a substitutive relationship between debt and leasing.  
 
Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) mention in lease agreements, the lessor will retain, and bear 
the cost of, the asset ownership. Thus, lessees may be charged higher costs (interest charges 
or rental commitments) as lessors will pass the costs to lessees. From this perspective, a 
firm may rank lease as a lower preference than debt; a lease will be used only if the firm 
has utilized their debt capacity. Cosci, Guida and Meliciani (2013) highlight the issue of 
substitution between leasing and debt. Using the debt ratio as the dependent variable and 
the leasing ratio as the explanatory variable in regressions, they found a negative coefficient 
on the debt ratio which implied total lease and debt financing are substitutable.  
 
3.2.1.3 Contracting Cost 
 
Financial Contracting Theory suggest that firm characteristics such as business risk and 
investment opportunity set should affect firms’ contracting cost; hence the firm may choose 
to lease rather than buy an asset (Mehran, Taggart & Yermack, 1999).  
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i. Investment Opportunity Set (Agency Theory) 
 
Myers (1977) mentions that shareholders might forgo positive net present value (NPV) 
investment opportunity if the project benefits accrue to the firm’s existing bondholders; this 
is the conflict between bondholders and shareholders. To overcome this conflict, Myers 
suggests that a firm can introduce debt with restrictive covenants, thus financing with lease 
contract will be a good choice. Stulz and Johnson (1985) also mention that incentive 
problems can be reduced if the firm retains the ability to finance new investment with high 
priority claims such as secured debt and leases. Lease can help to reduce agency conflict 
between shareholders and bondholders. Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) mention that firms may 
choose to lease when they are facing high external funding cost, as lease financing can 
economize the transaction costs. 
 
ii.  Leasing as Collateral for a Secured Loan  
 
 
Leasing as collateral for a secured loan implies that a firm using leasing has a higher 
funding capacity than one using secured lending. Stulz and Johnson (1985) show leasing 
as more effective than other forms of finance in mitigating underinvestment problems as 
leasing contract is tied to a specified fixed asset. Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) 
argue that firms that use more fixed assets in production processes should use more lease 
financing. They expect a positive relationship between use of fixed assets and debt, as fixed 
assets are more valuable in liquidation and hence support a higher debt capacity. As lease 
is a form of corporate debt, tangibility is expected to have a positive relationship with lease. 
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iii. Firm Size  
 
 
Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) suggest that based on the Size-based theories; 
larger firms are more likely to be debt financed. This is because large firms are more 
diversified and hence have more stable cash flows to meet the debt obligations. However, 
Sharpe and Nguyen (1995)  takethe opposite position; they mention that large firms may 
be able to exploit economies of scale in issuing securities  and because of such information 
asymmetries, smaller firms are more likely to face higher costs to obtain external funds. 
Thus, they suggest that leases mitigate such information problems and provide lower 
financing costs. Based on this argument, firm size is expected to have a negative 
relationship with lease financing.  
 
3.2.1.4 Firm Uniqueness  
 
The reason a firm invests in firm specific assets is to enhance firm uniqueness and achieve 
competitive advantage. However the employment of firm specific assets may affect firm 
borrowing capacity. Firm specific assets cannot be redeployed for other uses and therefore 
are hard to use as collateral for borrowing (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). Many of the firm’s 
specific assets are intangible assets (e.g. promotion and advertising, research and 
development). 
 
Firm uniqueness refers to a firm that employs highly specific assets. Smith and Wakeman 
(1985) suggest that firms are less likely to use lease financing for highly specific assets in 
order to avoid conflict and agency cost between lessor and lessees. Hence, firms are more 
likely to lease generic office facilities rather than firm specific asset, which are unique for 
the firm’s production or research. Hence, we may expect that the firm that engages in more 
research and development will be less likely to use lease.   
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3.2.1.5 Corporate Governance 
 
Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008) find that firm with strong governance structure (more 
outside directors) will use more lease financing. They also mention that lease can be used 
as a mechanism to mitigate agency costs of debt and overcome underinvestment problems 
by lessening the probability of rejecting positive net present value projects. On the other 
hand, they find that the number of directors is negatively and significantly related to the 
use of lease, possibly due to inefficient monitoring and control if the board is too big. 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) mention that the appointment of outside directors aims to 
provide better monitoring than inside board directors. Hence, our study expects a positive 
relationship between leasing employment and number of outside directors. 
 
3.2.2 CEO Personal Attributes and Corporate Leasing Decisions 
 
In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO personal attributes and the decision 
to use lease financing. We develop our hypotheses based on the firm’s financing 
perspective. Gombola and Marcuikaityte (2007) note that when managers are optimistic 
about future investment outcomes, they prefer to finance the project with debt financing 
rather than equity; as they are confident about future incomes, and this makes them 
unwilling to share the potential profits with new equity holders.  We expect the optimistic 
CEO will use lease more, considering lease is a type of debt. Heaton’s (2002) study on 
Managerial Optimism and corporate finance suggested that managerial optimism predicts 
the pecking order preferences in firm’s capital structure, whereby managers tend to finance 
their project with internal cash or risk-free debt and if external funds are needed, they would 
prefer risky debt to equity. As optimistic managers believe that the capital market 
undervalues the firm’s risky securities; optimistic managers always perceived issuing risky 
securities as a negative NPV event.  
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Hackbarth (2008) and Baker and Wurgler (2011) also mention an optimistic manager relies 
more on internal capital and debt in making financing decisions, resorting to equity issuing 
as a last resort; as optimistic managers view the firm’s risky securities are undervalued by 
the capital market, they perceive a larger cost in issuing new equity than debt. Moreover, 
Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2007) also find that overconfident CFOs tend to use more 
debt. From the perspective of CEO optimism, we may expect an optimistic CEO (younger, 
male, UK nationality and married) would be more likely to employ lease; we predict 
therefore a positive relationship between CEO optimism and corporate leasing decisions.  
 
In the case of CEO skill and experiences, and networking, lease can be used to mitigate 
agency cost of debt and lower the firm’s overall risk, as mentioned by Robicheaux, Fu and 
Ligon (2008). A CEO with higher skills and experiences, and more networking ties will 
have more access to information resources and knowledge. Such CEOs also have more 
power and possess good social skills, which can help the firm to get good deals in lease 
agreements. We may predict that CEOs with higher skills and experiences and CEOs with 
more networking ties will be more likely to employ lease. Based on the above arguments, 
we intend to test our hypotheses by examining the relationship between:   
1. CEO personal traits (age, gender, nationality, and marital status) with corporate leasing 
decisions 
2. CEO skills and experiences (educational background, founder, financial literacy, 
duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments) with corporate leasing decisions, and   
3. CEO networking ties (tenure with the firm, internally promoted, external directorships, 
and social networking prestige) with corporate lease financing decision. 
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3.2.2.1 CEO Personal Traits and Corporate Lease Financing  
 
 
Few studies explicitly study the relationship between CEO characteristics and corporate 
leasing decisions.  Brealey, Myers and Allen (2014) consider that lease is a type of 
corporate debt, and firms use lease as a financing alternative. Hence in this study we expect 
optimistic CEOs may also prefer lease if they engage in asset investment. Previous studies 
suggest that younger CEOs, male CEOs, UK nationality CEOs, and married CEOs are more 
likely to become optimistic and risk loving.  As mentioned by Graham, Harvey and Puri 
(2013), younger CEOs are more confident and more risk tolerant (risk -taking) compared 
to older CEOs.  Anderson and Galinsky (2006) find that older people were less optimistic 
than younger people. Most previous research shows that males tend to be more optimistic 
and risk taking than females (Barber and Odean, 2001; Bhandari and Deaves, 2010; Huang 
and Kisgen, 2012; Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). 
 
Mendenhall and Odduo (1985) consider that expatriate managers tend to have a greater 
need to be flexible and are required to have better ability to interact effectively with their 
national hosts than their UK CEO colleagues who already had established networking ties. 
In addition to technical competence, they also need to prepare themselves in terms of 
intercultural, perceptual and interpersonal ability. Mendenhall and Odduo (1985) mention 
that managers from a non-host country are exposed to cultural-toughness, where the host 
country’s political and legal system, socioeconomic and business environment are different 
from those of the home country. From this, we predict that UK nationality CEOs are more 
optimistic, as they are more familiar with the rules and regulations, people, culture and 
working environment of the place where they work. 
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Judge, Cable, Boudreau and Bretz (1995) suggest that marital status should have a positive 
impact on an executive’s career success. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) find that married 
people are more self-confident. Moreover, Puri and Robinson (2007) point out that the 
optimistic individual is more risk tolerant and also have the tendency to undertake 
remarriage. Hence, we predict married CEOs are more optimistic and risk tolerant. From 
the optimism perspective, we expect younger, male, UK nationality, and married CEOs will 
employ more lease (a type of corporate debt) as they view that the market tends to 
undervalue their firm and therefore they are reluctant to issue new equity to avoid sharing 
potential profits with new equity holders. Our first hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1: CEO personal traits (Younger, Male, UK Nationality and Married) have a positive 
relationship with firm corporate leasing decisions  
 
Table 3.2 
Prediction of the Relationship between CEO Personal Traits and Corporate Leasing 
Decisions 
CEO Personal Traits  Lease Employment 
1. Younger  
2. Male  
3. UK Nationality 
4. Married  
Positive 
Positive  
Positive  
Positive   
 
 
 
3.2.2.2 CEO Skills and Experiences and Corporate Lease Financing  
 
Our second objective for this empirical chapter is to find out which of the following CEOs 
skills and experiences are more likely to associate with corporate leasing decisions. Our 
hypothesis is derived from the idea that higher skills and experiences will provide a CEO 
with more power and, according to Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), a CEO who has 
power over the board will have a greater influence on decision-making in the organization. 
With powerful status, a CEOs can utilise his/her knowledge (MBA, PhD and financial 
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knowledge) to employ more leases in their firm, and, as Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008) 
claimed, leasing can mitigate agency cost of debt and lower the firm’s overall risk. 
 
Previous studies also show that the higher the skills and experiences of a manager, the more 
likely the manager will become optimistic and able to accept more risk. Our study 
anticipates higher skills and experiences CEOs as the one who are MBA or PhD holder, 
founder status, financially literate, duality, longer tenure as CEO, and higher emoluments, 
and we expect them to be more likely to become optimistic. Larwood and Whittaker (1977), 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999), and Malmendier and Tate (2005a) suggest corporate 
executive that holding an MBA, or a management studies are positively correlated with 
overconfidence. The CEO with founder status36 and the CEO who holds the chairman post 
simultaneously37have more influence and power in the firm’s decision-making process.  
 
Previous research also found that financial expertise significantly influences corporate 
decisions (Güner, Malmendier & Tate, 2008; Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013).  The longer 
a CEO’s tenure, the more the CEO tends to become influential over the board (Yim, 2013), 
and the more knowledge he/she gains the more comfortable they will feel dealing with their 
working environment (Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild & Bouri, 2012).  Additionally, 
emoluments received by a CEO is used as a proxy for CEO dominance (Brown & Sarma, 
2007).  
 
Our argument is that a CEO who has more skills and experiences would be expected to 
know the benefit of leasing and be able to utilise lease financing for their firm. As 
Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008) mentioned, leasing can lower a firm’s overall risk and 
                                                          
36See: Adam, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) and Buyl, Boone, Hendriks and Matthyssens (2011) 
37 See: Adam, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), Fracassi and Tate (2012) and Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri (2012) 
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reduce agency cost of debt by easing the conflicts among debt holders and shareholders. A 
skilful and experienced CEO is expected to act in the shareholders’ best interests and try to 
minimize agency cost of debt by using more lease financing. As Stulz and Johnson (1985) 
also point out, incentive problems can be reduced if the firm retains the ability to finance 
new investment with high priority claims such as secured debt and leases.  
 
Hence, in this study, we expect that the CEO with more skills and experiences (holder of 
MBA or PhD, firm founder, financially literate, with duality status, longer tenure as CEO 
and higher pay) will have more decision-making power, and their opinions will be taken 
and translated directly into outcomes for the firm. With the knowledge and experiences 
they have, they are expected to employ more leases for the firm to lower the firm’s risk.  
Thus, hypothesis 2 is designed as: 
 
H2: CEOs’ Skills and Experiences have a positive relationship with corporate leasing 
decisions  
Table 3.3 
Prediction of the Relationship between CEO Skills and Experiences and Corporate 
Leasing Decisions 
CEO Skills and Experiences    Lease Employment 
1. Educational Background (MBA, PhD holder) 
2. Founder Status 
3. Financial Literacy 
4. Duality  
5. Length of Tenure as CEO 
6. Emoluments 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
Positive 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2.3 CEO Networking and Corporate Leasing Decisions 
 
Our third hypothesis aims to examine CEOs’ networking ties with their leasing decision.  
We incorporate four measurements for networking ties based on internal and external 
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networking. Internal networking comprises tenure with the firm and internal promotion, 
while external networking comprises external directorships, and social networking prestige. 
 
We suggest that a CEO who has stronger networking ties tends to increase their likelihood 
to become optimistic. When CEOs work with a firm for a longer period or when they are 
internally promoted to CEO, they will tend to gain trust, respect and support: hence, they 
will have stronger networking ties with the board, their peers and subordinates. These 
factors help a CEO to be comfortable with a firm and know it well, and may be the reason 
why such CEOs become more prone to show optimistic behaviour.  
 
Furthermore, a CEO who holds external appointments and who has social networking 
prestige, especially related to  association with professional bodies, or the holding of 
fellowships or official honours (knighthoods), tends to increase his/her likelihood to 
become optimistic. Malmendier and Tate (2009) mention that prestigious awards might 
cultivate CEOs’ overconfident behaviour. CEOs who are appointed by outside firms or 
have social prestige are believed to have expertise and good external networking ties. Hence, 
such recognition from external firms may make them feel esteemed, and possibly make 
them more likely to become optimistic. Additionally, CEOs who have more networking 
ties (internal and external) are expected to have better social skills which may help them 
obtain better deals in leasing agreements. Hence, CEOs who have more networking ties are 
expected to be able to reduce agency conflicts between shareholders and debt holders, as 
they are more experienced in dealing with internal and external networking. Therefore, our 
hypothesis 3 is developed as follows: 
 
H3: CEOs’ networking ties have a positive relationship with corporate leasing decisions  
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Table 3.4 
Prediction of Relationship between CEO Networking Ties and Corporate Leasing 
Decision 
CEO Networking Ties Lease Employment 
1. Tenure with the firm 
2. Internally Promoted 
3. External Directorships 
4. Social Networking Prestige  
Positive  
Positive  
Positive  
Positive 
 
In summary, this chapter investigates the influence of CEOs’ personal attributes towards 
corporate leasing decisions. We summarise the research framework in Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 
Research Framework for Second Empirical Chapter 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
Leasing Decision 
 Operating 
lease  
 Finance 
lease 
 Total Lease 
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3.3 Data and Methodology 
 
Our study period is from 2000 to 2013; the final sample to examine the relationships 
between CEO personal attributes and corporate leasing decisions comprises 623 
observations. These observations are from the UK FTSE 100 firms, excluding financially 
related firms, utilities firms and natural resources firms38. We manually collect the data for 
operating lease from firms’ annual reports. To ensure the consistency and accuracy of the 
dataset, we also hand-collect the net finance leases (net book value of fixed assets held 
under finance lease) and depreciation expenses, from firms’ annual reports. 
 
In this study, we examine the influence of CEO personal attributes on their firm’s corporate 
leasing decisions. One may argue that financing decision is a responsibility of the CFO, yet 
we choose to examine the CEO, as the CEO is the firm’s dominant decision maker. 
Although he/she might not be directly involved in every single leasing agreement, the CEO 
monitors overall firm performance and on average, lease financing in our sample study was 
equivalent to 30-40% of the capital cost. Therefore, a CEO should be aware of, and 
concerned about his/her firm’s lease financing; Capital cost is important for a firm’s 
strategic planning, therefore, a CEO is expected to have influence on corporate leasing 
decisions. 
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
 
This study adopts Sharpe and Nguyen’s (1995) firm corporate leasing measurements as 
shown in Table 3.5. They propose three measures of a firm’s propensity to lease: capital 
                                                          
38Same as Sharpe and Nguyen (1995), Lin, Wang, Chou and Chueh (2013) 
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lease share (in this study we address this as finance Lease39), operating lease share, and 
total lease share. These measurements have also been used by Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon 
(2008) and Mehran, Taggart and Yermack (1999). 
 
Table 3.5  
Dependent Variables (propensity to lease) Used in this Study 
 
Propensity to Lease 
 
Measurement 
 
Finance Lease Share 
(FLS) 
𝐹𝐿𝑆
=
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝐸
 
The Finance Lease share is ratio of the 
net book value of fixed assets held 
under finance lease divided by net 
property, plant and equipment. 
Operating Lease 
Share (OPLS) 
𝑂𝑃𝐿𝑆
=
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
= 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
+ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒
+ (𝑖 𝑥 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝐸) 
𝑖 = 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
We use annual average rate of discount 
of 3-month UK Treasury bills as our 
short-term borrowing rate. 
Total Lease Share 
(TLS) 
𝑇𝐿𝑆
= 𝑂𝑃𝐿𝑆
+ (1 − 𝑂𝑃𝐿𝑆) 𝑋 𝐹𝐿𝑆 
 
Total lease share is the sum of 
operating lease share plus the finance 
lease share weighted by the share the 
total capital cost.  
 
 
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
 
In this study, our main explanatory variable is CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and 
experiences, and networking). For this study, we first examine every single CEO personal 
attributes (age, gender, nationality, and marital status, MBA or PhD holder, firm founder, 
financially literate, duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments, tenure with the firm, internal 
promotion, external directorships, and social networking prestige) and their effects on 
optimistic behaviour. In addition to looking at the individual effects of the attributes, we 
also compose a CEO Traits Index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking 
                                                          
39 UK firm uses the term of “Finance lease” as the same as “Capital Lease” uses in US. 
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Index (NI)40 to observe the effect of each of the indexes on firms’ lease financing. Lastly, 
derived from the results we discussed in chapter two; we find that CEOs personal traits, 
skills and experiences, and networking do cultivate their optimism behaviour, hence we 
construct a CEO Optimism Index41 (CEOOI) to investigate CEO optimism and corporate 
leasing decisions. We choose to use the binomial method to construct the indexes in this 
study, as our chapter two results suggest that the binomial index and PCA index are 
substitutable. Each of the indexes (TI, SEI, NI and CEOOI) comprises following 
components shown in Table 3.6 below: 
 
Table 3.6  
The Components for CEO Optimism Index (CEOOI) which comprises CEO Personal 
Traits index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index (NI) 
 
 
Panel A: CEO Personal Traits  
 
Age  
 
CEO’s age is calculated according to the difference between his/her year of 
birth and the examined year. Dummy 1 is allocated if the CEO is younger than 
the average age of the CEOs in the sample study. 
 
Gender For this study, a male CEO is assigned dummy variable 1; females are then 
dummy = zero 
 
Nationality  A dummy variable (1, 0) is used where a CEO of UK nationality is denoted as 
1 and others as zero 
 
Marital Status  If a CEO is single, a dummy of zero is assigned, if married; a dummy of 1 is 
assigned 
 
  
Panel B: CEO Skills and Experiences 
 
Formal 
Education 
CEOs with an MBA or PhD degree are identified. For these two variables, 
dummy 1 is assigned to those who hold an MBA and PhD respectively, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Founder If the CEO is also a founder of the firm, dummy variable 1 is denoted, otherwise 
zero is assigned. 
 
                                                          
40 The construction of index has been outlined in section 2.3.2 Methodology (page 83-84). 
41 Our CEO optimism index is the composite of CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking) 
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Financial 
Literacy 
 
If the CEO has worked as a financial officer or controller, banker, accountant, 
treasurer lawyer, or academic who was involved in the economics, business, 
finance or accounting fields, he/she is categorized as financially literate. 
Dummy variable 1 is used for a CEO who is financially literate: otherwise zero 
is assigned. 
 
Duality If a CEO holds the post of chairman at the same time, a dummy variable of 1 
is allocated to the CEO: otherwise zero is assigned. 
 
Tenure as 
CEO 
 
The tenure of a CEO is counted from the year he/she starts being designated 
CEO. If the CEO has worked longer than the average tenure of the CEOs in the 
sample, then dummy 1 is assigned: otherwise zero is assigned. 
 
Emoluments  Annual emoluments scaled by the firm’s total assets. If the CEO received 
higher than average pay, he/she is assigned 1, if he/she gets paid below- average 
emoluments, he/she is assigned dummy zero. 
 
 
Panel C: CEO Networking 
 
Tenure with 
the Firm 
Tenure with a firm is calculated from the year the respective CEO joins the 
firm until the examined year. If the CEO worked longer years than the average 
years worked in the sample, then dummy 1 is assigned: otherwise zero is 
assigned. 
 
Internal 
Promotion 
 
If the CEO is internally promoted, dummy 1 is assigned: otherwise zero is 
assigned 
External 
Directorships 
 
If the CEO has outside appointment, dummy 1 is assigned: otherwise zero is 
assigned 
Social 
Networking 
Prestige 
Observed from a CEO’s social networking prestige/status especially a CEOs’ 
networking in professional bodies, being awarded fellowship or official 
honours, particularly knighthoods. A CEO with any of the above-mentioned 
marks of prestige/status, is assigned dummy 1: otherwise zero is assigned. 
 
 
 
For control variables, we include firm-specific factors which have been used in previous 
research (Table 3.7). These leasing determinants are used to explain why firms choose to 
lease. Firm specific factors that we control for in this study include tax (tax loss carried 
forward), financial constraints (internal fund, growth opportunity, leverage, and 
profitability), contracting cost (tangibility, and firm size), firm uniqueness and corporate 
governance. Furthermore, we also control for industry effect and macroeconomic factors, 
namely GDP, Stock Market return and Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI). 
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Table 3.7 
Firm-specific Factors Used as Control Variables in this Study 
 
 
Firm-specific factors 
 
Measurement / Proxy 
 
Tax benefits Non Tax Shield (Dummy) Tax loss = 1, if the firm has tax loss 
carried forward 
 
Tax Rates Income taxes 
Profit before tax
 
 
Financial constraints Internal Fund Operating income before 
depreciation and amortization − taxes
Total Asset
 
 
Growth Opportunity Market value of asset
Book value of asset
 
 
Leverage 
 
Total Debt
Total Asset
 
 
Profitability Profits before tax
Total Asset
 
 
Contracting Cost Tangibility PPE
Total Asset
 
Firm Size 
 
Natural logarithm of the book value 
of Total Asset 
 
Uniqueness  Research and Development                               
(R & D) 
Dummy= 1, if the firm has R&D 
expenses, otherwise zero. 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
Proportion of independent 
directors on each firm’s 
board of directors 
 
Number of Non − executive Director
Board Size
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3.3.3 Regression Specification 
 
In this study, we examine the relationships between CEO personal attributes (personal traits, 
skills and experiences, and networking) and corporate leasing decisions using panel OLS 
regression. We control for firm macroeconomic factors and industry effects as our baseline 
Model I. In Model II, we include CEO personal attributes to observe the influence of CEO 
traits (age, gender, nationality, and marital status), skills and experiences, and networking 
towards corporate leasing decisions. To investigate further and from different perspectives, 
we construct three indices using the attributes: CEO personal Traits Index (TI), CEO Skills 
and Experiences Index (SEI), and CEO Networking Index (NI), as in Model III. Lastly, 
these three indexes are combined into the CEO Optimism Index (CEOOI) in order to 
observe the total effect of an optimistic CEO on firms’ corporate leasing decisions. The 
specifications of the regression models are as follows: 
 
Model I: titizti ZCLD ,,, )(     
 
Model II: 
 
titiztipati ZAttributesPersonalCEOCLD ,,,, )(__     
Model III: 
 
   tiztiNItiSEItiTIti ZNISEITICLD .,,,, )(  
Model IV: titiztiOIti ZCEOOICLD ,,,, )(     
 
 
Whereby:  
CLD = Corporate Leasing Decisions (Total Lease Share, Finance Lease Share, 
and Operating Lease Share) 
CEO 
personal 
Attributes 
= CEO personal traits (age, gender, nationality, and marital status) 
CEO Skills and Experiences (MBA or PhD  holder, firm founder, 
financially literate, duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments) 
CEO Networking Ties (tenure with the firm, internal promotion, 
external directorships, and social networking prestige) 
 Z = Vector of control variables (firm, and macroeconomic factors and 
industry  dummies) 
TI = Traits Index 
SEI = Skills and Experiences Index 
NI = Networking Index 
CEOOI = CEO Optimism Index 
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3.4 Results and Discussion 
 
Based on our sample firms, we find that UK firms commonly use lease financing. Of the 
sample in this study, 81.06% of the firms employed finance leases while 99.84% of the 
firms employed operating leases. The plausible explanation is that operating leases provide 
higher flexibility in term of the option to change to new assets (more compatible with fast 
changes in technology). Additionally, use of operating leases also lowers the firm’s risk by 
eliminating the risk of asset obsolescence. From a financial reporting perspective, operating 
lease is treated as off-balance sheet, which may make the firm’s financial status look less 
leveraged and enable it to attract new investors. Consequently, UK firms use finance leases 
less due to the need to include these as liabilities on the balance sheet, which does not add 
value from the financial reporting perspective. This finding is in line with Hirshleifer and 
Teoh’s (2009) suggestion that a firm prefers a “clean balance sheet”, therefore takes up 
operating leases rather than finance leases. 
 
The UK firms’ lease employment is similar to that of US firms; as Robicheaux, Fu and 
Ligon’s (2008) report, US firms employ 1.84% finance lease, 37.39% operating lease and 
38.81% total lease. Their study period covered the years 1992 to 2004. Figure 3.2 shows 
that UK firms tend to employ more operating leases than finance leases. The average 
propensity to use total leases ranges from 28-42% of their total capital cost, operating leases 
comprise 26-40% of their total capital cost, while the finance leases’ share is less than 10% 
of their net PPE. 
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Figure 3.2 
Lease Financing for UK firms (2000 to 2013) 
The figure presents the average of lease employment propensities (finance lease share, operating 
lease share, and total lease share) for UK FTSE 100 firms from 2000 to 2013. This study utilises 
623 observations. 
 
 
 
 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The summary statistics (Table 3.8) show that the average Total Lease Share (TLS) 
employed by our sample firms is 37.19% of their total capital cost. This shows that leasing 
is an important financing source for the UK firms. The average finance lease share (FLS) 
is 0.0455 of their net PPE book value.  This implies that less than 5% of the firms’ PPE in 
our sample is financed by finance leases. We find that UK firms prefer to use operating 
leases rather than finance leases, as the operating lease share (OPLS) is equivalent to 34.39% 
of firms’ total capital cost. 
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Table 3.8 
Summary Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. This study looked at 
the UK FTSE 100 firms from 2000 to 2013.  Panel A shows the dependent variables, which are 
the propensity to lease (Total Lease Share, Finance Lease Share, and Operating Lease Share). 
Panel B shows the explanatory variables used in this study (traits, skills and experiences, and 
networking). Panel C shows the control variables included in this study. 
 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. deviation 
Net Finance Lease (£’000) 71,483 0.0000 2,462,820 188,979 
Net PPE (£’000) 2,464,280 8,990 25,710,000 4,337,765 
Operating Lease (£'000) 124,586 0.0000 1,888,000 213,487 
Depreciation Expenses(£’000) 315,146 463 4,583,000 650,753 
Finance Lease Share (FLS) 0.0455 0.0000 0.6740 0.0892 
Operating Lease Share (OPLS) 0.3439 0.0000 0.8693 0.2207 
Total Lease Share (TLS) 0.3719 0.0000 0.8716 0.2235 
 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables (CEO Attributes) 
1. CEO Personal Traits 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. deviation 
Age 52.3980 31 69 5.9295 
Gender (GEN) 0.9374 0 1 0.2420 
Nationality (NAT) 0.6837 0 1 0.4650 
Marital Status (MS) 1.0160 0 2 0.3490 
2. CEO Skills and Experiences 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. deviation 
MBA 0.1926 0 1 0.3950 
PhD 0.1027 0 1 0.3040 
Founder (FOU) 0.0208 0 1 0.1430 
Financial Literacy (FL) 0.4189 0 1 0.4940 
Tenure as CEO (TCEO) 5.9052 1 28 4.5540 
Duality (DUA) 0.0240 0 1 0.1530 
Emoluments (EMO) 0.0053 0.0000 0.0569 0.0063 
3. CEO Networking 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. deviation 
Tenure with the firm (TWF) 14.7528 1 43 10.4690 
Internal Promotion (IP) 0.6869 0 1 0.4640 
External Directorships (ED) 0.7239 0 4 0.7780 
Social Networking Prestige (SNP) 0.5409 0 1 0.4990 
4. CEO Attributes Indexes     
Traits Index (TI) 0.7652 0.2500 1.0000 0.1942 
Skills and Experiences Index (SEI) 0.2208 0.0000 0.5714 0.1460 
Networking Index (NI) 0.5581 0.0000 1.0000 0.2721 
Optimism Index (OI) 
 
 
0.5147 0.1667     0.8095 0.1375 
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Panel C: Control Variables 
 
1. Firm Level Data 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. deviation 
i. Tax     
Taxes (£’000) 242,726 -547,000 2,956,000 428,228 
 Tax-loss carried forward 
(TLCF) (dummy) 
.04012 0.0000 1.0000 0.1964 
 Tax rate (TAXR) 0.2870 -3.3333 7.3444 0.5479 
ii. Financial Constraints    
Operating Income (£’000) 959,270 -6,260,000 8,982,000 1,639,286 
 Internal Fund (IF) 0.1260 -0.0350 0.5537 0.0671 
 Leverage (LEV) 0.2478 0.0000 1.6724 0.1612 
 Market to Book Value 
(MTB) 
3.534 -540.14 202.32 30.2556 
 Profitability (PRO) 0.0999 -0.5144 0.6354 0.0849 
iii. Contracting cost     
 Tangibility (TANG) 0.2524 0.0005 0.8943 0.2193 
 Firm Size (FS) 15.3042 11.7324 18.9613 1.3433 
iv. Uniqueness      
 Research and 
Development (R&D) 
(£’000) 
204,625 0.0000 3,810,000 605,658 
 Uniqueness (UNIQ) 
(dummy) 
0.5040 0.0000 1.0000 0.5003 
v. Corporate Governance     
 Proportion of Non-
executive Directors (N-
ED) 
0.6380 0.0000 0.8947 0.1470 
 Board Size (BS) 11.27 5 20 2.7740 
2. Macroeconomic Factors 
 Mean Min. Max. Std. deviation 
Log GDP (GDP) 14.1043 13.8026 14.2938 0.1484 
Log Stock Market Return (SMR) 8.5827 8.2371 8.7560 0.1583 
Consumer Confidence  Indicators 
(CCI) 
 
-10.0247 -21.3500 -1.8800 7.2088 
 
 
This study employs 623 observations; as Table 3.8 shows, the CEO’s average age is 52.39 
years. Only a small number of female CEOs head UK FTSE firms. Our sample comprises 
93.74% male CEOs, 68.37% of UK nationality and most married (only 5.29% of the CEOs 
are single). In terms of CEO skills and experiences, 19.26% of the CEOs hold an MBA 
degree and 10.27% hold a PhD. Only 2.08% are also a founder of the firm; 41.89% possess 
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financial knowledge. On average, the CEOs have worked as CEO for 5.9 years. Only 2.4% 
of them hold the position of chairman simultaneously.  On average, CEOs receive pay 
equivalent to 0.53% of the firm’s total asset value. In terms of CEO networking ties, the 
average CEO has worked with the firm for 14.75 years and 68.69% have been internally 
promoted to become CEO, while, 55.85% of the CEOs in our sample hold external 
directorships and 54.09% of them have networking prestige. 
 
For firm level data, we include tax, financial constraints, contracting cost, firm uniqueness, 
and corporate governance and industries dummy to control for the conventional 
determinant of corporate leasing. For macroeconomics factors, we also include GDP, stock 
market return, and consumer confidence indicators (CCI). 
 
3.4.2 Correlation Coefficients 
 
Table 3.9 shows the correlations between our dependent variables and independent 
variables. Panel A shows that the three propensities-to-lease measurements: Total Lease 
Share (TLS), Finance Lease Share (FLS), and Operating Lease Share (OPLS), are 
significantly positively correlated with each other. As a major proportion of a firm’s total 
lease share made up by the firm’s operating lease, the TLS and OPLS are highly correlated 
at R = 0.968. In the case of CEO personal traits (age, gender, nationality, and marital status); 
the CEO’s age is negatively, though non-significantly, correlated with all the propensity-
to-lease measurements. CEO gender (male) is significantly negatively correlated with the 
use of lease and non-UK nationality CEOs, while the status (married) of CEOs is positively 
correlated with finance lease employment.  
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In the case of CEO skills and experiences, CEOs’ education background (holder of MBA 
or PhD) shows significant negative correlations with finance lease and total lease share. 
Founder CEOs exhibit a significant positive correlation with OPLS and TLS. CEOs who 
are financially literate are found to have significant positive correlations with the 
employment of all type of leases. A CEO’s duality status is significantly negatively 
correlated with OPLS. Tenure as CEO is significantly positively correlated with TLS and 
OPLS, but significantly negatively correlated with FLS.  CEO emoluments show a 
significant positive relationship with all types of leasing propensity. In the case of CEO 
networking ties, tenure with the firm exhibits a negative correlation with all type of leases, 
while internally promoted CEOs show a significant negative correlation with FLS, and 
CEOs who have external appointments tend to have a significant positive correlation with 
FLS. Lastly, CEOs who have social networking prestige (such as holding fellowships and 
professional memberships, or being a recipient of a knighthood) exhibit significant positive 
correlations with TLS and OPLS. 
 
Panel C presents the correlations between conventional corporate leasing determinants and 
the firms’ propensity-to-lease. TLS shows a significant positive correlation with tax-loss 
carried forward. This implies that the firm with tax loss is more likely to use finance leases 
more.    Furthermore, firms with less internal funds are found to significantly correlate with 
higher OPLS and TLS.  For the relationship between leasing propensity and leverage, the 
correlation results show that OPLS and TLS are significant negatively correlated with debt 
ratio, which shows that the relationship between operating lease and total lease used by the 
firm and the firm’s debt ratio are in a substitution relationship.  Firm profitability is found 
to have significant negative correlations with OPLS and TLS; firms making less profit are 
more likely to have higher operating leases and total leases. 
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Tangibility, firm size and firm uniqueness are found to have significant negative 
correlations with all types of lease (TLS, FLS and OPLS); smaller firms,fewer tangible 
assets, and firm with research and development expenses are more likely to use less lease 
financing. Corporate governance exhibits significant negative correlations with OPLS and 
TLS; firms with a smaller proportion of non –executive directors on the board will tend to 
have more operating leases and total leases. In the case of macroeconomic factors, GDP is 
found to have significant positive correlations with OPLS and TLS, while CCI shows 
significant negative correlations with OPLS and TLS. 
 
Our correlation coefficient results show that most of the explanatory variables we examine 
are significantly correlated with the dependent variables – propensity-to-lease (total lease 
share, operating lease share, and finance lease share).  This implies that CEO personal 
attributes have a significant impact on corporate leasing decisions.  We therefore carry out 
univariate and multivariate analyses to further examine how, and to what extent CEO 
personal attributes influence firms’ leasing decisions. 
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Table 3.9 
Correlations 
 
Panel A: Correlations among dependent variables and explanatory variables 
 
 
FLS OPLS TLS Age Gen Nat MS MBA PhD FOU FL DUA TCEO EMO TWF IP ED SNP 
FLS 1                  
OPLS .090** 1                 
TLS .326*** .968*** 1                
Age -.025 -.037 -.041 1               
Gen -.259*** -.128*** -.179*** .033 1              
Nat -.099** .025 .004 -.011 .138*** 1             
MS .067* -.040 -.026 .213*** .012 -.018 1            
MBA -.075* .018 .007 -.009 .126*** -.272*** -.092** 1           
PhD -.116*** -.041 -.068* .178*** .022 -.168*** -.106*** .143*** 1          
FOU -.064 .222*** .203*** .261*** .038 .099** -.007 .299*** -.049 1         
FL .083** .181*** .195*** -.076 -.116*** .172*** -.151*** -.109*** -.116*** .172*** 1        
DUA .047 -.081** -.058 .083** .041 .039 -.007 -.050 .119*** -.023 -.006 1       
TCEO -.113*** .277*** .243*** .320*** -.005 .200*** .002 .036 -.034 .516*** .173*** .045 1      
EMO .296*** .228*** .276*** -.116*** -.344*** -.031 -.010 -.085** .028 -.077* -.116*** .124*** .011 1     
TWF -.143*** -.070* -.104*** .204*** .188*** .235*** .114*** -.074* -.062 .101** -.125*** -.080** .350*** 
-.127**
* 
1    
IP -.151*** .021 -.020 -.059 .326*** .166*** .140*** .075* -.125*** .099** .026 -.120*** .116*** 
-.145**
* 
.621*** 1   
ED .110*** .022 .050 .265*** -.151*** .020 -.013 -.010 .168*** .081** .184*** .164*** .195*** .070* -.018 -.160*** 1  
SNP -.041 .081** .076* .030 -.052 .184*** -.022 -.056 .068* .134*** .358*** .103** .232*** 
-.165**
* 
.044 -.004 .108*** 1 
*, **, *** denote that the correlation is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Panel B: Correlations among dependent variables and indexes 
 
 
FLS OPLS TLS TI SEI NI CEOOI 
TI -.085** .013 -.004 1    
SEI -.020 .265*** .254*** -.040 1   
NI -.133** .051 .018 .188** .244** 1  
CEOOI -.135*** .134*** .100** .581*** .496*** .835*** 1 
 
Panel C: Correlations among dependent variables and control variables 
 
FLR OPLS TLS TLCF TAXR IF MTB LEV PRO TANG FS UNIQ CG GDP SMR CCI 
TAXR -.043 -.043 -.051 -.079** 1            
IF .017 -.183*** -.170*** -.037 .043 1           
MTB -.037 -.018 -.029 -.014 -.010 .021 1          
LEV -.011 -.139*** -.134*** -.007 .020 .391*** -.014 1         
PRO .007 -.096** -.093** -.276*** .007 .770*** .087** .171*** 1        
TANG -.088** -.345*** -.350*** .066* -.024 .140*** -.056 .052 .040 1       
FS -.070* -.299*** -.298*** .048 .024 -.216*** -.010 .104*** -.221** .021 1      
UNIQ -.140*** -.326*** -.352*** -.075* .021 .002 .019 -.086** .025 -.242*** .126*** 1     
CG -.008 -.076* -.079** .011 .020 .066 -.034 .149*** .024 -.286*** .338*** .216*** 1    
GDP .033 .154*** .153*** .043 -.033 .045 -.028 .085** .031 -.075* .243*** -.048 .346*** 1   
SMR .013 -.004 -.003 -.027 -.120*** .000 .005 .045 .048 -.006 .085** .010 .041 .206*** 1  
CCI .040 -.131*** -.115*** -.074* -.037 .017 .070* -.043 .052 .057 -.237*** .013 -.262*** -.672*** -.090** 1 
*, **, *** denote that the correlation is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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3.4.3 Univariate Analyses 
 
Table 3.10  presents the results of the univariate analysis for lease employment by CEOs 
groups  in terms of their Personal Traits (age, gender, nationality, marital status); Skills 
and Experiences (holder of MBA or PhD, firm founder, financially literate, duality, tenure 
as CEO, and emoluments), and Networking (tenure with the firm, internal promotion, 
external directorships, and social networking prestige).  
 
The compare means results show that younger CEOs tend to use a higher total lease share 
(TLS) of 0.3919 compared to older CEOs (0.3527). Female CEOs tend to use a higher 
lease share than male CEOs; female CEOs employ 0.5267 of total lease share, while male 
CEOs’ average total lease share is 0.3617. Identical results are found for the compare 
medians analysis. The compare medians results also finds significant differences in total 
lease share depending on nationality (UK nationality CEOs are found to employ higher 
total lease compare with their counterparts).  The younger, UK nationality CEOs are 
found to be more likely to use leases and this is consistent with an optimistic and risk-
taking approach, as mentioned by Heaton (2002), who posited that optimistic managers 
believe that the market undervalues their firm, so they are reluctant to issue new equity 
to finance their investment. Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) mentioned that younger 
CEOs and home country nationality CEOs are more risk taking and optimistic.  
 
The univariate results for total lease share, operating lease share and finance lease share 
show that female CEO tend to have higher lease ratios compared to male CEOs. This 
result may support the argument that females are more risk averse. Additionally, from 
accounting disclosure approach, whereby a lease is treated as a low risk security and has 
off-balance sheet treatment in the case of an operating lease. The compared univariate 
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results show that females are more likely to use more lease compare to males, however 
we also noted that this result is not conclusive as the number of females in our study is 
much lower than the males. 
 
The compare means and compare medians analysis also show that married CEOs tend to 
employ a significantly higher finance lease ratio compare to single status CEOs. Grinblatt 
and Keloharju (2009) and Puri and Robinson (2007), mention that married people are 
more self-confident hence they may have higher confidence in the firm’s future earnings 
and be unwilling to share them with new equity holders; thus married CEOs may be 
reluctant to issue new equity to finance new assets, and  prefer to choose lease financing.  
 
Based on the univariate analyses and the significant differences in the use of lease by 
CEOs age, gender, and nationality in the UK firms, we may conclude that a CEO’s 
personal traits may have a significant influence on the firm’s leasing decisions. 
 
In the case of CEOs’ skills and experiences, we find significant differences in total leases 
used by CEOs depending on their status as PhD holders and firm founders, their financial 
literacy, duality status, length of tenure as CEO, and level of emoluments. PhD holders 
and CEOs with duality status are found to have lower mean lease employment while 
CEOs who are also firm founders and have financial knowledge, longer tenure, and higher 
pay tend to have higher lease employment. CEOs who have worked as CEO for a longer 
period in the firm show significantly higher usage of total leases and operating leases. 
Significant differences in means and medians are also found in the case of finance leases; 
shorter tenure CEOs tends to have higher use of finance leases. Interestingly, CEOs who 
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are financially literate and have higher emoluments are consistently found to have a 
higher propensity to lease (TLS, FLS and OPLS).  
 
The results of univariate analyses in Panel C shows that CEOs who have networking 
prestige (fellowships, professional memberships, and awarded knighthoods) tend to have 
higher total lease use compared with CEOs who have no networking prestige. However, 
compare medians results for total lease shows that CEOs who were not internally 
promoted tend to have higher lease employment compared with internally promoted 
CEOs. Identical results for social networking prestige and internally promoted CEOs are 
found for finance leases and operating leases. 
 
CEOs who work for fewer years (shorter tenure) with the firm are found to have higher 
finance lease use compared to CEOs who work longer years with the firm. There is no 
significant difference in lease employment between CEOs who have external directorship 
appointments and those who have no outside directorships. In the case of networking ties, 
social networking prestige and internal promotion are factors that show significant 
differences in CEOs’ employment of leases, whereby CEOs with social networking 
prestige tend to have higher use of all type of lease and CEOs who are not internally 
promoted tend to have higher use of TLS, FLS, and OPLS leases. 
 
Panel D presents the univariate analysis for lease decision and indexes (Traits Index, 
Skills and Experiences Index, Networking Index, and Optimism Index). CEOs with a 
higher Traits Index (TI) score are found to have higher employment of total leases but 
lower employment of finance leases. The Skills and Experiences Index (SEI) shows a 
significant difference in the use of total leases and operating leases, whereby CEOs with 
 159 
 
a higher SEI score tend to use higher total leases and higher operating leases. The 
Networking Index (NI) only shows a significant difference in the case of FLS; CEOs with 
a lower NI score tend to have higher finance lease employment. Lastly, the CEO 
Optimism Index (OI) shows significant differences as regards FLS and OPLS; CEOs with 
lower OI scores show higher lease employment in FLS, while CEOs with higher OI scores 
show higher operating lease employment. This implies that optimistic CEOs prefer to rent 
an asset than purchase it. 
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Table 3.10 
Univariate Results 
 
In the case of univariate analysis, we use compare means and compare medians to examine the lease employment by different groups of CEO, namely 
CEO Personal Traits (age, gender, nationality, marital status), CEO Skills and Experiences (holder of MBA or PhD, firm founder, financially literate, 
duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments), and CEO Networking (tenure with the firm, internal, external directorships, and social networking prestige) 
 
Panel A: CEO Personal Traits 
   Total Lease Share Finance Lease Share Operating Lease Share 
  N mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. diff. mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. diff. mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. 
diff. 
Age Younger CEO 307 0.3919 
** 
0.3677 ** 0.0495  
 
0.0101  0.3618 
** 
0.3056 * 
Older CEO 316 0.3527 0.3007 0.0417 0.0137 0.3265 0.2705 
Gender  Male 584 0.3617 
*** 
0.3071 *** 0.0396 
*** 
0.0111 ** 0.3366 
*** 
0.2744 *** 
Female 39 0.5267 0.5798 0.1349 0.0328 0.4531 0.5316 
Nationality UK nationality 426 0.3725  
 
0.3155 * 0.0395 
** 
0.0093 *** 0.3477  
 
0.2713 ** 
Non-UK nationality 197 0.3708 0.3141 0.0585 0.0155 0.3357 0.2967 
Marital Status Married 590 0.3708  
 
0.3128  0.0475 
** 
0.0137 *** 0.3415  
 
0.2747  
Single 33 0.3929 0.3921 0.0100 0.0037 0.3864 0.3921 
               
Panel B: CEO Skills and Experiences 
   Total Lease Share Finance Lease Share Operating Lease Share 
  N mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. diff. mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. diff. mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. 
diff. 
MBA holder Holder 120 0.3752  
 
0.5432  0.0318 
* 
0.0258  0.3519  
 
0.5083 
** 
Non-holder 503 0.3712 0.5624 0.0488 0.0480 0.3420 0.5206 
PhD holder Holder 64 0.3272 
* 
0.3758  0.0149 
*** 
0.0124  0.3173  
 
0.3632 
* 
Non-holder 559 0.3771 0.3125 0.0490 0.0126 0.3470 0.2748 
Founder status Founder 13 0.6821 *** 
 
0.6846 *** 0.0065 
*** 
0.0000 * 0.6799 
*** 
0.6783 
*** 
Non-founder 610 0.3654 0.3123 0.0464 0.0129 0.3367 0.2750 
Financial literacy Financially literate 261 0.4232 
*** 
0.4137 *** 0.0542 
** 
0.0171 *** 0.3910 
*** 
0.3528 
*** 
Non-financially literate 362 0.3351 0.2810 0.0393 0.0092 0.3099 0.2569 
Duality As chairman and CEO 15 0.2889 
** 
0.3042  0.0722 
 
0.0572  0.2305 
** 
0.2573 
 
CEO post only 608 0.3740 0.3162 0.0449 0.0123 0.3467 0.2876 
Tenure as CEO Longer tenure 264 0.4017 *** 
0.3464  0.0385 
* 
0.0086 *** 0.3785 
*** 
0.3163 
 
Shorter tenure 359 0.3501 0.3097 0.0507 0.0152 0.3184 0.2715 
Emoluments Higher  pay 256 0.4316 
*** 
0.4553 *** 0.0531 
* 
0.0088 * 0.4011 
*** 
0.3960 
*** 
Lower pay 367 0.3304 0.2717 0.0402 0.0150 0.3040 0.2300 
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Panel C: CEO Networking 
   Total Lease Share Finance Lease Share Operating Lease Share 
  N mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. diff. mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. diff. mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. 
diff. 
Tenure with the Firm Longer Tenure 278 0.3663 
 
0.3029  0.0321 
*** 
0.0063 *** 0.3476 
 
0.2509  
Shorter Tenure 345 0.3766 0.3498 0.0563 0.0160 0.3409 0.2946 
Internal promotion Internally promoted 428 0.3690  
0.3025 
** 
0.0365 
*** 
0.0089 
*** 
0.3470 
 
0.2577 
* 
Newly recruited 195 0.3785 0.3586 0.0654 0.0185 0.3371 0.3000 
External directorships With external appointment 348 0.3728 
 
0.3207  0.0475 
 
0.0137  0.3433 
 
0.2918  
No external appointment 275 0.3710 0.3074 0.0430 0.0103 0.3447 0.2777 
Social networking 
prestige 
With networking prestige 337 0.3875 
* 
0.3531  0.0422 
 
0.0149 * 0.3603 
** 
0.2944  
No networking prestige 286 0.3537 0.3059 0.0494 0.0086 0.3245 0.2750 
               
Panel D: CEO Personal Attributes Indexes 
   Total Lease Share Finance Lease Share Operating Lease Share 
  N mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. diff. mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. diff. mean Sig. diff. media
n 
Sig. 
diff. 
Traits Index (TI) High TI 185 0.3869  0.3649 ** 0.0344 ** 0.0074 ** 0.3654  0.3291  
 Low TI 438 0.3656  0.3065  0.0502  0.0140  0.3348  0.2753  
Skills and Experiences 
Index (SEI) 
High SEI 309 0.4291 
*** 
0.4495 
*** 
0.0465 
 
0.0112  0.4015 
*** 
0.3921 *** 
Low SEI 314 0.3157 0.2572 0.0445 0.0140 0.2871 0.2226 
Networking Index (NI) High NI 258 0.3712  
0.2993 
 
0.0364 
** 
0.0087 ** 0.3491 
 
0.2576  
Low NI 365 0.3725 0.3399 0.0519 0.0144 0.3402 0.2959 
CEO Optimism Index 
(OI) 
High OI 295 0.3821 
 
0.3162 
 
0.0370 ** 0.0090 ** 0.3597 * 0.2853  
Low OI 328 0.3628 0.3146 0.0531 0.0147 0.3296 0.2856 
               
*, **, *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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3.4.4 Multivariate Analyses 
 
3.4.4.1 Firm and Macroeconomics Leasing Determinants 
 
The conventional leasing determinants play an important role in corporate leasing 
decisions. Table 3.11 shows that financial constraints (internal fund and growth 
opportunity) do significantly influence firms’ leasing decisions; financially constrained 
firms are more likely to use leases, a result consistent with that of Eisfeldt and Rampini 
(2009). In the case of contracting cost, we find that firms with fewer tangible assets and 
smaller firms are more likely to use leases, supporting Sharpe and Nguyen’s (1995) 
viewpoint of information asymmetries; smaller firms are more likely to face higher costs 
for obtaining external funds, hence smaller firms may choose to lease when facing high 
external funding costs.  
 
Furthermore, firm uniqueness also exhibits a significant negative relationship with total 
lease; firms with research and development are less likely to use leases. Our result is 
consistent with that of Smith and Wakeman (1985), who suggest that firms are less likely 
to use lease financing for highly specific assets in order to avoid conflict and agency cost 
between lessor and lessees. In the case of macroeconomic factors, we find that GDP is 
positively correlated with firm leasing decisions. This implies that when the economy 
grows, firms will tend to use more leases. The possible reason for this is that during better 
economic conditions, leasing firms (lessors) can make better leasing contract offers, 
resulting in lessees taking up more lease contracts. 
 
In our baseline model, total lease share and operating lease share show an R2 of 0.5682 
and 0.5629 respectively. This implies that the determinants in our baseline model have 
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the power to explain the employment of total lease and operating lease. The low R2 
(0.0828) in the finance lease share baseline model may indicate that finance lease 
employment may have a different set of determinants. 
 
Table 3.11 
Firm and Macroeconomics Leasing Determinants: Baseline Model 
 
This table examines the determinants of corporate leasing decisions using OLS regression 
analysis using 623 observations from the period 2000 to2013. The dependent variables are Total 
Lease Share (TLS), Finance Lease Share (FLS) and Operating Lease Share (OPLS). Year and 
industry effects are included. Our regression is based on our Model I:
titizti ZCLD ,,, )(    , 
in which Z is the vector of control variables (firm, and macroeconomic factors and industries 
dummies). T statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Panel A: 
Total Lease 
Share 
Panel B: 
Finance Lease 
Share 
Panel C: 
Operating Lease 
Share 
c  -1.8148**  -0.7771*  -1.4527* 
  (-2.28)  (-1.68)  (-1.84) 
Tax Loss Carried 
Forward 
 
0.0409 
 
0.0550*** 
 
0.0033 
  (1.24)  (2.87)  (0.10) 
Internal Fund  -0.6565***  0.0320  -0.7270*** 
  (-3.93)  (0.33)  (-4.39) 
MTB  -0.0003*  -0.0001  -0.0002 
  (-1.70)  (-1.18)  (-1.24) 
Leverage  0.0284  -0.0251  0.0487 
  (0.63)  (-0.96)  (1.10) 
Profitability  -0.0367  0.0381  -0.0499 
  (-0.29)  (0.52)  (-0.40) 
Tangibility  -0.4180***  -0.0636***  -0.3861*** 
  (-13.24)  (-3.46)  (-12.31) 
Firm Size  -0.0599***  -0.0033  -0.0614*** 
  (-10.95)  (-1.03)  (-11.30) 
Uniqueness  -0.1990***  -0.0162**  -0.1934*** 
  (-14.31)  (-2.00)  (-13.99) 
Corporate Governance  -0.0720  -0.0227  -0.0485 
  (-1.44)  (-0.78)  (-0.98) 
GDP  0.2534***  0.0597*  0.2267*** 
  (4.42)  (1.79)  (3.98) 
Stock Market Return  -0.0116  0.0092  -0.0137 
  (-0.30)  (0.41)  (-0.35) 
CCI  -0.0017  0.0013**  -0.0026** 
  (-1.55)  (2.12)  (-2.40) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.5682  0.0828  0.5629 
Observations   623  623  623 
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3.4.4.2 CEO Personal Attributes and Corporate Leasing Decisions 
 
 
Table 3.12, Panel A, appears to indicate that the CEO personal traits youth, male gender, 
UK nationality and married status show positive relationships with firm’s total lease 
financing, although the results are not significant.  These results do, however, provide us 
an intimation of a plausible relationship between CEOs’ possession of optimistic traits 
(younger, male, UK nationality, and married) and the employment of lease financing. 
Female gender in CEOs shows a significant positive correlation with finance lease 
employment, while male gender in CEOs exhibits a significant positive correlation with 
operating lease share.  This implies that, in asset investment, male CEOs prefer to rent an 
asset while female CEOs prefer to have an option to buy the asset at the end of the lease 
contract.  
 
In the case of CEO skills and experiences, Table 3.12 Panel B, shows that CEOs who are 
MBA or PhD holders tend to use more leases; a significant positive relationship is found 
between educational background (MBA, PhD) and employment of operating lease and 
total lease.  CEOs with founder status are found to have significant negative correlation 
with employment of finance leases, but do, however, exhibit a positive relationship with 
the use of operating lease financing.  CEOs with duality status are found to have a 
negative relationship with total leases and operating leases used, which implies that CEO 
who are also the firm’s chairman at the same time are less likely to use lease financing. 
Firm founder CEOs and CEO with longer tenure are found to have a positive, yet non-
significant relationship with lease employment.  CEOs who possess financial knowledge 
and CEOs who receive higher pay than average tend to use more leases as reported in 
Panel B, Table 2.13. 
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Table 3.12  
CEO Personal Attributes and Corporate Lease Decisions 
 
This table examines the relationship between CEO personal traits (age, gender, nationality, and marital status), CEO skills and experiences (educational 
background, founder status, financial literacy, duality, tenure as CEO and emoluments), and networking ties (tenure with the firm, internally promoted, 
external directorships, and social networking prestige) with firm corporate leasing decisions using OLS regression analysis. There are 623 observations 
from the period, 2000-2013. The dependent variables are Total Lease Share (TLS), Finance Lease Share (FLS) and Operating Lease Share (OPLS). 
Year and industry effects are included. Our regression is based on Model II: 
titiztipati ZAttributesPersonalCEOCLD ,,,, )(__    . T statistics are 
reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Corporate Leasing Decisions  
and CEO Personal Traits 
Panel B:  Corporate Leasing Decisions  
and CEO Skills and Experiences 
Panel C:  Corporate Leasing Decisions   
and CEO Networking 
 Total Lease 
Share (TLS) 
Finance Lease 
Share (FLS) 
Operating Lease 
Share (OPLS) 
Total Lease 
Share (TLS) 
Finance Lease 
Share (FLS) 
Operating Lease 
Share (OPLS) 
Total Lease 
Share (TLS) 
Finance Lease 
Share (FLS) 
Operating Lease 
Share (OPLS) 
c -1.7645** -0.8201* -1.3832* -1.1261 -0.7159 -0.7820 -1.6992** -0.7554* -1.3568* 
 (-2.17 ) (-1.77) (-1.72) (-1.43) (-1.62) (-0.99) (-2.15) (-1.66) (-1.73) 
Tax Loss Carried 
Forward 
0.0407 0.0534*** 0.0040 0.0500 0.0441** 0.0184 0.0368 0.0517*** 0.0010 
 (1.23) (2.83) (0.12) (1.56) (2.48) (0.57) (1.12) (2.74) (0.03) 
Internal Fund -0.6600*** 0.0153 -0.7201*** -0.7915*** -0.0272 -0.8333*** -0.6728*** -0.0163 -0.7127*** 
 (-3.93) (0.16) (-4.34) (-4.87) (-0.29) (-5.14) (-4.05) (-0.17) (-4.32) 
MTB -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (-1.69) (-1.18) (-1.23) (-1.81) (-1.33) (-1.30) (-1.65) (-1.16) (-1.19) 
Leverage 0.0225 -0.0074 0.0324 0.0424 -0.0160 0.0584 0.0391 -0.0089 0.0487 
 (0.49) (-0.28) (0.72) (0.98) (-0.66) (1.35) (0.87) (-0.34) (1.09) 
Profitability -0.0247 0.0320 -0.0322 -0.0399 -0.0198 -0.0252 -0.0221 0.0964 -0.0729 
 (-0.19) (0.44) (-0.25) (-0.32) (-0.29) (-0.20) (-0.17) (1.32) (-0.58) 
Tangibility -0.4176*** -0.0550*** -0.3903*** -0.3709*** -0.0565*** -0.3436*** -0.4210*** -0.0771*** -0.3804*** 
 (-13.10) (-3.02) (-12.38) (-11.54) (-3.15) (-10.72) (-13.01) (-4.13) (-11.82) 
Firm Size -0.0591*** -0.0030 -0.0608*** -0.0491*** 0.0195*** -0.0625*** -0.0623*** -0.0022 -0.0644*** 
 (-10.63) (-0.95) (-11.04) (-7.25) (5.15) (-9.25) (-11.24) (-0.69) (-11.69) 
Uniqueness -0.2036*** -0.0052 -0.2050*** -0.1838*** -0.0151* -0.1779*** -0.1981*** -0.0086 -0.1977*** 
 (-13.70) (-0.61) (-13.94) (13.01) (-1.91) (-12.62) (-13.90) (-1.05) (-13.94) 
Corporate Governance -0.0684 -0.0465 -0.0316 -0.0886* -0.0305 -0.0630 -0.0897* -0.0513* -0.0480 
 (-1.34) (-1.59) (-0.62) (-1.78) (-1.10) (-1.27) (-1.78) (-1.77) (-0.96) 
GDP 0.2643*** 0.0672** 0.2348*** 0.1878*** 0.0301 0.1756*** 0.2498*** 0.0602* 0.2232*** 
 (4.56) (2.03) (4.09) (3.27) (0.93) (3.06) (4.40) (1.83) (3.95) 
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Stock Market Return -0.0109 0.0089 -0.0126 -0.0125 0.0107 -0.0152 -0.0130 0.0092 -0.0150 
 (-0.28) (0.40) (-0.33) (-0.33) (0.51) (-0.41) (-0.34) (0.41) (-0.39) 
CCI -0.0018 0.0013** -0.0027** -0.0015 0.0015** -0.0024** -0.0018 0.0013** -0.0026** 
 (-1.61) (2.05) (-2.46) (-1.35) (2.39) (-2.26) (-1.58) (1.96) (-2.35) 
Age  -0.0652 0.0032 -0.0726       
 (-1.15) (0.09) (-1.30)       
Male CEO 0.0123 -0.0735*** 0.0560**       
 (0.43) (-4.59) (2.01)       
UK Nationality  0.0072 -0.0122 0.0145       
 (0.51) (-1.53) (1.04)       
Married CEO 0.0209 0.0111 0.0185       
 (1.06) (0.99) (0.95)       
MBA holder    0.0337** -0.0091 0.0333**    
    (2.04) (-0.98) (2.02)    
PhD holder    0.0358* -0.0322*** 0.0599***    
    (1.74) (-2.81) (2.92)    
Firm Founder    0.0545 -0.0683** 0.0984*    
    (1.08) (-2.43) (1.95)    
Financial Literacy    0.0729*** 0.0256*** 0.0597***    
    (5.55) (3.49) (4.56)    
Duality    -0.1015** 0.0189 -0.1296***    
    (-2.57) (0.85) (-3.30)    
Tenure as CEO    0.0041 -0.0110** 0.0093    
    (0.51) (-2.49) (1.17)    
Emoluments    0.0487*** 0.0671*** 0.0147    
    (3.68) (9.11) (1.12)    
Tenure with the firm       -0.0223** -0.0131** -0.0152 
       (-2.32) (-2.35) (-1.58) 
Internal Promotion       0.0280 -0.0104 0.0374* 
       (1.40) (-0.90) (1.88) 
External Directorships       0.0021 0.0127*** -0.0063 
       (0.26) (2.73) (-0.79) 
Social Networking 
Prestige    
 
  0.0482
*** 0.0043 0.0451*** 
       (3.75) (0.57) (3.53) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Adjusted R2 0.5671 0.1169 0.5656 0.6013 0.2198 0.5932 0.5776 0.1176 0.5710 
Observations  623 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 
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Overall, most of the skills and experiences variables that we use in this study, except CEO 
duality status, show a positive relationship with corporate lease employment.  This 
implies that CEOs who have more skills and experiences tend to use more leases to lower 
the firm’s risk as they are aware of the benefit of leasing to mitigate the cost of debt.  
 
Table 3.12 Panel C provides the regression results for CEO networking ties and corporate 
leasing decisions. The results show that CEOs who work for longer with the firm are less 
likely to use leases, holding social networking prestige (e.g., a CEO’s professional 
memberships, fellowships, knighthoods, trusteeships) shows a significant positive 
relationship with the use of corporate leases. This may be because a CEO who has social 
networking prestige has easier access to information and resources and is able to obtain 
better deals for leasing financing contracts. Additionally, internal promotion, and outside 
directorship appointments in CEOs show non-significant positive relationships with lease 
employment. 
 
In summary, we may conclude that a CEOs personal attributes (traits, skills and 
experiences, and networking) do influence firm corporate leasing decisions. CEO skills 
and experiences have the highest explanatory power in corporate leasing decisions (with 
a R2 of 0.6013), specifically, the MBA holder CEOs, PhD holder CEOs, CEOs with 
financial knowledge, and CEOs who receive higher pay tend to use more leases in their 
financing decisions.  
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3.4.4.3 CEO Personal Attribute Index and Corporate Leasing Decisions 
 
Table 3.13, Panel A, shows the results of the investigation of three indexes (TI, SEI, and 
NI), and their relationship with total lease employment (model III). We observe a 
significant positive relationship between CEO Skills and Experiences Index (SEI) with 
the firm’s Total Lease Share (TLS). This result is consistent with our model II result 
(Panel B, Table 3.12) which suggests that the skills and experiences variables have the 
highest contribution in explaining corporate leasing decisions.  
 
In model IV, we amalgamate the three indexes into a CEO Optimism Index (CEOOI).  
Total lease results show that CEOOI is significantly positively correlated with firm 
leasing decisions. This supports our hypothesis that optimistic CEOs are more likely to 
use leases. Optimistic managers tend to consider that the market undervalues their firm, 
and they are reluctant to issue shares to finance new assets (Heaton, 2002). When 
managers are optimistic about future investment outcomes, they prefer to finance the 
project with debt financing rather than equity, as they are unwilling to share the potential 
profits with new equity holders (Gombola & Marcuikaityte, 2007).  
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Table 3.13 
Regression Results for Personal Attributes Indexes and Corporate Leasing 
Decisions 
The table presents the regression result for three-lease propensity (Total Lease Share, 
Finance Lease Share, and Operating Lease Share). Model III in this study is Baseline with 
and Traits index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index (NI), while 
Model IV is the baseline amalgamating the three indexes into the CEO Optimism Index 
(CEOOI). Our regressions are based on: Model III    tiztiNItiSEItiTIti ZNISEITICLD .,,,, )( , 
and Model IV: titiztiOIti ZCEOOICLD ,,,, )(    . T statistics are reported in parentheses and 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Panel A:  Total 
Lease Share 
 
Panel B:  Finance 
Lease Share 
 
Panel C:  Operating 
Lease Share 
 
c -1.6861** -1.8036** -0.7776* -0.7837* -1.3234* -1.4376* 
 (-2.14) (-2.28) (-1.68) (-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.84) 
Tax Loss Carried 
Forward 
0.0475 0.0481 0.0507*** 0.0508*** 0.0125 0.0129 
(1.45) (1.46) (2.65) (2.66) (0.38) (0.40) 
Internal Fund -0.7099*** -0.6544*** 0.0271 0.0307 -0.7748*** -0.7242*** 
 (-4.30) (-3.94) (0.27) (0.31) (-4.74) (-4.42) 
MTB -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (-1.79) (-1.77) (-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.35) (-1.33) 
Leverage 0.0338 0.0133 -0.0148 -0.0161 0.0473 0.0282 
 (0.75) (0.29) (-0.56) (-0.62) (1.06) (0.64) 
Profitability -0.0546 -0.0460 0.0432 0.0436 -0.0710 -0.0625 
 (-0.44) (-0.36) (0.59) (0.60) (-0.57) (-0.50) 
Tangibility -0.3875*** -0.4022*** -0.0721*** -0.0729*** -0.3506*** -0.3647*** 
 (-11.92) (-12.60) (-3.77) (-3.93) (-10.89) (-11.56) 
Firm Size -0.0550*** -0.0606*** -0.0024 -0.0028 -0.0575*** -0.0623*** 
 (-9.56) (-11.12) (-0.73) (-0.91) (-10.09) (-11.58) 
Uniqueness -0.1936*** -0.2035*** -0.0128 -0.0135* -0.1904*** -0.1994*** 
 (-13.75) (-14.60) (-1.55) (-1.67) (-13.66) (-14.49) 
Corporate 
Governance 
-0.0683 -0.0514 -0.0359 -0.0349 -0.0366 -0.0207 
(-1.36) (-1.02) (-1.22) (-1.20) (-0.74) (-0.41) 
GDP 0.2334*** 0.2469*** 0.0627* 0.0635* 0.2053*** 0.2179*** 
 (4.12) (4.33) (1.88) (1.91) (3.66) (3.87) 
Stock Market 
Returns 
-0.0112 -0.0101 0.0082 0.0083 -0.0125 -0.0116 
(-0.29) (-0.26) (0.37) (0.37) (-0.33) (-0.30) 
CCI -0.0015 -0.0016 0.0013** 0.0013** -0.0024** -0.0026** 
 (-1.38) (-1.51) (2.10) (2.08) (-2.25) (-2.36) 
TI 0.0292  -0.0249  0.0418  
 (0.86)  (-1.25)  (1.24)  
SEI 0.1992***  -0.0143  0.1996***  
 (4.32)  (-0.52)  (4.38)  
NI -0.0048  -0.0285*  0.0161  
 (-0.18)  (-1.90)  (0.63)  
CEOOI  0.1260***  -0.0748***  0.1705*** 
  (2.73)  (-2.79)  (3.74) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.5805 0.5728 0.0903 0.0931 0.5785 0.5721 
Observations  623 623 623 623 623 623 
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Leases used by a firm can be categorised as one of two different types: finance lease and 
operating lease. Table 3.13, Panel B shows the results of regression between finance 
leases and the three indexes (TI, SEI, and NI). It appears that CEOs who have more 
networking ties are less likely to use finance leases. The CEO Optimism Index (OI) shows 
a significant negative relationship with Finance Lease Share (FLS), which implies that 
optimistic CEOs tend to use less finance leases. Finance leases offer an option to buy at 
the end of the contract, and an optimistic CEO might not require such an option. 
Optimistic CEOs are confident of their own decisions; if they think the asset may 
potentially generate positive outcomes and can be used for future projects, they might just 
buy the asset.  
 
In the case of operating leases, the results, reported in Panel C, are identical to those for 
total lease; a CEO with higher skills and experiences level is more likely to use more 
leases and when we compose our Optimism Index, the results show that optimistic CEOs 
tend to use more operating leases. The high correlation between operating leases and total 
leases may explain the Total Lease Share (TLS) and Operating Lease Share (OPLS) 
exhibiting similar results, - whereby the firms’ use of total leases is heavily influenced by 
the use of operating leases.  
 
The Optimism Index results provide support for our hypothesis that CEO optimism does 
have a positive relationship with corporate leasing decisions, although when we examine 
the CEO personal attributes (age, gender, nationality, marital status, skills and 
experiences, and social networking ties) individually our results show inconsistent effects 
of CEO personal attributes on corporate leasing decisions. However, we believe that 
human attributes should be examined from a wider perspective, and that amalgamating 
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all the attributes as one, may give us a better understanding of the effect on CEOs’ 
behaviour.   
 
Our CEO Optimism Index comprises CEO personal traits (younger, male, UK nationality 
and married), CEO skills and experiences (MBA or PhD holder, firm founder, financial 
literacy, duality status, longer tenure as CEO, and higher emoluments), and CEO 
networking ties (longer tenure with the firm, internally promoted, holding external 
directorships, and with social networking prestige).  The combination of all these CEO 
attributes is shown to positively significantly influence firms’ corporate leasing decisions 
(Total Lease Employment). 
 
The reason why younger, male, UK nationality and married CEOs use more leases is 
because CEOs with these traits are more prone to show optimistic behaviour as proven in 
the literature and also confirmed by our own results (chapter two). Furthermore, we 
believe that CEOs with more skills and experiences will tend to have an increased 
likelihood of becoming optimistic, as all of these positive skills and experiences qualities 
will provide them with knowledge and dominance/ power in their management decision-
making.  
 
Additionally, those who have more skills and experiences will be more likely to use leases, 
which can help lower the firm’s overall risk and mitigate the agency cost of debt. 
Furthermore, we also believe that the longer a person works with the same firm, the 
stronger his/her relationship with the board and employees.  Since they have persevered 
for a longer period with the firm, we expect them to possess very good communication 
and negotiation skills. The reason for allowing a CEO to hold an outside appointment is 
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that the board believes that such an appointment can broaden a CEO’s experience and 
knowledge, and thus benefit the group. Masulis and Mobbs (2011) show that when a 
firm’s director holds outside directorships, it improves the firm’s performance. Therefore, 
we believe that a CEO who has external appointments and more social networking 
prestige (such as holding professional fellowships and having been awarded official 
honours) will have more information about financing and investing opportunities that can 
benefit the firm he/she works with. 
 
3.4.4.4 Additional Robustness Test 
 
We employ Cosci, Guida and Meliciani’s (2013) method as an additional test in 
examining the relationship between leasing and debt financing. We regress the debt ratio 
with leasing, and find that they are significantly negatively correlated. This implies a 
substitution relationship between debt and lease, which is consistent with the results of 
Adedeji and Stapleton (1996), who also find a substitution relationship for debt and lease 
in UK firms. Our results are reported in Appendix IV. 
 
Furthermore, we also examine the relationship between the employment of debt and CEO 
optimism, and we find that UK firms’ optimistic CEOs are more likely to employ debt42, 
a result consistent with that of Gombola and Marcuikaityte (2007), who mention that 
optimistic managers are confident about future investment outcomes, and hence prefer to 
finance projects with debt financing to avoid sharing the potential profits with any new 
equity holders. In short, our results show that optimistic CEOs are more likely to employ 
debt financing and leasing.  
 
                                                          
42 The result for CEO optimism and debt employment is attached in Appendix V. 
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To further investigate the optimistic CEOs’ financing preferences and in order to find out 
whether optimistic CEOs prefer debt over lease, we calculate the Lease-Debt ratio. Based 
on the results obtained (Appendix VI), we find that CEO optimism has a significantly 
negatively relationship with lease-debt ratio, which implies that the increment in the 
CEO’s optimism level will lead to higher debt employment rather that increments in 
leases. This finding may indirectly show that optimistic CEOs prefer debt employment. 
This result may be consistent with Adedeji and Stapleton’s (1996) suggestion that in a 
lease agreement the lessor will retain the ownership and bear the ownership cost. Hence, 
lessors may charge lessees higher costs in order to cover the costs they bore. This 
perspective suggests that a firm may prioritise taking debt put over leasing and will 
consider using a lease only when they have utilised their debt capacity.  
 
Although our results shows that optimistic CEOs may prefer debt financing rather than 
leasing, by looking at the high lease ratio (an average of 37.19% of a firm’s total capital 
cost, while debt ratio is 24.78%) employed by firms, we conclude that lease financing is 
very important for UK firms as different types of asset may require different financing 
sources/choices. For example, a firm may prefer to finance the purchase of computer 
software by leasing, and might prefer debt financing to finance office furniture. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
We would like to highlight a few important trends discovered from this study. The first 
is the growth and development of the global leasing market, especially in the UK; the 
steady growth trend in the use of leases as an alternative financing resource in the UK 
market, as reported in the World Leasing Yearbook (White Clarke Group Global Leasing 
Report 2015). Secondly, our study also detects an upward trend in the employment of 
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leases, especially operating leases, by the UK firms. The average total lease share 
increased from 28.92% in 2000 to 40.40% in 2013. 
 
Thirdly, we find that UK firms tend to use more operating leases than finance leases. 
Continuing existing studies on the determinants of corporate leasing decisions, we 
obtained results of an examination of CEOs’ personal attributes that affect their firm’s 
leasing decisions that suggest that CEO traits, skills and experiences, and networking do 
influence the firm’s employment of leases. Using the traits, skills and experiences, and 
networking index, we find that optimistic CEOs tend to use more lease financing, which 
may be due to their optimistic belief that the market undervalues their firm and so they 
are reluctant to issue shares to finance new asset and they are optimistic about future 
profits and unwilling to share them with new equity holders. Hence, they prefer to finance 
their assets by lease (a type of corporate debt).  
 
We find that optimistic CEOs in the UK FTSE 100 tend to use more leases. The 
employment of a lease is a good mechanism to avoid the potential conflicts that might 
arise between debt holders and shareholders. In this situation, optimistic CEOs actually 
help the firm to mitigate agency cost of debt and lower the firm’s overall risk.  
 
Looking beyond the lease employment from lessee firm’s perspective, this study also has 
an implication for the leasing market (lessor). Lessors can use a CEO’s optimism 
perspective  as a selling point (as optimistic CEOs are the ones who have higher levels of 
skills and experiences, and stronger networking) to promote their leases and convince 
their clients to use leases in their firms in order to lower the firm’s risk and mitigate the 
agency cost of debt. This will indirectly help the development and growth of the UK 
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leasing market, in which  the leasing firm (lessor) can offer a wide range of lease assets  
that can be tailored to meet firms’ (lessees’) needs.  Leasing decisions can be a part of 
asset management policy. Leasing can help avoid the retention of idle assets resulting 
from wasteful asset purchases. Leasing provides firms with the right to use an asset and 
an option to buy (finance lease), hence firms can manage their assets more precisely and 
efficiently. Due to the fast growth of technology, lessee firms can also benefit from offers 
of compatible future technical innovations from lessors. 
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Chapter 4: CEO Personal Attributes and Corporate Hedging Decisions 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Corporate hedging policies mainly aim to establish the strategies to offset or protect a 
firm’s transactional risk exposure. The strategies that are commonly used are borrowing 
or lending in different currencies, commit into forwards, futures, or options contracts; and 
also swaps utilisation to switch assets/liabilities with other parties (Megginson, Smart & 
Gitman, 2007). Due to market imperfections, derivatives are one of the financial strategies 
or tools that firms use to manage their financial risks; foreign currency risk, interest rate 
risk, and commodity risk (Belghitar, Clark & Mefteh, 2013). As Judge (2006) mentioned, 
if the capital market were perfect, then corporate hedging would not add any value to the 
firm.  
 
Beber and Fabbri (2012) study corporate speculation in the foreign exchange market, and 
mention that CEO personal characteristics are an empirically important determinant of a 
large range of corporate decision and policy making.  Iqbal (2015) suggests that CEO age 
and education are two important attributes that may impact corporate hedging decisions. 
He finds that CEO age does explain the use of financial derivative instruments in the US 
oil and gas industry. 
 
Firms may experience an adverse change in the value of their cash flow as a result of 
exchange rate movement. No firm can escape facing exchange rate risk. Even if the firm 
operates in one country in only one currency, they are still exposed to exchange rate risk 
if their products compete with importers’ products in the home market or if their 
production input requires imported goods or services.   
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Chapter four of this thesis focuses on the impact of CEO personal attributes on his/her 
firm’s corporate hedging decisions. Our study sample is the UK FTSE 100 firms. These 
large firms are highly exposed to market risk and therefore corporate hedging is an 
important risk management decision 43 . An understanding of the current trends and 
developments in the derivatives market and how it works may help us to have a clearer 
picture as to why and how firms hedge their financial risk.  
 
4.1.1  Contribution 
 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, we examine more 
CEO characteristics in our study than in similar studies. Few studies have looked into 
“who” (personal attributes) tends to use hedging instruments - to our knowledge, only 
two US studies look at CEO attributes’ relationships with hedging decision: Iqbal (2015) 
studies the US oil and gas industry’s hedging decisions relationships with CEO 
characteristics (age, college degree holder and educational institutions attended) while 
Beber and Fabbri (2012) examine US non-financial firms’ relationships between 
corporate speculation in the foreign exchange market and CEO characteristics (age, MBA 
holder and working experiences). We believe that there are more attributes that do 
influence corporate hedging decisions; for example CEO financial knowledge, firm 
founder and duality status, and also their networking ties.  Hence, our study contributes 
significantly to the existing literature by examining corporate hedging decisions from the 
perspective of a wider range of CEOs’ personal attributes, providing a linkage between 
CEO traits, skills and experiences, and networking and CEOs’ hedging preferences. Our 
study also tries to relate the CEOs’ personal attributes to social psychology, management 
                                                          
43 For types of derivatives instrument that available in the UK derivatives marker, refer Appendix VII  
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and existing finance theory, in order to understand the attitude of optimistic CEOs 
towards firm risk and how such CEOs deal with the risk.  
 
Secondly, our study extends and complements the existing studies on UK firms’ corporate 
hedging. Existing corporate hedging studies in the UK mainly focus on firm 
characteristics, for instance, Judge (2006) and Clark and Judge (2009) study UK non-
financial firms’ hedging decisions by looking at the firms’ foreign currency derivatives 
(user and non-user) and the type of instruments the firms used. Our study extends the 
existing UK studies in two ways. Firstly, we extend the hedging measurement from 
measurement of dichotomous variables to measurement of magnitude variables, for 
which we manually collected the total amount of derivatives used by the firm. Secondly, 
we fill in a gap by examining the influence of CEO personal attributes on corporate 
hedging decisions in the UK firms.  Few researchers have studied corporate hedging in 
the UK market, most of the corporate hedging studies having been based on the US 
market. As by the Bank of England (2013) reported, the UK has one of the most active 
derivatives market, hence, we believe that it is worthwhile to understand UK firms’ 
hedging decisions. Our study will help shed light on the managers’ personal 
characteristics perspective, in addition to controlling for conventional firm characteristics 
and market conditions.  
 
Thirdly, the data that we used in this study were mainly manually collected from firms’ 
annual reports. This unique data set will be useful to give us a clearer picture of hedging 
decisions by UK firms. The lack of studies in the UK may be because the collection of 
derivatives data is time consuming. Au Yong, Faff and Nguyen (2011) find that a variety 
of previous research studied only the use of derivatives or foreign debt as hedging 
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instruments, but, they suggest, in reality, firms tends to use various types of hedging 
instruments to hedge their financial risks. Motivated by Au Yong, Faff and Nguyen, 
therefore, we studied a more comprehensive range of hedging strategies that firms employ 
to manage their risk. Our study complements the current literature by looking at UK firms’ 
corporate hedging decisions. The unique data set provides us with a more comprehensive 
measurement of hedging, and we employ broader measurements, as below: 
 
i. The traditional approach using dichotomous variables measurement for “hedge or 
non-hedge firm” and using logistic regression (Iqbal, 2015). 
ii. The additional approach adopted from Au Yong, Faff & Nguyen (2011), of ordered 
probit regression to examine a number of different types of derivative contracts 
(Judge, 2006). 
iii. A third measure - the degree of hedging (financial hedge ratio), using the fair value 
of total derivatives used by the firm. Beber and Fabbri (2012) use currency 
derivatives notional amounts and claim that they are the first to use this measurement. 
 
4.1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The existing literature still lacks a full-fledged theory which associates CEO personal 
characteristics with corporate hedging decisions (Beber & Fabbri, 2012). A better 
understanding of the influence of a CEO’s personal attributes toward firm hedging 
policies can help us to identify the profile of the CEOs with regard to their hedging 
preferences.  
 
Additionally we also examine the influence of CEO personal attributes on hedging 
decisions during a calm economic period (2000 to 2006) and during a period of global 
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financial crisis44 (2007 to 2013). Hence, this study aims to address the following research 
questions: 
 
1. Do the CEO’s personal attributes influence the firm’s hedging decisions? 
2. To what extent do the CEO’s personal attributes affect the magnitude of hedging in the 
firm? 
3. Do the CEO’s personal attributes influence the type of contract used (‘co-ordinated’ 
corporate hedging strategy)? and  
4. Does the impact of CEO personal attributes vary across different types of period (calm and 
global financial crisis)? 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
Empirical studies by Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2006) and Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) suggest a positive relationship between hedging and firm value. As Belghitar, 
Clark and Mefteh, (2013) mention, derivatives create shareholder value by reducing the 
‘bad’ exposures to provide an increase in average returns. Additionally, Chen and King 
(2014) outline the benefit of hedging - they mention that hedging can help to smoothen 
firms’ performances by lowering cash flow and income volatility. Guay and Kothari 
(2003) suggest based on the risk management theory, that firms’ cash flow volatility, 
growth opportunities and financial distress are the incentives for firms to hedge.  
 
                                                          
44 “UK economy is highly exposed to foreign economic developments due to its trade and financial openness. And 
given the major world events that have occurred since 2007, the global economy has been an important influence on 
UK output and inflation over the recent past. These events include the global financial crisis in 2007-2008, severe 
gyrations in global commodity prices over 2008-11 and, since 2010, and the euro-area crisis.” (Chawla, Qualietti & 
Rachel, 2014) 
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Guay and Kothari (2003) study 234 large non-financial US firms and find that the 
corporate derivatives the firms used were a relatively small piece of the firms’ overall 
profiles. In addition to examining the conventional incentives for a firm to hedge (cash 
flow volatility, growth opportunities and leverage), they also included firm size, segment 
diversification and geographic diversification to capture the contracting-related reasons. 
They posit that large, diversified firms may result in managers’ demands for more 
derivatives for hedging purposes. 
 
Kim, Mathur and Nam (2006) study operational hedging and financial hedging by 424 
US firm from 1996 to 2000. They defined the operationally hedged firms as firms with 
foreign sales, and non-operationally hedged firms as firms with export sales. In the case 
of financial hedging, they used the total notional amount of currency and interest rates 
derivatives use (forwards, futures, options, and swaps). Their results showed that hedging 
increases a firm’s value, and suggested that operational hedging is effective in managing 
long-term economic exposure, while financial hedging is effective for short-term 
transaction exposure. They further concluded that operational hedging and financial 
hedging are important in firms’ risk management strategies. 
 
Au Yong, Faff and Nguyen (2011) study the association between Australian listed 
companies’ characteristics and the use of a corporate hedging strategy. Their sample 
period is 1999 to 2000, and the sample comprises 239 firms in 1999 and 230 firms in 
2000. In their study they categorise the derivatives into foreign currency derivatives 
(FCD), interest rate derivatives (IRD), commodity derivatives (CD), and foreign debt 
(FD). Using the ordered probit method they find that firm size, leverage and block holding 
are positively correlated with hedging decisions, while executive shareholding shows a 
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negative relationship with firm hedging decisions. Their results support the ‘scale 
economies’ hypothesis and ‘financial distress cost’ hypothesis in their study. Their study 
mainly focuses on firm characteristics (firm size, leverage, market to book ratio, liquidity, 
current ratio, and dividend yield), however, we also notice that some managerial 
characteristics were included in the study: executives’ shares, executives’ options, block 
holding. This may show that the researchers also recognised the importance of managerial 
characteristics in corporate hedging decisions. 
 
More recently, Iqbal (2015) studies hedging decisions by US oil and gas firms in relation 
to two CEO attributes, age and educational background, using logistic regression.  
Categorising the CEOs into hedger and non-hedger, they find that CEO age does explain 
the use of financial derivatives in the oil and gas industry; the hedger CEOs are younger 
than the non-hedger CEOs. The study also find that there is a difference between CEOs 
holding petroleum-related degrees and those holding business degrees CEO, whereby the 
former are better represented (higher percentage) in the hedge group.  He concludes that 
CEO attributes do play a significant role in corporate hedging decisions. 
 
Another study that investigates the relationship between CEO attributes and corporate 
hedging was carried out by Beber and Fabbri (2012). They study large US non-financial 
firms between 1996 and 2001, and find that younger CEOs, MBA degree holder CEOs, 
and CEOs with less previous working experience tend to speculate more (use more 
derivatives). They view the use of derivatives as having a speculation motive which 
implied risk-taking behaviour. They conclude that their finding is consistent with the idea 
of managerial overconfidence - overconfident managers taking more risks. 
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In studies in the UK, Judge (2006) use mixed data (from surveys and collected from 
annual reports) to examine UK firms’ rationales for corporate hedging. He finds a strong 
relationship between a firm’s hedging decision and its expected financial distress cost; 
larger firms, cash rich firms, high probability of financial distress firms, export or import 
firms, and firms with more short-term debt tend to hedge with derivatives. The sample 
firms comprises the 500 largest UK companies listed on the London Stock Exchange in 
1995. Using the same sample, Clark and Judge (2009) distinguish between short-term 
hedge and long-term hedge. They suggest that short-term hedge is aimed to hedge 
exposure caused due to export activity and the derivatives used are foreign currency 
forwards, options, and futures. The long term hedge, on the other hand, is used to hedge 
exposure arising from assets being located in foreign locations, and the derivatives for 
long-term hedge are foreign currency debt, and foreign currency swaps (with longer-term 
horizons). They use multinomial logit to estimate the likelihood of using different 
derivatives. They indicate the user of foreign currency swaps as a long-term hedger, and 
show that it is important to distinguish between long-term and-short term exposure as 
different types of derivatives serve different purposes. 
 
4.2.1  Motives for Corporate Hedging 
 
Several rationales for hedging have been discussed in the literature. Rationales include 
minimising corporate tax liabilities (Smith & Stulz, 1985; MacMinn, 1987), reducing 
bankruptcy cost/financial distress (Smith & Stulz, 1985; Guay & Kothari, 2003; Judge, 
2006; Chen & King 2014), mitigation of agency cost of debt (Judge, 2006; Chen & King 
2014), and lowering the level of information asymmetry (Judge, 2006; Chen & King 
2014). 
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4.2.1.1 Minimise Corporate Tax Liability 
 
Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest that hedging can lower the expected tax liability; the more 
convex the corporate tax function, the greater incentives for a firm to hedge. However, 
Judge (2006) mentioned that tax incentives may not be particularly attractive in the UK 
market as the progression range of the UK corporate tax structure is relatively small; most 
of the listed firms have pre-tax beyond the progressive range which they are facing a 
linear form tax function. Hence, he conclude that in the UK market a motive for hedging 
based on tax is rather weak. Hence, we exclude tax as our control variable in this study. 
 
4.2.1.2 Reduce Bankruptcy Cost/ Reduce the Expected Cost of Financial Distress  
 
Judge (2006) and Chen and King (2014) suggest that hedging can help reduce the cost of 
bankruptcy or the expected cost of financial distress. Smith and Stulz’s (1985) study on 
the determinants of hedging policies suggest that hedging can help to reduce the volatility 
of a firm’s cash flow, thus lowering the expected financial distress cost. When a firm’s 
cash flow is highly volatile, there is more risk of financial distress.  
 
4.2.1.3 Lower Agency Cost of Debt / Ameliorate Conflicts of Interest between 
Shareholders and Bondholders 
 
According to Judge (2006), a firm that hedges can effectively commit to meet its 
obligations, therefore such a firm can expand its debt capacity to finance new projects. 
Additionally, Chen and King (2014) suggest that hedging can help address 
underinvestment problems by reducing the likelihood of poor states occurring and, on the 
other hand, hedging can encourage a firm to invest in value-enhancing projects. Hence 
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hedging eases the conflicts between shareholders and bondholders and lowers the cost of 
debt. 
 
4.2.1.4 Lower Level of Information Asymmetry   
 
Chen and King (2014) posit that firms with hedging instruments tend to lower the level 
of information asymmetry.  By hedging, a firm can reduce its cash flow volatility, making 
cash flow become more predictable. Chen and King mentioned that if the firm’s cash flow 
is stable hence the bondholder may demand a lower rate of return as the default risk is 
lower. Hedging helps to improve the co-ordination between financing and investment 
policy, whereby a firm can have lower financing cost and provide more capital for 
investment projects.  
 
4.2.2 CEO Personal Attributes and Corporate Hedging Decisions 
 
We examine in this study the effect of CEO personal attributes on their corporate hedging 
decisions. Specifically, we classify CEO attributes into three categories; CEO personal 
traits (age, gender, nationality, and marital status), CEO skills and experiences 
(educational background, firm founder, financial literacy, duality, tenure as CEO, and 
emoluments), and CEO networking ties (tenure with the firm, internal promotion, external 
directorships, and social networking prestige).  
 
Beber and Fabbri (2012) point out the importance of personal characteristics for corporate 
risk management. A few approaches may explain the relationship between CEO personal 
attributes and corporate hedging decisions. We list here the related theories/approaches 
that may help us investigate which CEOs are more likely to use hedging as a mechanism 
to manage corporate risk. 
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4.2.2.1. Managerial Risk Aversion Hypothesis  
 
In corporate risk management, hedging is used as a tool to manage firm risk. Hence, CEOs 
who take up more hedging strategies can be considered as showing risk-averse behaviour. 
Based on our CEO risk taking traits (younger, male, UK nationality and married CEOs) 
if the use of hedging instruments is classified as risk aversion, then we may expect 
younger, male, UK nationality and married CEO to be less likely to employ hedging 
strategies.  Thus, we may expect a negative relationship between ‘risk taking’ in CEOs 
and their corporate hedging decisions. 
 
4.2.2.2. Value Enhancing Hypothesis  
 
The benefits of hedging have been widely addressed in the literature; empirical research 
suggests that hedging can help firms mitigate agency cost of debt, reduce bankruptcy cost, 
and lower level of information asymmetry. Smith and Stulz (1985) suggest that hedging 
can help firms to reduce cash flow volatility and therefore lower the expected financial 
distress cost. Graham and Rogers (2002) claim that hedging increase firm debt capacity 
and they prove that hedging adds firm value. Chen and King (2014) suggest that hedging 
may lower cost of debt by mitigating underinvestment and risk-shifting problems. Chen 
and King also mention that hedging lowers a firm’s information asymmetry; hedging can 
reduce cash flow volatility, hence making cash flows more predictable and result in 
bondholders demanding a lower rate of return (lower cost of debt). 
 
If the rationales or motivations for hedging can add value to a firm, we may expect that a 
CEO with a high level of skills and experiences and stronger networking will tend to use 
more hedging instruments to lower his/her firm’s risk and maximize the firm’s value. 
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4.2.2.3 Power Approach and Risk Taking 
 
A third approach can potentially explain the relationship between CEO personal attributes 
(especially skills and experiences and networking ties).  A CEO who has more skills and 
experiences, and stronger networking ties, tends to have more power in the firm. There 
are two different perspectives on the relationship between power and risk taking 
behaviour.  According to the Prospect Theory proposed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), an individual with low power might be more likely to take risk, as they will try 
any available opportunity to help them out from the disadvantage of their situation as they 
have less to lose.  Hence, from this perspective, powerless people are more risk taking, 
and we may expect them to be less likely to use hedging in their firm. 
 
On the other hand, the Approach/Inhibition Theory proposed by Anderson and Galinsky 
(2006) states that power increases with optimism, and hence an increase in the propensity 
to take risks. They argue that when people have power, they can more easily obtain 
material sources (financial, physical comforts) and social resources (prestige, positive 
attention). This approach is in line with the power-influence approach of French and 
Raven (1959). From this perspective, a powerful CEO may be less likely to hedge.  
 
4.2.2.4 CEO Optimism Hypothesis 
 
Scheinert (2014) studies managerial optimism and hedging and outlines the plausible 
reason for a negative or positive relationship between CEO optimism and hedging. The 
first idea is based on the suggestion of Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) who showed 
that optimistic managers tend to view external financing as costly, and hence are expected 
to rely more on internal funds. Thus, in order to avoid raising capital from external 
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funding, optimistic CEOs are more likely to hedge their internal cash flow. Beber and 
Fabbri (2012) explain the relationship between optimism and hedging in a different way, 
their suggestion being based on Heaton’s (2002) and Malmendier and Tate’s (2005) ideas; 
optimistic CEOs systematically overestimate the probability of good outcomes resulting 
from their actions. Optimistic CEOs are more aggressive and more risk taking, hence such 
CEOs may actively become involved in the foreign exchange market as a part of their 
corporate risk management strategy. From this perspective, optimism in CEOs is 
expected to have positive relationship with their corporate hedging decisions. 
 
Conversely, Scheinert (2014) also suggests a possible negative relationship between CEO 
optimism and corporate hedging decisions. According to Scheinert, the optimistic CEO 
overestimates future cash flows, and thus underestimates the risk that the firm may 
become unable to meet its obligations. The underestimation of risk may result in the 
firm’s financial distress. Hence, if the optimistic CEO underestimates the financial 
distress cost and is less concerned about cash flow volatility in the firm, that may put the 
firm into insolvency, and so such CEOs may be less likely to use hedging. 
 
Alsubaie (2009) studies the relationship between CEO overconfidence/optimism and 
hedging decisions in US firms. He used insider transaction data to proxy CEO optimism 
and finds that CEO optimism exhibits positive yet non- significant relationship with the 
firm’s usage of currency derivative instruments. Additionally, he also finds a positive 
significant support for the usage of interest rate derivatives with CEO optimism. The 
results obtained contradicted the author’s expectation. Alsubaie expected that optimistic 
CEOs would be less likely to engage in derivatives usage as previous literature suggested 
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that optimistic managers are more likely to predict the occurrence of positive future 
outcomes and undervalue the risk.  
 
Adam, Fernando and Golubeva (2015) study managerial overconfidence/optimism and 
corporate derivatives engagement for 92 North American gold mining firms.  They find 
that MO45 is positively correlated with financial derivatives usage.  Adam, Fernando and 
Golubeva report that past derivatives gains tend to increase MO and losses do not reduce 
MO. They suggest that their findings are inconsistent with the rationale of risk 
management theories. However, the overconfidence hypothesis may explain this 
behaviour, as managers incorporate their private market views into hedging decisions and 
become more confident following past derivatives gain (speculative success), and hence 
become more aggressive in engaging in a financial hedging strategy. Adam, Fernando 
and Golubeva also suggest that managerial behaviour affects corporate risk management 
practices. Hence, recognising the presence of such behaviour can help in bridging the gap 
between corporate risk management theory and practice.  
 
In summary, our study investigates the effect of CEO personal attributes on firm corporate 
hedging decisions. The framework for this research is summarised in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45Their MO is measured by firm’s acquisitiveness in the M&A market. 
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Figure 4.1 
Research Framework for Third Empirical Chapter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corporate 
Hedging Decision 
 
 
 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
 
This study examines the influence of CEO personal attributes on CEOs’ corporate 
hedging decisions. The study period covers the years 2000 to 2013 and all financial 
hedging data were manually collected from annual reports.  We exclude financial-related 
firms as these firms play a role as market makers and dealers in the derivatives market 
(Au Yong, Faff & Nguyen, 2011). We take note of the firm’s purpose for using 
derivatives, because as Clark and Judge (2009) mention, it is important to identify the 
firms that disclose that the usage of derivatives is for hedging not for speculation in their 
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annual report. Firms report their use of derivatives in their annual report. Most of the 
firms report that they use derivative instruments to hedge against financial risk and that 
the corporate hedging decisions are mainly approved by the top management46.  
 
For a robustness test we also exclude swaps contracts. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) and 
Beber and Fabbri (2012) mention that firms generally use swaps to translate foreign debt 
into domestic liabilities and do not hedge foreign sales, and firms swap FC debt into 
domestic debt (Allayannis, Brown & Klapper, 2003; Clark & Judge, 2009). Since our 
study focuses on CEOs and their hedging decision in the firm in specific years, a study of 
short-term horizon derivatives (FC forwards, Options and Futures) would be more 
theoretically appropriate. Swaps and foreign debt are used as a long term hedge (Clark & 
Judge, 2009); hence, we exclude swaps in our robustness test in order to observe any 
significant differences. 
 
However, we noted that WPP plc 2004, in their annual report, stated that: “From time to 
time, the Group uses certain short-term derivative ﬁnancial instruments to mitigate 
interest rate and foreign exchange rate risks.” and they employed only swaps contract 
(interest rate swaps, and cross currency swaps) in order to hedge the interest rate and 
exchange rate risk. This means that firms also use swaps contract to hedge their short-
term financial risk, which contradicts Clark and Judge’s (2009) claim that Swap is for 
long-term hedge.  
                                                          
46 E.g., Anglo American PLC disclose in their 2002 annual report: 
 ‘The Group utilises derivative and equity instruments to manage its exposure to fluctuations in foreign currency 
exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices. The use of derivative instruments can give rise to credit and market 
risk….’ 
‘The use of derivative instruments is subject to limits and the positions are regularly monitored and reported on to 
senior management.’  
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4.3.1  Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable for this study is corporate hedging. We study the corporate 
hedging decisions from three perspective; firstly, the decision to hedge or not to hedge; 
secondly, the magnitude of hedging, and thirdly, the co-ordination of contract used. 
 
Corporate Hedging Proxy 1: Hedge or Not-Hedge 
 
To identify whether the UK firms employ hedging instrument or not in their firm, we 
adopt the measurement used by Chen and King (2014) by performing a keyword search 
for derivatives used in their annual reports.  
 
Keywords searching process: 
1. We search for the following words: currency, exchange, interest rates, commodity, 
hedge, hedging, derivative, currency exchange, swaps, forwards, futures.  
2. When a keyword is found, we review the content in which the keyword appears 
and make sure the term is used for hedging purposes. 
3. If we are able to confirm the use of derivatives in the firm, we assign Dummy 1 
for a firm that hedges in a given year. If we fail to identify the use of any hedging 
instrument or the firm mentions in the annual report that they did not hedge, then 
the firm will be categorised as a non-hedger, which dummy zero will be assigned.  
 
 
Although we may identify a hedge or not-hedge firm based on the reported derivatives 
used in our third measurement (magnitude of hedging), we still perform the keyword 
search to identify hedge or non-hedge firms, as there are firms which hedge but do not 
report their amount of hedging instruments’ value.  
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Corporate Hedging Proxy 2: The Magnitude of Hedging 
 
The measurement of a firm’s hedging magnitude is more complicated than the 
measurement of Proxy 1. Beber and Fabbri (2012) study US firms’ hedging decisions 
using notional amounts of foreign currency derivatives outstanding at the end of the year 
to proxy the degree of derivative employment. In contrast to Beber and Fabbri’s US study, 
we use fair value of the derivatives to examine hedging decisions by UK firms. The reason 
why we employ fair value instead of notional contract amount is that not many UK firms 
reported the notional value in their annual reports. However, majority of UK firms have 
started to report the fair value47 of derivative in their balance sheet, starting in 2006, so 
the data for the years before this need to be extracted from the financial notes.  
 
To maintain the consistency of our data, we choose to use the fair value of derivatives 
reported in firms’ annual reports as our measurement of hedging magnitude. Hence, our 
study forms our derivatives data as follows: The total of derivatives used is the sum of 
current asset derivatives, non-current asset derivatives, current liabilities derivatives and 
non-current liabilities derivatives. Subsequently, we obtain the measurement of the 
magnitude of hedging by the total derivatives scaled by firm total assets.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
47 Under International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 101, FRS 102 and 
FRS 26 all derivatives on the balance sheet are at their fair value even if they are counted for as a hedge. 
Example: Anglo American Plc, 2003: ‘The adoption of IAS 32 and 39 (revised) will require all derivatives to be 
recognised on the balance sheet at fair value’. 
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Corporate Hedging Proxy 3: Hedging Preferences 
 
We follow Au Yong, Faff and Nguyen’s (2011) and Chen and King’s (2014) studies for 
this proxy, by collecting the number of types of derivatives used in a firm48. Au Yong, 
Faff and Nguyen mention that this measurement is a meaningful proxy of the application 
of a ‘co-ordinated’ corporate hedging strategy. 
 
This measurement also uses the keyword search method, and we follow Clark and Judge’s 
(2009) method in collecting the different types of derivative contracts. The reason we 
follow their measurement is because we are examining the same market, hence, using 
with the same measurement, we obtain results comparable result with those of Clark and 
Judge. For this method, we record the type of financial derivatives used by the firm. We 
search for the keywords of ‘forwards’, ‘swaps’, ‘futures’, and ‘options’ to identify the 
type of contract. The use of ‘forwards’, ‘swaps’, ‘futures’, and ‘options’ contracts is 
recorded for each firm in the sample for a given year, and dummy of ‘1’ is assigned to 
the firm that has employed every single type of contract mentioned. Later a ‘count’ of the 
dummies will be performed to obtain a categorical and ordinal variable as the number of 
derivative contract types.  
 
For this variable construction, we follow Au Yong, Faff and Nguyen’s (2011) ordered 
probit method with a ‘count’ of the number of different types of derivatives, whereby, 
dummy zero is for non-users, dummy ‘1’for users of one type, dummy ‘2’ for users of 
two types, dummy ‘3’for users of three types and dummy ‘4’ for users of four types. 
                                                          
48  See Appendix VIII for an example of an annual report - section of derivative financial instruments & hedge 
accounting (Weir Group Plc’s Annual Report 2013) 
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Table 4.1 
Summary of Corporate Hedging Measurements Used in this Study 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Measurement  
Hedge or non-
hedge firm 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm hedges in a given 
year, and zero otherwise. 
 
Magnitude of 
hedging  
 
Fair value of total derivatives used in the given year:  
i. Total Derivatives/ Total Asset  
ii. Total Derivative excluding Swaps/ Total Asset (robustness 
test) 
 
Number of types 
of derivative used  
 
 ‘Count’ of number of different types of derivative contracts used 
(‘forwards’, ‘options’, ‘futures’, and ‘swaps’). 
 
 
 
 
4.3.2  Explanatory Variables 
 
This study uses the same explanatory variable of CEO personal attributes (traits, skills 
and experiences, and networking) as the previous chapter. Additionally, we control for 
firm and macroeconomics hedging determinants as listed in Table 4.2.   
 
Table 4.2 
Firm and Macroeconomics Hedging Determinants as the Control Variables Used 
in this Study 
 
Conventional 
Hedging 
Determinants 
 
Measurement  Definition  Previous Studies 
Cost of financial 
distress 
DEBT  Total debt/ 
Total assets 
Kim, Mathur, & Nam, 
(2006); Beber and 
Fabbri (2012) 
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Reduction in 
underinvestment 
problem theory 
 
Research and 
Development 
expenditure 
R&D 
expenditures/ 
total assets 
Kim, Mathur, & Nam, 
(2006); Clark & Judge, 
(2009);Beber and 
Fabbri, (2012)-
robustness 
 
Growth  Capital 
expenditure  
/total assets 
 
Beber and Fabbri 
(2012) 
Firm size 
 
Total assets =logarithm of 
total assets 
 
Iqbal (2005); Kim, 
Mathur, & Nam 
(2006);  
 
 
Availability of internal 
funds 
Cash ratio Total cash and 
cash equivalents 
divided by total 
current 
liabilities 
 
Clark & Judge, (2009) 
Dividend yield Gross dividend 
divided by 
share price 
Clark & Judge (2009); 
(Au Yong, Faff & 
Nguyen, (2011) 
 
Corporate governance Proportion of non-
executive director/ 
Board size 
  
Foreign exchange 
exposure 
Foreign sales/ total 
sales 
 Beber and Fabbri 
(2012) 
 
Industry dummy/ 
industrial segment 
  Kim, Mathur, & Nam 
(2006) 
 
Macroeconomic 
factors 
GDP, Stock market 
Return, 
Consumer 
Confidence 
Indicator (CCI) 
  
 
 
4.3.3 Regression Specification 
 
To examine the relationship between CEO personal attributes (personal traits, skills and 
experiences, and networking) and corporate hedging decisions, we employ panel OLS 
regression analysis. We control for firm (conventional hedging determinants), 
macroeconomic factors and industry effects as our baseline Model I. We include CEO 
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personal attributes in Model II to observe the influence of CEO traits (age, gender, 
nationality, and marital status), skills and experiences, and networking ties on corporate 
hedging decisions. Subsequently, for Model III, we construct indexes based on the CEO 
personal attributes from three perspectives: CEO Personal Traits Index (TI), CEO Skills 
and Experiences Index (SEI), and CEO Networking Index (NI). These three indexes are 
amalgamated into the CEO Optimism Index (CEOOI) in order to observe an optimistic 
CEO’s hedging preferences. 
 
Model I: 
, , ,( )i t z i t i tCHD Z      
 
Model II:  
, , , ,_ _ ( )i t pa i t z i t i tCHD CEO Personal Attributes Z         
Model III: 
 
, , , , .( )i t TI i t SEI i t NI i t z i tCHD TI SEI NI Z            
 
Model IV:   
 
 
  tiztiOIti ZCEOOICHD ,,, )(  
 
 Whereby:  
CHD = Corporate Hedging Decisions  
CEO 
Personal 
Attributes 
= CEO personal traits (age, gender, nationality, and marital status) 
CEO Skills and Experiences (MBA or PhD holder, firm founder, financial 
literacy, duality, tenure as CEO, and emoluments) 
CEO Networking Ties (tenure with the firm, internal promotion, external 
directorships, and social networking prestige) 
 Z = Vector of Control Variables (firm, and macroeconomic factors and industry  
dummies) 
TI = Traits Index 
SEI = Skills and Experiences Index 
NI = Networking Index 
CEOOI = CEO Optimism Index 
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4.4 Results and Discussion 
 
Based on the UK FTSE 100 firms in our sample, we find that the majority of UK firms 
are hedged; 95% of the firms in our sample use financial derivative instruments to hedge 
the firm’s financial risk (foreign currency exchange, interest rate and commodity risk). 
As mentioned in the Bank of England’s (2013) report, the UK has the most active 
derivatives market in the world and this well-developed derivatives market may provide 
UK firms with convenient access to employment of hedging instruments.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows an interesting occurrence during 2008, a year during which all of the 
firms in our sample used financial derivative instruments. A possible reason of this 
phenomenon of firms being highly hedged may be the financial crisis of 2007, on which 
firms became more risk alert, and thus used more hedging mechanisms. Corporate 
hedging using derivative instruments exhibits an increasing trend of firms using financial 
derivatives from 2000 up to 2008, in which year all of the sample firms employed 
financial derivative instruments. However, after 2008, the average number of firms that 
employed financial derivatives decreased slightly, yet the non-hedgers comprise less than 
8% of the total sample firms from 2009-201349. We may conclude that the UK FTSE 100 
firms were highly hedged during the period 2000 to 2013.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
49 The details of The FTSE 100 UK firms’ financial hedging behaviour (2000 to 2013) are presented in appendix IX 
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Figure 4.2 
The FTSE 100 UK Firms’ Corporate Hedging Behaviour (2000 to 2013) 
 
 
 
 
In addition to looking at the hedging behaviour for the FTSE 100 UK firms by year, we 
also categorise our sample firms by industry in order to observe the corporate hedging 
decisions by industry, as shown in Figure 4.3. The computing equipment industry shows 
less use of financial derivative instruments; only half of the sample firms used derivatives 
to hedge. In contrast, we find all of the telecommunication and utilities firms used 
derivative intruments to hedge their financial risk.  
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Figure 4.3 
The FTSE 100 UK Firms’ Corporate Hedging Behaviour by Industry 
 
Industry classifications: 
 
 
Industry 
Dummy 
Sector 
 
ID 1 Chemicals,  Mining 
ID 2 
 
Aerospace & Defence, Construction & Materials, General Industrials, 
Industrial Engineering, Support Services 
ID 3 
 
Automobiles & Parts, Beverages, Food Producers, Household Goods, 
Personal Goods, Tobacco 
ID 4 Health Care Equipment & Services, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
ID 5 Food & Drug Retailers, General Retailers, Media, Travel & Leisure 
ID 6 Fixed Line Telecommunications, Mobile Telecommunications 
ID 7 Electricity, Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
ID 8 
 
Banks, General Financial, Life Insurance, Non-life Insurance, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts 
ID 9 Software & Computer Services, Technology Hardware & Equipment 
ID 10 
 
Oil & Gas Producers, Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution 
 
 
 
 
Software, hardware and computer technology firms may use fewer financial derivatives 
because of the industry’s fast changing technology which results in firms focusing on, 
and spending more on research and development (R&D). Such firms have more 
intangible assets compared to other industries so they are less likely to use derivatives. 
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Therefore, information technology firms invest more in R&D, hence most of their 
financing comes from venture capitalists rather than the debt market. Hence, hedging is 
therefore less. 
 
Telco and utilities firms use more financial derivatives possibly becausethese firms are 
highly regulated, hence incur high operating leverage (fixed costs). Hedging helps firms 
to stabilise the cash flow to ensure they can meet their need to pay the fixed costs though 
debt financing. Furthermore, telco and utilities firms in the UK are in the mature stage of 
their business cycle. They need to maintain the stability to continue as main market 
players in the industry. Due to the need for huge capital investments, a firm may need to 
borrow internationally though the foreign bond market. Firms can maintain their stability 
and sustainability by employing hedging mechanism. 
 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
From the summary statistics in Table 4.3, we observe that 95% of the firms used financial 
derivatives as their hedging tools, 91% of the firms in our sample hedged their foreign 
exchange risk by foreign currency derivatives (FCDs), 78% hedge interest rate risk by 
interest rate derivatives (IRDs) and 36% hedged commodity risk by commodity 
derivatives (CDs). Most of the firms chose to engage in forwards and swaps contracts: 
forwards (85%), and swaps (83%). Moreover, firms also used options and futures to meet 
their hedging needs: options (31%), and futures (13%). The firms in our sample hedged 
an average of 2.05 risk types and used an average of 2.12 types of derivatives contract.  
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Table 4.3 
Summary Statistics 
The table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. The study sample 
comprises the UK FTSE 100 firms from 2000 to 2013 (financial-related firms are excluded). The 
dependent variables are the Operational Hedging and Financial Hedging in Panel A. Panel B 
shows the explanatory variables used in this study (traits, skills and experiences, and networking). 
Panel C shows the control variables included in this study. 
 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
 
 N Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
Corporate  Hedger (CH) 816 0.9500 0.0000 1.0000 0.2260 
Foreign Currency Derivatives (FCDs) 816 0.9100 0.0000 1.0000 0.2890 
Interest Rate Derivatives (IRDs) 816 0.7800 0.0000 1.0000 0.4160 
Commodity Derivatives (CDs) 816 0.3600 0.0000 1.0000 0.4800 
Total Type of Derivatives Used (TTDU) 816 2.0500 0.0000 3.0000 0.8070 
Forwards Contract (FORC) 816 0.8500 0.0000 1.0000 0.3620 
Options Contract (OPC) 816 0.3100 0.0000 1.0000 0.4620 
Swaps Contract (SWC) 816 0.8300 0.0000 1.0000 0.3750 
Futures Contract (FUC) 816 0.1300 0.0000 1.0000 0.3390 
Total Type of Derivatives Contract Used 
(TTDCU) 816 2.1200 0.0000 4.0000 0.9910 
Total Derivatives Used (£’000), Fair 
Value 816 708,482 0.0000 32,290,899 2,808,531 
Total Derivative/ Total Assets (TDTA) 
 
 
816 
 
 
0.0277 
 
 
0.0000 
 
 
0.3329 
 
 
0.0429 
 
 
 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables (CEO Attributes) 
 N Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
1. CEO Personal Traits 
Age 816 52.6400 31.0000 77.0000 5.9080 
Gender (GEN) 816 0.9500 0.0000 1.0000 0.2240 
Nationality (NAT) 816 0.6500 0.0000 1.0000 0.4770 
Marital Status (MS) 816 1.0100 0.0000 3.0000 0.3430 
 N Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev. 
2. CEO Skills and Experiences 
MBA  816 0.2000 0.0000 1.0000 0.3980 
PhD  816 0.1300 0.0000 1.0000 0.3380 
Founder (FOU) 816 0.0400 0.0000 1.0000 0.1910 
Financial Literacy (FL) 816 0.4200 0.0000 1.0000 0.4940 
Duality (DUA) 816 0.0400 0.0000 1.0000 0.2000 
Tenure as CEO 816 6.0000 1.0000 29.0000 5.0660 
Emolument (EMO) 816 0.0050 0.0000 0.1125 0.0088 
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3. CEO Networking 
Tenure with the Firm (TWF) 816 15.0800 1.0000 43.0000 10.6070 
Internal Promotion (IP) 816 0.7200 0.0000 1.0000 0.4500 
External Directorship (ED) 816 0.7900 0.0000 5.0000 0.8510 
Social Networking Prestige (SNP) 
 
816 
 
0.5700 
 
0.0000 
 
1.0000 
 
0.4950 
 
4. CEO Personal Attributes Indexes 
Traits Index (TI) 816 0.7561 0.2500 1.0000 0.1949 
Skills and Experiences Index (SEI) 816 0.3199 0.1429 0.7143 0.1317 
Networking Index (NI) 816 0.5836 0.0000 1.0000 0.2667 
Optimism Index (OI) 816 0.5065 0.2000 0.8000 0.1208 
 
Panel C: Control Variables 
 N Mean Min Max Std. Dev. 
1. Firm Level Data       
Leverage (LEV) 816 0.2518 0.0000 1.6724 0.1619 
R & D/Total Asset (RD) 791 0.01479 0.0000 0.2380 0.0334 
Capital Expenditure/Total Asset (CE) 813 6.2940 0.0000 50.7200 5.7240 
Dividend Yield (DY) 811 2.8992 0.0000 11.6200 1.8187 
Firm Size (FS) 816 15.5616 11.3161 19.2059 1.4669 
Profitability (PRO) 816 0.1041 -0.8357 0.6354 0.0921 
Corporate  Governance (CG), Proportion 
of Non-executive Directors 816 0.6468 0.0000 1.0000 0.1342 
Foreign Sales/ Total Sales (FSTS) 773 57.4592 0.0000 229.1300 36.5765 
      
2. Macroeconomic Factors       
Log GDP (GDP)  
816 14.1106 13.8026 14.2938 0.1453 
Log Stock Market Return (SMR)  
816 8.5841 8.2371 8.7560 0.1564 
Consumer Confidence Indicators (CCI)  
 
816 -10.1732 -21.3500 -1.8800 7.2329 
 
As shown in the summary statistics in Table 4.3, the average fair value of derivatives held 
by a firm was £708 million, and the maximum holding was about £32,290 million. The 
average of total derivatives over total assets was 2.77% and the highest proportion of 
derivatives was 33.29% of the firm’s total assets.  
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4.4.2  Correlation Coefficients 
 
Correlations Table 4.4 presents the correlations between dependent variables (corporate 
hedging decisions) and explanatory variables (CEO personal attributes) and control 
variables in this study (firm and macroeconomic factors). Panel A shows that corporate 
hedgers are significantly positively correlated with the use of financial derivatives 
contracts; Forwards (FORC), Options (OPC), Swaps (SWC), and Futures (FUC). Our 
magnitude of corporate hedging (Total Derivatives/Total Assets, TDTA) also shows 
significant positive correlation with all types of derivatives contracts (FORC, OPC, SWC, 
and FUC). In terms of CEO personal traits, CEO age and male gender show a significant 
positive correlation with corporate hedging (to hedge or not to hedge). In the case of the 
total derivatives used as financial hedging, UK nationality of CEOs shows a significant 
positive correlation with magnitude of hedging (TDTA). 
 
Panel B in Table 4.4 shows the correlations among corporate hedging decisions with CEO 
skills and experiences. Only CEO emolument exhibits a significant negative correlation with 
corporate hedging (to hedge or not to hedge). For the degree of hedging, holding an MBA 
shows a significant negative correlation with the total derivatives used, while financial 
literacy in CEOs shows a significant positive correlation with the magnitude of the 
derivatives used.  
 
Panel C in Table 4.4 presents the correlations among corporate hedging decisions with 
CEO networking. Holding external directorships by CEOs exhibits a significant positive 
correlation with corporate hedging (hedger and the total amount of derivative instruments 
used). Additionally, possession of social networking prestige by CEOs shows a 
significant positive correlation with financial hedging (total derivatives used). 
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Panel D in Table 4.4 reports the correlations among corporate hedging decisions with the 
CEO attributes indexes.  The CEO Traits Index (TI) shows a non-significant negative 
correlation with corporate hedging (hedge or not to hedge) while the CEO Skills and 
Experiences Index (SEI), CEO Networking Index (NI) and CEO Optimism Index (OI) all 
show a non-significant positive correlation with corporate hedging (hedge or not to 
hedge). In the case of magnitude of hedging, the CEO Traits Index (TI), CEO Skills and 
Experiences Index (SEI), CEO Networking Index (NI) and CEO Optimism Index (OI) all 
exhibit significant positive correlations with financial hedging (magnitude of hedging). 
This implies that the higher the index value (of TI, SEI, NI, and OI) the higher the 
employment of derivatives by the firm.    
 
Panels E and F in Table 4.4 list the correlations between hedging decisions, firm and 
macroeconomic factors.  Leverage, R&D, firm size, cash ratio, dividend yield, corporate 
governance, GDP and CCI show significant correlations with corporate hedging decisions 
(to hedge or not to hedge). Leverage, R&D, capital expenditure, firm size, cash ratio, 
dividend yield, foreign sales/ total sales, GDP and CCI also exhibit significant 
correlations with the magnitude of hedging (TDTA) 
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Panel B: Correlations among dependent variables and explanatory variables (CEO Skills and Experiences) 
 
 
 CH FORC OPC SWC FUC TTDCU TDTA MBA PHD FOU FL DUA TCEO EMO 
MBA .023 .016 -.097*** .068* .079** .014 -.064* 1       
PhD .012 .045 .056 .001 .073** .068* .003 .081** 1      
Founder (FOU) .019 -.163*** .090*** .056 -.002 .003 -.027 .111*** -.039 1     
Financial Literacy (FL) .029 .092*** .111*** .143*** .038 .153*** .167*** -.189*** -.128*** .141*** 1    
Duality (DUA) -.005 .038 .100*** -.004 .190*** .124*** -.049 -.088** .046 .151*** -.104*** 1   
Tenure as CEO (TCEO) -.047 -.175*** -.011 -.027 -.028 -.088** .008 -.034 .016 .633*** .169*** .123*** 1  
Emolument (EMO) -.143*** -.116*** -.097*** -.363*** -.154*** -.278*** -.052 -.118*** .212*** -.021 -.109*** .035 .140*** 1 
*, **, *** denote the correlation is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 4.4 
Correlations 
 
 
Panel A: Correlations among dependent variables and explanatory variables (CEO Personal Traits) 
 
 CH FORC OPC SWC FUC TTDCU TDTA AGE GEN NAT MS 
Corporate hedger (use of financial derivative) 1           
Forwards (FORC) .559*** 1          
Options (OPC) .159*** .248*** 1         
Swaps (SWC) .529*** .268*** .046 1        
Futures (FUC) .093*** .167*** .406*** .167*** 1       
Total Type of Derivatives Contracts Used (TTDCU) .510*** .638*** .713*** .555*** .655*** 1      
Total Derivative/Total Assets (TDTA)  .154*** .182*** .162*** .173*** .127*** .252*** 1     
AGE .100*** -.028 .038 .129*** .051 .075** -.051 1    
Gender (GEN) .065* -.010 .110*** .128*** .092*** .127*** .040 .039 1   
Nationality (NAT) -.026 -.042 -.054 .061* -.147*** -.068* .096*** -.037 .127*** 1  
Marital Status (MS) -.007 -.014 -.109*** .007 -.088** -.084** -.048 .193*** .008 -.019 1 
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Panel C: Correlations among dependent variables and explanatory variables (CEO Networking) 
 
 CH FORC OPC SWC FUC TTDCU TDTA TWF IP ED SNP 
Tenure with the Firm (TWF) .030 -.046 .052 .041 .160*** .076** .009 1    
Internal Promotion (IP) -.029 -.072** .028 -.007 .068* .007 .044 .608*** 1   
External Directorship (ED) .062* .153*** .109*** .031 .084** .148*** .099*** .015 -.139** 1  
Social Networking Prestige (SNP) .023 .101*** .096*** .091*** .033 .128*** .136*** .057 .017 .000 1 
 
Panel D: Correlations among dependent variables and explanatory variables (CEO Attributes Indexes) 
 CH FORC OPC SWC FUC TTDCU TDTA TI SEI NI OI 
Traits Index (TI) -.041 -.017 -.021 .005 -.124*** -.058 .115*** 1    
Skills and Experiences Index (SEI) .003 .000 .072** .082** .119*** .107*** .065* -.111*** 1   
Networking Index (NI) .044 .055 .130*** .093*** .139** .163*** .134*** .108*** .339*** 1  
Optimism Index (OI) .010 .025 .104*** .099*** .089** .126*** .161*** .438*** .661*** .808** 1 
 
Panel E: Correlations among dependent variables and control variables (Firm Level Data) 
 
 CH FORC OPC SWC FUC TTDCU TDTA LEV RD CE FS CASH DY CG FSTS 
Leverage (LEV) .220*** .049 -.062* .331*** -.025 .105*** .125** 1        
R&D/TA (RD) -.177*** -.029 -.053 -.144*** -.137*** -.137*** -.142*** -.217*** 1       
Capital Expenditure/Total 
Assets (CE) 
-.032 -.008 .165*** -.063 .121*** .091*** .086** -.060* -.153*** 1      
Firm Size (FS) .271** .312*** .123*** .412*** .327*** .440*** .225*** .063* -.063* .014 1     
Cash Ratio (CASH) -.300*** -.116*** .142*** -.396*** .055 -.106*** -.062* -.253*** .158*** .195*** -.218** 1    
Dividend Yield )DY) .252*** .209*** .055 .271*** .105*** .238*** .183*** .339*** -.112*** -.116*** .327*** -.277*** 1   
Corporate Governance (CG) .187*** .183*** .093*** .106*** .145*** .202*** .055 .011 .023 -.089** .327*** .114*** -.049 1  
Foreign Sales/Total Sales 
(FSTS) 
.017 .031 -.017 .109*** .162*** .101*** -.102*** -.116*** .087** -.004 .151*** .070* -.140*** .300**
* 
1 
 
Panel F: Correlations among dependent variables and control variables (Macroeconomic Factors) 
 CH FORC OPC SWC FUC TTDCU TDTA GDP SMR CCI 
Log GDP (GDP)  .123*** .102*** -.020 .148*** -.021 .079** .150*** 1   
Log Stock Market Return (SMR)  -.008 .021 -.008 .004 -.012 .000 .000 .225*** 1  
Consumer Confidence Indicators 
(CCI) 
-.058* -.091*** .029 -.085** .030 -.043 -.135*** -.666*** -.089** 1 
*, **, *** denote the correlation is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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4.4.3  Univariate Analyses 
 
We employ compare mean analysis to examine the different means of CEO attributes 
across non-hedger and hedger firms, and low-hedged and high-hedged firms.   The results 
for univariate analyses are reported in Table 4.5.  The results indicate that the age of the 
CEO is significantly different across non-hedger and hedger and low-hedged and high-
hedged firms, whereby older CEOs are found in the hedger group and also in low-hedged 
firms.  UK Nationality of CEOs shows higher mean value in highly-hedged firms, while 
married status of CEOs was found significant in low-hedged firms. Based on the single 
trait results, the result for hedger and non-hedger and low and high-hedged firms are 
inconclusive. Hence we construct the Traits Index (TI), to further investigate the blend of 
the personal traits of a CEO and the impact of this on hedging decisions. The results in 
Panel D, Table 4.5, lead us to conclude that there is a significant difference between the 
CEO personal traits for low-hedged and those for high-hedged firms, whereby CEOs 
show higher trait index values in high-hedged firm compared to low-hedged firms. This 
implies that younger, male, UK nationality and married CEOs are more likely to be found 
in high-hedged firms.  
 
In the case of CEO skills and experiences, MBA holders show significantly higher mean 
values in the low-hedged group. Furthermore, CEOs who possess financial knowledge 
show higher means in high-hedged firms. A significant difference between means was 
also found for CEO emoluments, with higher means for non-hedger firms. For further 
investigation, we formed the CEO Skills and Experiences Index (SEI); our results in Panel 
D show that hedger and high-hedged firms exhibit higher SEI values. However, the result 
is non-significant.   
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In the case of CEO networking, CEOs who also hold external appointments show higher 
means in the hedger group and also in high-hedged firms. Additionally, CEOs who have 
social networking prestige also exhibit higher mean values for high-hedged firms. From 
the results presented in Panel D, the CEOs’ Networking Index (NI) shows a significantly 
higher mean value in high-hedged firms.  
 
Panel D in Table 4.5 reports the univariate analyses for CEO attributes indexes across 
hedger and non-hedger firms, and low-hedged and high-hedged firms. Higher means in 
the Traits Index, Skills and Experiences Index, and Networking Index have been found 
in high-hedged firms. Meanwhile, higher CEO Optimism Index (OI) is significantly 
found in the high-hedged group; a result that implies that optimistic CEOs are more likely 
to employ more hedging instruments. The higher indexes value for highly hedged firms 
once again strengthen our correlations findings which indicate that CEOs with higher 
Traits Index values, higher skills and experiences, more networking and  who are 
optimistic are more likely to employ derivative instruments. To further investigate the 
relationship between CEO personal attributes and corporate hedging decisions, we 
perform multivariate analyses, reported in the next section. 
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Table 4.5 
Univariate Analyses for Non-hedger CEOs versus Hedger CEOs and Low Hedged 
and High Hedged Firms’ CEOs 
 
The table shows the compare means and compare medians results for corporate hedging decisions 
(to hedge or not to hedge) and low-hedged firms and highly-hedged firms with CEO personal 
attributes (traits, skills and experiences, networking, and CEO attributes indexes). Our non-hedger 
firm sample comprises 44 observations, while the hedger firm sample has 772 observations. Our 
low or high hedge firms are selected from the top 25% (204 observations) and lowest 25% (204 
observations) of derivatives used by the firms. 
 
 
Panel A: CEO Personal Traits 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
  
Non-
hedger 
Hedger 
Sig. 
diff
. 
Sig. diff. 
Low 
hedged 
firm 
Highly 
hedged 
firm 
Sig. 
diff
. 
Sig. diff. 
Age 50.1600 52.7800  **  52.6400 51.5700 * * 
Gender 0.8900 0.9500    0.9500 0.9500   
Nationality 0.7000 0.6500    0.6200 0.7400 **  
Marital Status 1.0200 1.0100    1.0700 0.9700 *** *** 
 
Panel B: CEO Skills and Experiences 
  
MBA holder 0.1600 0.2000   0.1900 0.1100 ** * 
PhD holder 0.1100 0.1300   0.1400 0.1300   
Founder status 0.0200 0.0400   0.0400 0.0200   
Financial literacy 0.3600 0.4300   0.3100 0.5400 *** *** 
Duality 0.0500 0.0400   0.0500 0.0200   
Tenure as CEO 7.0000 5.9500   5.7700 5.8800   
Emoluments 0.0103 0.0047 *** *** 0.0063 0.0052  *** 
 
Panel C: CEO Networking 
  
Tenure with the Firm 13.7700 15.1600   15.7200 15.2800   
Internal promotion 0.7700 0.7200   0.7500 0.7700   
External directorships 0.5700 0.8000 *  0.7300 0.9000 **  
Social networking 
prestige 
0.5200 0.5700   0.4800 0.6500 *** 
 
 
Panel D: CEO Personal Attributes Indexes 
  
Traits Index (TI) 0.7898 0.7542  *** 0.7549 0.7953 ** * 
Skills and Experiences 
Index (SEI) 
0.3182 0.3199   0.2990 0.3179  
 
* 
Networking Index 
(NI) 
0.5341 0.5865   0.5625 0.6348 *** 
** 
CEO Optimism Index 
(OI) 
0.5015 0.5068   0.4909 0.5297 *** 
*** 
*, **, *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
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4.4.4  Multivariate Analyses 
4.4.4.1 Corporate Hedging Decisions: To hedge or not to hedge 
 
 
We start our multiple regression analysis by examining the relationship of CEO personal 
attributes with the corporate hedging decisions; to hedge or not to hedge. As Table 4.6 
shows, we include the firm and macroeconomics factors as our baseline model; Model I. 
Firm and macroeconomics factors are important determinants for corporate hedging 
decisions. As shown in Table 4.6, we find that leverage significantly influences the 
corporate hedging decision. Higher leverage firms tend to use financial derivatives to 
hedge their financial risk.  
 
Our findings support the suggestion of Judge (2006) who posits that hedging can 
effectively help firms to meet their obligations. Hence, if a firm is highly leveraged, then 
derivatives can be used as a hedging mechanism to help the firm to lower the risk of being 
unable to meet the obligations committed to. We also find that larger firms are more likely 
to hedge using financial derivative instruments. Additionally, lower cash firms also 
exhibit the intention to hedge by employing financial derivatives instruments; our finding 
is consistent with that of Clark and Judge’s (2009) findings in their UK study; they also 
found a negative relationship between cash ratio and hedging strategies.  
 
 212 
 
Table 4.6 
CEO Personal Attributes and Financial Hedging Decision (to hedge or not to hedge) 
 
This table examines the relationship between CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking) with corporate hedging decisions 
(hedger or non-hedger) using panel logistic regression. Industry effects are included. Our regressions are based on our Model I: titizti ZCHD ,,, )(    , 
Model II: , , , ,_ _ ( )i t pa i t z i t i tCHD CEO Personal Attributes Z        , Model III: , , , , .( )i t TI i t SEI i t NI i t z i tCHD TI SEI NI Z           , and Model IV:  
  tiztiOIti ZCEOOICHD ,,, )( , where  Z is the vector of control variables (firm, and macroeconomic factors and industries dummies). P-values are 
reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Model I: 
Baseline 
Model 
Model II: CEO Personal 
Attributes 
Model III:  CEO Personal Attributes Indexes Model IV: CEO 
Optimism Index 
c 22.2536 17.2711 29.8140 -0.8872 18.2853 13.2722 29.7149 11.3310 26.5305 
 (0.5675) (0.6690) (0.5356) (0.9844) (0.6436) (0.7419) (0.4603) (0.7879) (0.5059) 
Leverage 4.9586* 4.6469* 3.5927 4.4394 5.1295** 4.7610* 5.3408** 5.4015* 4.9895* 
 (0.0546) (0.0783) (0.1748) (0.1400) (0.0476) (0.0725) (0.0477) (0.0525) (0.0602) 
R&D -1.8196 1.8999 -6.4813 -6.0060 -1.0128 -2.8431 -1.5256 -1.4355 -2.6755 
 (0.8648) (0.8611) (0.7266) (0.6295) (0.9243) (0.7911) (0.8890) (0.8947) (0.8071) 
Capital Expenditure 0.0227 0.0219 -0.0039 0.0066 0.0200 0.0171 0.0258 0.0147 0.0246 
 (0.5367) (0.5668) (0.9353) (0.8653) (0.5888) (0.6495) (0.4875) (0.7005) (0.5072) 
Firm Size 0.8675*** 0.8862*** 2.8941*** 1.0097*** 0.8391*** 0.9606*** 0.9292*** 0.9437*** 0.9400*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0010) (0.0053) (0.0066) (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0056) (0.0047) 
Cash Ratio -0.8236*** -0.9986*** -1.3772*** -0.7181** -0.8317*** -0.7965*** -0.7953*** -0.7930*** -0.7946*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0018) (0.0114) (0.0003) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0013) 
Dividend Yield 1.1332*** 1.1841*** 1.6125*** 1.3684*** 1.1202*** 1.2581*** 1.2367*** 1.2788*** 1.2301*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Corporate Governance 6.3716** 4.8529 6.7470* 5.0649 5.8823** 5.7766* 6.0088** 4.6114 6.3552** 
 (0.0213) (0.1047) (0.0935) (0.1102) (0.0388) (0.0521) (0.0360) (0.1443) (0.0281) 
FSTS -0.0017 -0.0035 0.0204 -0.0014 -0.0018 0.0005 0.0009 0.0011 0.0005 
 (0.8750) (0.7427) (0.2191) (0.9101) (0.8678) (0.9682) (0.9381) (0.9207) (0.9670) 
GDP -0.7781 -0.1404 -4.1031 -0.0099 -0.3627 -0.1973 -1.4139 0.1138 -1.2523 
 (0.7751) (0.9597) (0.2759) (0.9976) (0.8969) (0.9440) (0.6193) (0.9696) (0.6572) 
Stock Market Return -2.8364* -3.0841* -1.9045 -1.5240 -2.8887* -3.0176* -2.8439* -3.0847* -2.8365* 
 (0.0940) (0.0769) (0.3549) (0.3984) (0.0897) (0.0836) (0.0934) (0.0781) (0.0956) 
CCI 0.0830* 0.1000* 0.1112* 0.0935* 0.0872* 0.1015** 0.0858* 0.1081** 0.0857* 
 (0.0881) (0.0516) (0.0609) (0.0832) (0.0777) (0.0464) (0.0794) (0.0387) (0.0788) 
Age  0.0115        
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  (0.8250)        
Male CEO  Omitted        
          
Married CEO  -0.5692        
  (0.6222)        
UK Nationality  -1.2616        
  (0.1426)        
 
MBA holder 
 
 
 
0.5312 
  
 
  
 
   (0.6447)       
PhD holder   0.2514       
   (0.8580)       
Founder   6.8730**       
   (0.0146)       
Financial Literacy   2.7325**       
   (0.0129)       
Duality   0.4385       
   (0.8044)       
Tenure as CEO   -0.9571*       
   (0.0503)       
Emoluments   1.6882**       
   (0.0119)       
Tenure with the firm    -0.7127      
    (0.1708)      
Internal Promotion    -0.0945      
    (0.9310)      
External Directorships    1.4280***      
    (0.0075)      
Social Networking prestige    1.6750**      
    (0.0295)      
Trait Index     -0.9371   -1.5677  
     (0.5382)   (0.3333)  
Skills and Experiences Index      4.1782*  3.5430  
      (0.0732)  (0.1958)  
Networking Index       1.2263 0.8101  
       (0.2078) (0.4992)  
Optimism Index         2.4341 
         (0.2185) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo  R2 0.5398 0.5508 0.6544 0.6032 0.5412 0.5521 0.5457 0.5561 0.5453 
Observations 765 765 765 765 765 765 765 765 765 
Number of non-hedger 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Number of  hedger 731 731 731 731 731 731 731 731 731 
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The results in Table 4.6 show that higher dividend yield firms are more likely to engage 
in decisions to hedge. Our findings are consistent with that of Au Yong, Faff and Nguyen 
(2011), who suggest that high dividend payout firm are logically more likely to have 
liquidity constraints, hence tend to hedge more. Corporate governance is found to have a 
positive relationship with hedging decision. Hedging can help firms reduce cash flow 
volatility and ease the conflict among bondholders and shareholders (Chen & King, 2014), 
hence firms with stronger corporate governance are more likely to employ hedging 
strategies. 
 
In the case of macroeconomics factors, we find a significant relationship between firms’ 
stock market returns and hedging decision. This implies that when there is a downturn in 
the stock market the firms tend to use derivative instruments to minimize potential risk 
of loss. However, when consumer confidence indicators are higher, the firm is more likely 
to choose to hedge. Once the firm is hedged, the firm’s outcome becomes more 
predictable (Chen & King, 2014), and will thus attract more investors to invest.   
 
Model II in Table 4.6 shows the regression results for CEO personal attributes (traits, 
skills and experiences, and networking) and the decision to hedge or not to hedge. There 
is no significant relationship between CEO traits (age, marital status and nationality) with 
the decision to hedge. However, we find some skills and experiences attributes of the 
CEOs do have a significant effect on hedging decision; founder status CEOs, financially 
literate CEOs, and higher pay CEOs are more likely to hedge their firm. On the other 
hand, in the case of CEO networking attributes, we find that CEOs who have stronger 
external networking (external directorship and social networking prestige) are more likely 
to hedge their firm. 
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Model III in Table 4.6 presents the relationship of CEO personal attributes indexes with 
the decision to hedge or not to hedge. The results show that only the Skills and 
Experiences Index (SEI) has a significant positive relationship with the decision to hedge. 
This implies that CEOs with higher skills and experiences will be more likely to hedge 
their firm. In the case of the CEO Optimism Index reported in Model IV, we find a 
positive non-significant relationship between CEO optimism and the hedging decision. 
Since our sample consists of a higher percentage of firms that hedged (731 out of 765), 
we further investigate the magnitude of hedging, in order to examine the influence of 
CEO personal attributes towards the degree of hedging. 
 
4.4.4.2 Magnitude of hedging 
 
 
In this section, we present the multiple regression analysis results that examine the 
correlations between CEO personal attributes and corporate hedging decisions; 
magnitude of hedging. As shown in Table 4.7, Model I is our baseline model, in which 
we include the firm and macroeconomics factors. We find that leverage and capital 
expenditure significantly influence the corporate hedging decision. Higher leverage firms 
and higher capital expenditure firms tend to use more financial derivatives to hedge their 
financial risk. Our finding is consistent with the idea of Judge (2006), who suggests that 
derivative instruments can be used as hedging tools to help lower the firm’s risk by 
matching and meeting the obligation committed to. We also find that larger firms use 
more financial derivative instruments. Additionally, higher dividend yield firms also 
exhibit higher employment of financial derivative instruments. Our finding is consistent 
with the proposition of Au Yong, Faff and Nguyen (2011) -that high dividend pay-out 
firms are more likely to face liquidity constraints, and hence tend to hedge more.  
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In the case of macroeconomics factors, we find a significant positive relationship between 
GDP and degree of hedging. This may be because when the economy is growing, firms 
will have more investment opportunities and expand their businesses (product line or 
geographical diversification), hence the need to hedge using derivative instruments will 
also increase. On the other hand, we find a significant negative relationship between a 
firm’s stock market return and the degree of hedging, This implies that when there is a 
stock market return downturn, firms tend to use more derivative instruments to minimize 
risk of loss and limit cash flow uncertainty, as mentioned by Chen and King (2014), and 
a firm’s outcomes will be more predictable once the firm is hedged. 
 
Model II in Table 4.7 presents the results for correlations between CEO personal 
attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking) and the magnitude of hedging. 
A significant relationship is found between CEO traits (age, marital status and nationality) 
and the magnitude of derivatives used. Younger, married, and UK nationality CEOs show 
higher employment of financial derivatives in their firm. Iqbal (2015) also finds that 
younger CEOs are more likely to hedge. Beber and Fabbri (2012) find the same 
relationship; younger CEOs use more derivative instruments.  Additionally, we find some 
skills and experiences attributes of CEOs do have a significant effect on decision to hedge. 
CEOs with an MBA degree are found to use financial derivatives less, but CEOs who 
possess financial knowledge are found to have higher employment of hedging derivative 
instruments.  In the case of CEO networking attributes, we find that CEOs who are 
internally promoted, and who have stronger external networking (external directorship 
and social networking prestige) tend to hedge more. 
 
 217 
 
 
Table 4.7 
CEO Personal Attributes and Financial Hedging Decision (Magnitude of Hedging) 
 
This table examines the relationship between CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking) with financial hedging magnitude 
(Total fair value of the derivatives/Total Assets) using panel OLS regression. Year and industry effects are included. Our regressions are based on our 
Model I: titizti ZCHD ,,, )(    , Model II: , , , ,_ _ ( )i t pa i t z i t i tCHD CEO Personal Attributes Z        , Model III: , , , , .( )i t TI i t SEI i t NI i t z i tCHD TI SEI NI Z           , 
and Model IV:
  tiztiOIti ZCEOOICHD ,,, )( , where Z is the vector of control variables (firm, and macroeconomic factors and industries dummies). 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Model I: 
Baseline Model 
Model II: CEO Personal Attributes Model III:  CEO Personal Attributes Indexes Model IV: 
CEOOI 
c -0.3759** -0.3886** -0.4014** -0.4570** -0.3912** -0.3649** -0.3645** -0.3736** -0.3664** 
 (-2.0984) (-2.1829) (-2.2656) (-2.5765) (-2.1965) (-2.0441) (-2.0513) (-2.1132) (-2.0752) 
Leverage 0.0293*** 0.0258*** 0.0290*** 0.0272*** 0.0240** 0.0310*** 0.0295*** 0.0257*** 0.0277*** 
 (3.0025) (2.6083) (3.0005) (2.8032) (2.4303) (3.1739) (3.0386) (2.6270) (2.8691) 
R&D -0.0283 -0.0570 -0.0082 -0.0439 -0.0459 -0.0322 -0.0446 -0.0587 -0.0549 
 (-0.4932) (-0.9761) (-0.1420) (-0.7615) (-0.8010) (-0.5643) (-0.7823) (-1.0314) (-0.9676) 
Capital Expenditure 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0006** 0.0006** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 
 (2.3641) (2.4348) (2.9014) (2.8629) (2.5178) (2.3685) (2.7250) (2.7569) (2.7413) 
Firm Size 0.0034*** 0.0039*** 0.0045*** 0.0023** 0.0038*** 0.0033 0.0024** 0.0030** 0.0028** 
 (2.9351) (3.4087) (3.1899) (2.0133) (3.2808) (2.8378) (2.0329) (2.5027) (2.4190) 
Cash Ratio -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (-0.7951) (-0.7494) (-0.5162) (-0.5004) (-0.6661) (-0.6492) (-0.4603) (-0.3311) (-0.3279) 
Dividend Yield 0.0023*** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0029*** 0.0024*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 
 (2.6521) (2.8917) (2.9516) (3.2400) (2.7718) (2.9019) (2.9798) (3.1797) (3.2126) 
Corporate Governance -0.0034 0.0002 0.0033 -0.0040 0.0038 -0.0018 0.0003 0.0070 0.0053 
 (-0.2889) (0.0180) (0.2806) (-0.3386) (0.3145) (-0.1522) (0.0211) (0.5804) (0.4421) 
FSTS -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-1.6228) (-0.9904) (-1.3110) (-2.0165) (-1.0828) (-1.7780) (-1.7532) (-1.3313) (-1.5496) 
GDP 0.0333** 0.0347*** 0.0316** 0.0382*** 0.0321** 0.0317** 0.0322** 0.0301** 0.0302** 
 (2.5717) (2.6921) (2.4596) (2.9823) (2.4884) (2.4499) (2.5042) (2.3535) (2.3585) 
Stock Market Return -0.0153* -0.0151* -0.0131 -0.0140* -0.0148* -0.0149* -0.0149* -0.0142* -0.0143* 
 (-1.7752) (-1.7609) (-1.5558) (-1.6507) (-1.7258) (-1.7308) (-1.7404) (-1.6708) (-1.6785) 
CCI -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(-0.8447) 
 
(-0.6538) 
 
(-0.3903) 
 
(-0.9701) 
 
(-0.7100) 
 
(-0.7663) (-0.9578) (-0.7393) (-0.7755) 
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Age   -0.0007***        
  (-2.6997)        
Male CEO  -0.0027        
  (-0.4102)        
Married CEO  0.0149**        
  (2.3436)        
UK Nationality  0.0061*        
  (1.8570)        
MBA holder   -0.0114***       
   (-2.9785)       
PhD holder   -0.0003       
   (-0.0786)       
Founder   0.0004       
   (0.0568)       
Financial Literacy   0.0138***       
   (4.6926)       
Duality   0.0003       
   (0.0048)       
Tenure as CEO   0.0019       
   (1.0731)       
Emoluments   0.2169       
   (0.9168)       
Tenure with the firm    -0.0007      
    (-0.3556)      
Internal Promotion    0.0120***      
    (2.7895)      
External Directorships    0.0069***      
    (4.3823)      
Social Networking prestige    0.0048*      
    (1.6523)      
Trait Index     0.0235***   0.0214***  
     (3.1823)   (2.8609)  
Skills and Experiences Index      0.0269**  0.0203*  
      (2.5543)  (1.8273)  
Networking Index       0.0190*** 0.0133**  
       (3.6483) (2.3744)  
Optimism Index         0.0536*** 
         (4.7526) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1589 0.1723 0.2014 0.1883 0.1692 0.1652 0.1728 0.1821 0.1829 
Observations 754 754 754 754 754 754 754 754 754 
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Model III in Table 4.7 presents the result for the relationships between CEO personal 
attributes indexes and corporate hedging decisions: magnitude of hedging. The results 
show that all of the indexes (Traits Index, Skills and Experiences Index, and Networking 
Index) exhibit significant positive relationships with decision to hedge. This implies that 
the higher the Traits Index (composite of younger, male, married, and UK nationality) 
value of a CEO, the higher the magnitude of the use of derivative instruments in his/her 
firm. Also, the higher the Skills and Experiences Index value CEOs, the higher the 
employment of financial derivatives as hedging instruments. Moreover, the higher the 
Networking Index value, the more financial derivatives will be used to hedge firm risk.  
In the case of the CEO Optimism Index, as reported in Model IV, we find a positive 
significant relationship between CEO optimism and the decision to hedge. This implies 
that optimistic CEOs will employ more derivative instruments in their firm as a hedging 
mechanism.  Our result is consistent with those of Alsubaie (2009) and Adam, Fernando 
and Golubeva (2015), who also find that CEO optimism is positively correlated with 
financial derivatives used. 
 
We explain our results in this way: recall from chapter two that the term “optimism” is 
based on the concepts proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008), Doukas 
and Petmezas (2007) and Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013):  ‘better than average’, 
‘illusions of control’ and ‘highly committed to good outcomes’. Hence, the optimistic 
CEO would be one who has self-confidence, believes that he/she is able to predict future 
events precisely and is confident that he/she can lead the firm to perform better in the 
future. Hence such a CEO will try to eliminate the potential risks that he/she foresees, and 
uses derivative instruments as a hedging mechanism to make sure that the firm’s 
outcomes are more assured and under their control.  This explanation supports Smith and 
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Stulz’s (1985) suggestion that hedging can help to reduce cash flow volatility, and hence 
lower the expected cost of financial distress. 
 
4.4.4.3 ‘Co-Ordinated’ Corporate Hedging Strategy: Type of Derivative Contract Used 
 
 
Table 4.8 presents the result for CEO personal attributes and their ‘co-ordinated’ 
corporate hedging strategy. As mentioned by Au Yong, Faff and Nguyen (2011), an 
examination of the number of types of derivatives used in a firm will provide a meaningful 
proxy of diversity of financial hedging strategy.  From the results, we find that CEO 
personal Traits Index (TI), Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), and Networking Index 
(NI) show a positive relationship with the number of types of derivative contracts used. 
In particular, we find a significant positive influence of SEI on the ‘co-ordinated’ hedging 
strategy, which implies that the CEO with higher skills and experiences tends to use more 
types of derivatives (forwards, futures, swaps and option contracts).  
 
In Table 4.8, the Model IV result shows that the CEO Optimism Index (OI) significantly 
positively affects the corporate hedging strategy. The higher the CEO optimism index 
value, the more ‘co-ordinated’ the hedging strategy employed. This shows that optimistic 
CEOs tend to use more types of financial derivative instruments (forwards, futures, swaps 
and option contracts) to hedge their firm’s financial risk (currency exchange risk, interest 
rate risk and commodity risk).   
 
As already mentioned, optimistic CEOs are committed to good outcomes and the ‘illusion 
of control’. Therefore it is sensible that optimistic CEOs will employ more or different 
types of derivative instruments to meet their needs in eliminating different types of 
financial risk in order to deliver good outcomes for the firm. 
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Table 4.8 
CEO Personal Attributes and Financial Hedging Decision (‘Co-ordinated’ 
Strategy) 
 
This table examines the relationship between CEO personal attributes indexes with use of 
total types of derivatives and total types of derivative contracts (forwards, futures, swaps 
and options contracts) using ordered probit regression. Z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
    
Model III                               Model IV 
 
Leverage   0.3386 0.3188 
   (1.1417) (1.0866) 
R&D   -4.8192*** -4.9648*** 
   (-2.8417) (-2.9332) 
Capital Expenditure   0.0258*** 0.0263*** 
   (3.4708) (3.5456) 
Firm Size   0.3056*** 0.2991*** 
   (8.6229) (8.6505) 
Cash Ratio   0.0142 0.0152 
   (0.2363) (0.2522) 
Dividend Yield   0.0973*** 0.0960*** 
   (3.6229) (3.5803) 
Corporate Governance   1.3786*** 1.3874*** 
   (3.7735) (3.8306) 
FSTS   0.0021 0.0022* 
   (1.5982) (1.6648) 
GDP   0.0639 0.0731 
   (0.1642) (0.1879) 
Stock Market Return   -0.2063 -0.2114 
   (-0.7998) (-0.8199) 
CCI   0.0187** 0.0182** 
   (2.4886) (2.4244) 
Trait Index   0.3413  
   (1.5087)  
Skills and Experiences 
Index 
  0.9443***  
  (2.8276)  
Networking Index   0.1657  
   (0.9683)  
Optimism Index    1.2272*** 
    (3.5346) 
Industry dummies   Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2   0.1214 0.1206 
Observations   769 769 
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4.4.4.4 Corporate Hedging Across Time 
 
 
As mentioned by Belghitar, Clark and Mefteh (2013), firms use financial derivatives as 
hedging mechanisms to manage their financial risk; hence we further investigate the 
impact of CEO personal attributes and CEOs’ use of financial derivatives across 
economic calm and crisis periods. Table 4.9 presents the results of the effects of CEO 
personal attributes on their hedging decisions during a calm period in the economy (2000 
to 2006) and a global financial crisis period (2007 to 2013). The results show that personal 
attributes indexes (Traits Index, Skills and Experiences Index, and Networking Index) 
show a positive but non-significant relationship with the use of derivatives during a calm 
period in the economy. However, the CEO personal Traits Index (TI) and Networking 
Index (NI) exhibit a significant positive relationship with the magnitude of financial 
hedging during a global financial crisis period.  This implies that younger, male, married 
and UK nationality CEOs and CEOs who have more networking ties (internally promoted, 
longer tenure with the firm, more external directorships, and has social networking 
prestige) will employ more derivative instruments during times of financial crisis.   
 
Nevertheless, the CEO Optimism Index, as presented in Model IV, shows a significant 
positive relationship with decision to hedge throughout both calm and crisis periods. 
Hence, we may conclude that optimistic CEOs tend to employ more derivatives regardless 
of the condition of the economy.  Even so, we observe a higher co-efficient value during 
the crisis period compared to the calm period. 
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Table 4.9 
CEO Personal Attributes Indexes and Corporate Hedging Magnitude Across 
Time (2000 to 2006 and 2007 to 2013) 
This table examines the relationship between CEO personal attributes indexes (Traits Index, 
Skills and Experiences Index, Networking Index, and CEO Optimism Index) with financial 
hedging magnitude (Total fair value of the derivatives/Total Assets) using panel OLS 
regression. Industry effects are included. Our regressions are based on our, Model III:
, , , , .( )i t TI i t SEI i t NI i t z i tCHD TI SEI NI Z           , and Model IV:   tiztiOIti ZCEOOICHD ,,, )( , 
where Z is the vector of control variables (firm, and macroeconomic factors and industries 
dummies). T-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Whole sample 
 
 
2000-2006 
 
2007-2013 
 Model III Model IV Model III Model IV Model III Model IV 
c -0.3736** -0.3664** -0.6752** -0.6826** 1.7456*** 1.8571*** 
 (-2.1132) (-2.0752) (-2.1643) (-2.1953) (2.7154) (2.8918) 
Leverage 0.0257*** 0.0277*** 0.0126 0.0108 0.0266* 0.0321** 
 (2.6270) (2.8691) (0.9959) (0.8715) (1.8489) (2.2574) 
R&D -0.0587 -0.0549 -0.0362 -0.0334 -0.1738* -0.1390 
 (-1.0314) (-0.9676) (-0.5250) (-0.4877) (-1.8822) (-1.5254) 
Capital Expenditure 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0006* 0.0006 
 (2.7569) (2.7413) (2.2492) (2.2976) (1.6893) (1.5939) 
Firm Size 0.0030** 0.0028** 0.0017 0.0019 0.0067*** 0.0062*** 
 (2.5027) (2.4190) (1.0563) (1.2485) (4.0084) (3.7274) 
Cash Ratio -0.0006 -0.0006 0.0047* 0.0047* -0.0072** -0.0071** 
 (-0.3311) (-0.3279) (1.7084) (1.7144) (-2.5650) (-2.5262) 
Dividend Yield 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0017 0.0017 0.0033** 0.0034*** 
 (3.1797) (3.2126) (1.4991) (1.4716) (2.5286) (2.6189) 
Corporate Governance 0.0070 0.0053 0.0162 0.0176 0.0059 0.0027 
 (0.5804) (0.4421) (1.0493) (1.1570) (0.3296) (0.1522) 
FSTS -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (-1.3313) (-1.5496) (0.0634) (0.2434) (-2.6865) (-3.0155) 
GDP 0.0301** 0.0302** 0.0429** 0.0428** -0.1309** -0.1385*** 
 (2.3535) (2.3585) (2.2545) (2.2551) (-2.5604) (-2.7112) 
Stock Market Return -0.0142* -0.0143* 0.0028 0.0029 -0.0010 0.0004 
 (-1.6708) (-1.6785) (0.2502) (0.2650) (-0.0560) (0.0205) 
CCI -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (-0.7393) (-0.7755) (-0.0232) (-0.0033) (-0.6840) (-0.7373) 
Trait Index 0.0214***  0.0020  0.0367***  
 (2.8609)  (0.1917)  (3.5449)  
Skills and Experiences Index 0.0203*  0.0192  0.0129  
 (1.8273)  (1.3371)  (0.7655)  
Networking Index 0.0133**  0.0096  0.0171**  
 (2.3744)  (1.2645)  (2.1380)  
Optimism Index  0.0536***  0.0336**  0.0698*** 
  (4.7526)  (2.1019)  (4.3484) 
Industry dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1821 0.1829 0.0914 0.0955 0.2955 0.2903 
Observations 754 754 325 325 429 429 
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4.4.4.5 Additional and Robustness Test  
 
There is an argument that swaps contracts are used to translate foreign debt into domestic 
liabilities and do not hedge foreign sales (Allayannis, Brown and Klapper, 2003; Clark & 
Judge, 2009). Moreover, Clark and Judge (2009) also mention that swaps are used for 
long-term hedge.  Hence for a robustness test, we exclude the swaps50  amount in our total 
derivatives. Our results show, however, that the exclusion of swaps in the total derivatives 
provides similar results with those for the total derivatives containing swaps contracts. 
The results for this additional test are reported in Appendix X. 
 
In the case of the annual reports, we find that swaps used by the UK FTSE 100 firms are 
not ultimately designed for long-term hedging, as claimed by Clark and Judge (2009), as 
some of the contracts are short-term contracts51 and swaps are used to hedge interest rate 
and exchange rate risk, as mentioned in WPP plc, 2004 Annual Report.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
A look at the corporate hedging decisions by UK firms from 2000 to 2013 shows that 
most of the UK firms (95%) use financial derivatives to hedge their firm’s financial risk. 
The most common derivatives contracts used by the UK firms are forwards and swaps 
contracts.  
 
                                                          
50 We tried our best to exclude the amount of swaps contracts used by the firms. Yet, we also noted that during our 
collection of data on the amount of swaps, there are some limitations, whereby which there are firms who mentioned 
the used of swaps but did not present the amount in their annual report (e.g., ABF),  and there are also firms that 
combine the amount of swaps with other contracts (e.g., AMEC plc 2009-2013, combined their forward foreign 
exchange contracts and foreign exchange swaps) 
 
51 E.g.,: Shire plc Annual Report and Accounts, (2009) the swaps and forward contracts mature within 90 days. 
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We conclude that that younger, male, UK nationality and married CEOs tend to hedge 
more. From the correlation coefficient analyses, the CEO Traits Index (TI) exhibits a 
significant positive correlation with financial hedging (magnitude of hedging). Our 
regression results also suggest that younger, married, and UK nationality CEOs tend to 
have higher employment levels of financial derivatives in their firm. This result is 
consistent with those of Iqbal (2015) and Beber and Fabbri (2012), who also found that 
younger CEOs are more likely to hedge. 
 
We also conclude that CEOs with higher skills and experiences tend to employ more 
financial derivatives as hedging tools. In correlation coefficient analyses, the CEO skills 
and Experiences Index (SEI) shows a significant positive correlation with financial 
hedging (magnitude of hedging). In the case of regression analysis, CEOs with an MBA 
degree are found to use financial derivatives less, but CEOs who possess financial 
knowledge are found to have higher employment of hedging derivative instruments.  
 
We also to conclude that the more networking ties a CEO has, the more hedging 
derivative instruments will be used. The correlation coefficient analyses show that the 
CEO Networking Index (NI) exhibits a significant positive correlation with financial 
hedging (magnitude of hedging). In the case of univariate analyses, the CEOs’ 
Networking Index (NI) shows a significantly higher mean value in high-hedged firms. 
The results from multiple regression analysis also suggest that internally promoted CEOs, 
and CEOs with stronger external networking (external directorship and social networking 
prestige) tend to hedge more. 
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In conclusion, we find that optimistic CEOs tend to hedge more. This conclusion is based 
on the correlation coefficient analysis, univariate analyses and also multiple regression 
analysis, for which test results show that the CEO Optimism Index positively significantly 
affects the employment of hedging instruments52. Our results support those of Alsubaie 
(2009) and Adam, Fernando and Golubeva (2015), who also found that CEO optimism 
was positively correlated with decision to hedge. A possible explanation for the use of 
more financial derivatives by optimistic CEOs in hedging their firms’ risk can be derived 
from the proposition of Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008), Doukas and 
Petmezas (2007) and Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013), that optimistic CEOs are the ones 
who are believed to have high levels of commitment towards their firm’s good outcomes 
and are confident in predicting future events. Hence optimistic CEOs may use more 
derivative instruments to hedge their firm’s risk to ensure their firm is under their control 
(‘illusion of control’). As Smith and Stulz (1985) mentioned, hedging can help reduce 
cash flow volatility, and hence lower the probability of the occurrence of financial distress. 
                                                          
52 We acknowledge the possibility that hedging can also be viewed as an attempt to manage risk, rather than a result 
of optimistic trait.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Research 
 
 
 
This thesis builds on a motivation to understand managerial behaviour, particularly CEO 
optimism.  The approach used was to incorporate behavioural finance with cross-disciplinary 
studies from the perspectives of leadership and management and also psychology. Our main 
aim in this study was to examine CEO personal attributes that we believe have an important 
influence on CEOs’ optimistic behaviour. The results of our study suggest that CEO personal 
attributes do contribute to their optimistic behaviour.  Subsequently we proposed the CEO 
Optimism Index derived from the CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences and 
networking) -that this study has proven to have an impact on triggering CEO optimistic 
behaviour. Our study complements Petit and Bollaert’s (2012) results but we provide 
additional insight into the underlying causes of CEO optimistic behaviour from a CEO 
personal attributes perspective, after controlling for firm, industry and macroeconomics 
effects. We provide a more comprehensive composite proxy in the shape of the CEO 
Optimism Index, based on CEOs’ traits, skills and experiences and networking ties.  
 
The sample period for this study was from 2000 to 2013 (14 years) and we examined 248 
CEOs of the UK FTSE 100 firms to answer what drives CEOs to exhibit optimistic behaviour 
in corporations, and how CEO optimism affects corporate leasing and hedging decisions. Our 
study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, this study fills a research 
gap by examining CEO personal traits, CEO skills and experiences, and CEO networking for 
the UK FTSE 100 firms. This is the first attempt to examine UK firms’ CEOs’ personal 
attributes that may contribute to their optimistic behaviour. Secondly, by its use of primary, 
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unique, manually-collected datasets, this research shows both originality and a novel 
approach.  
 
This study also proposed four new composite indexes: the CEO personal Trait Index (TI), 
Skills and Experiences Index (SEI), Networking Index (NI), and Optimism Index (OI).  
These indexes can be used to explain managerial behaviour and corporate decisions, and may 
also be used to examine the competency of firms’ existing CEOs/managers, or to compare 
potential CEOs’/managers’ skills and experiences and networking recruitment exercises. 
Explicitly addressing the relationship between CEOs’ personal attributes and their optimistic 
behaviour can help boards select their CEO based on their firm’s nature of business as certain 
industries may need a more aggressive CEO/manager. 
 
Our study also provides a linkage between CEO personal attributes and CEOs’ optimistic 
behaviour by integrating management, leadership and psychological approaches (traits 
approach, power-influence approach, social exchange theory and social networking 
approach). Our study reflects Mohamed, Baccar, Fairchild and Bouri’s (2012) concern 
regarding the lack of a well-established theoretical framework that explicitly expresses the 
link between CEO personal attributes and their optimistic behaviour. Moreover, as Gervais, 
Heaton and Odean (2011) and Otto (2014) mentioned, dynamic compensation contracts can 
be designed for optimistic CEOs to adjust and realign the incentives to differences in 
managers’ attributes. Hence detecting the optimistic CEO enables the board to make the 
necessary refinements to its strategy. 
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Additionally, this study also provides useful information or guidelines to investors, market 
participants and shareholders who are developing their investment strategy.  According to 
Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013) optimistic CEOs are less risk averse. Hence risk tolerant 
investors may choose to invest in a firm led by an optimistic CEO, to opt for higher expected 
outcomes. Acknowledgement of the optimism factor in CEOs may help investors suit their 
risk preferences to their investment decisions, portfolio allocation and risk management 
strategies.  
 
Our first empirical chapter suggests that in the case of CEO personal traits; younger, male, 
married and UK nationality CEOs are more likely to become optimistic. CEO skills and 
experiences (MBA holder, PhD holder, firm founder, financially literate, duality status, 
longer tenure as CEO and high emoluments) have also been found to have a significant 
impact on CEO optimism. In addition, CEO internal networking (tenure with the firm, 
internal promotion), and CEO external networking ties (external directorship, social 
networking prestige) show significant influences in cultivating CEO optimistic behaviour. 
Hence we propose that a composite of CEO personal attributes can be used as a new 
alternative proxy for CEO optimism alongside the proxies used by others and reported in the 
literature. 
 
Beber and Fabbri (2012) mention that, in addition to the firm, industry and market conditions, 
managers’ personal beliefs and characteristics do explain corporate decisions. Thus, our 
second empirical chapter in this thesis examines the relationship between CEO personal 
attributes and corporate leasing decisions. Motivated by the limitations in data availability 
due to few studies having been done in this area, we manually collected the data for firm’s 
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corporate leasing decisions (total lease, operating lease, finance lease) from the respective 
firms’ annual reports. Our results show that optimistic CEOs tend to use more lease financing, 
a finding consistent with the optimistic perspectives proposed by Heaton (2002). Lease is a 
type of debt and optimistic CEOs tend to perceive that the capital market often undervalues 
their firm. Optimistic CEOs are confident of their firm’s future earnings ability and hesitate 
to raise external funds by issuing new equity, the potential profits of which new equity 
holders will be able to share. This might be the reason why optimistic CEOs tend to prefer 
lease financing. 
 
The UK leasing market exhibits steady growth, as reported in the World Leasing Yearbook 
(White Clarke Group Global Leasing Report 2015). Leasing provides firms with alternative 
financing sources, and we find that UK firms’ employment of lease financing, especially 
operating leases, is increasing. This study benefits leasing firms (lessors) as well as lessees – 
the study provides an attractive selling point (optimistic CEOs are those who have higher 
skills and experiences, and stronger networking ties) that lessors can use to convince their 
clients (lessees) to use more leased assets, and leasing can lower overall firm risk and mitigate 
agency cost of debt. 
 
Our third empirical chapter examines the relationship between CEO personal attributes and 
firms’ corporate hedging decisions. Firm hedging strategy is important as all firms are 
exposed to market risk, and most of the UK FTSE 100 firms use financial derivatives as 
hedging tools. Our results suggest that younger, married, and UK nationality CEOs tend to 
employ more financial derivatives in their firm, consistent with the findings of Iqbal (2015) 
and Beber and Fabbri (2012), who also noted that younger CEOs are more likely to hedge. 
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Furthermore, we also find CEOs with higher skills and experiences tend to employ more 
financial derivatives as their hedging tools. In particular, CEOs who possess financial 
knowledge are found to have higher employment of hedging derivative instruments.  Our 
results also suggest that internally promoted CEOs, and CEOs with external directorships 
and social networking prestige tend to hedge more.   
 
We conclude that optimistic CEOs tend to employ more financial derivatives to hedge 
potential firm risks, consistent with the results reported by Alsubaie (2009) and Adam, 
Fernando and Golubeva (2015). The possible reason why optimistic CEOs employ more 
financial derivative instruments derives from the proposal of Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 
2005b, 2008), Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and Graham, Harvey and Puri (2013); optimistic 
CEOs are those who are highly committed to their firm’s good outcomes, confident in 
predicting future events as they have a belief that they are “better than average” and have the 
‘illusion of control’. Hence optimistic CEOs may use more derivative instruments to hedge 
their firm’s risk to ensure that their firm is under their control by reducing cash flow volatility, 
delivering more predictable outcomes and lowering the firm’s financial distress cost. This 
finding is also in line with the idea that optimistic CEOs are more risk taking, and hence the 
need for financial derivatives as hedging mechanisms will also increase.  
 
In this thesis we examine the influence of CEO personal attributes on corporate decisions, 
particularly leasing and hedging decisions. Future studies may investigate the relationship 
between CEO personal attributes and other corporate decision-making, including decisions 
on investment, payout policy, corporate fraud and other accounting issues. Future studies 
may also look into the relationship between CEO optimism and shareholders/investors. We 
 232 
 
suggest that behavioural finance studies may incorporate more psychological perspectives 
which might provide a clearer picture of the issue of conflict among managers, shareholders 
and debt-holders. The most challenging task for future study is the development of a new 
proxy for ‘optimism’, and we suggest that future studies use our measurement as a 
fundamental base to develop a more ‘intrinsic’ optimism proxy derived from CEOs personal 
attributes. Additionally, future research may also look into the optimism of the management 
team or top executive (comprising chairman, CEO, CFO, COO etc.) to further investigate the 
influence of ‘team attributes’ on firm value, corporate policies, and investment decisions.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I 
Industry classification for this study 
 
Industry 
Dummy 
Sector 
 
ID 1 Chemicals,  Mining 
ID 2 
 
Aerospace & Defence, Construction & Materials, General Industrials, Industrial 
Engineering, Support Services 
ID 3 
 
Automobiles & Parts, Beverages, Food Producers, Household Goods, Personal 
Goods, Tobacco 
ID 4 Health Care Equipment & Services, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology 
ID 5 Food & Drug Retailers, General Retailers, Media, Travel & Leisure 
ID 6 Fixed Line Telecommunications, Mobile Telecommunications 
ID 7 Electricity, Gas, Water & Multi-utilities 
ID 8 
Banks, General Financial, Life Insurance, Non-life Insurance, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts 
ID 9 Software & Computer Services, Technology Hardware & Equipment 
ID 10 Oil & Gas Producers, Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution 
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Appendix II 
Robustness result with alternative MO proxy (stock options exercise behaviour) 
Baseline Model                Panel A: Binomial Index Panel B: PCA Index 
Model  Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
C 11.1375 11.1492 11.6877 8.9749 9.7863 9.8598 11.8844 11.0607 11.1135 
 (0.8246) (0.8242) (0.8612) (0.6589) (0.7154) (0.7266) (0.8748) (0.8135) (0.8103) 
Corporate governance (CG) 1.2633 1.2607 1.2550 1.2226 1.2053 1.3491 1.2422 1.4368* 1.4315* 
 (1.5228) (1.4903) (1.4785) (1.4405) (1.3716) (1.6171) (1.4707) (1.6971) (1.6636) 
Firm Size (FS) -0.1013* -0.1013 -0.0624 -0.1163* -0.0873 -0.1066* -0.0502 -0.1179* -0.0708 
 (-1.6467) (-1.6448) (-0.9674) (-1.8686) (-1.3200) (-1.7242) (-0.7546) (-1.8914) (-1.0442) 
Leverage (LEV) 1.5452** 1.5449** 1.5460** 1.4541** 1.4652** 1.5456** 1.4857** 1.4145** 1.3883* 
 (2.1878) (2.1867) (2.1827) (2.0476) (2.0621) (2.1825) (2.0981) (1.9867) (1.9560) 
Market to Book Ratio (MTB) 0.0403** 0.0403** 0.0394** 0.0369** 0.0366** 0.0397** 0.0391** 0.0405** 0.0388** 
 (2.2795) (2.2780) (2.2212) (2.0896) (2.0661) (2.2703) (2.1793) (2.2691) (2.1730) 
Profitability (PRO) -6.5556*** -6.5572*** -6.7231*** -6.3276*** -6.4996*** -6.4136*** -6.0991*** -6.6459*** -6.1185*** 
 (-4.3723) (-4.3629) (-4.4563) (-4.2073) (-4.2927) (-4.2537) (-4.0066) (-4.4013) (-3.9807) 
Log GDP -0.5946 -0.5950 -0.7200 -0.4552 -0.5697 -0.5004 -0.7103 -0.5430 -0.6120 
 (-0.6165) (-0.6167) (-0.7403) (-0.4688) (-0.5824) (-0.5165) (-0.7304) (-0.5599) (-0.6244) 
Log Stock Market Return (SMR) -0.2703 -0.2700 -0.2407 -0.2963 -0.2674 -0.2753 -0.2691 -0.3321 -0.3208 
 (-0.4487) (-0.4481) (-0.3968) (-0.4878) (-0.4383) (-0.4565) (-0.4435) (-0.5479) (-0.5258) 
Consumer Confidence Indicator 
(CCI) -0.0183 -0.0183 -0.0193 -0.0178 -0.0187 -0.0179 -0.0201 -0.0169 -0.0188 
 (-0.9855) (-0.9848) (-1.0365) (-0.9514) (-1.0001) (-0.9656) (-1.0810) (-0.9085) (-1.0039) 
Traits Index (TI)  -0.0079   -0.0636 0.1059   0.0629 
   (-0.0155)     (-0.1213) (1.1504)     (0.6488) 
Skills & Experiences Index (SEI)   1.4542**  1.0251  0.1847**  0.1708* 
     (2.0298)   (1.3732)   (2.0544)   (1.8745) 
Networking Index (NI)    1.0711*** 0.9254**   0.1966** 0.1581 
       (2.6294) (2.1814)     (2.0905) (1.5936) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1130 0.1130 0.1190 0.1230 0.1259 0.1149 0.1191 0.1194 0.1248 
Incremental R2  0.00% 0.6% 1.00% 1.29% 0.19% 0.61% 0.64% 1.18% 
Observations 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 507 
Dep=0 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 256 
Dep=1 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 
Z-Statistics are reported in the parentheses and *, **, *** denote significant at the10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
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Appendix III 
Robustness result with alternative MO proxy (insider transactions behaviour) 
 
Panel A: Control models Panel B: Binomial Index Panel C: PCA Index 
MO proxy MA IT I IT II MA IT I IT II MA IT I IT II 
C 131.0410 0.2720 109.3108 145.7628 -16.64605 110.9314 126.9974 -27.2176 124.3735 
 (1.2305) (0.0032) (1.4088) (1.3331) (-0.1898) (1.4113) (1.1820) (-0.3060) (1.5720) 
CG 1.3606 -0.5115 0.0760 1.2714 -0.6728 0.1846 1.4163 0.0301 0.2767 
 (0.9604) (-0.4592) (0.0808) (0.8605) (-0.5804) (0.1906) (0.9475) (0.0255) (0.2799) 
FS -0.2605** 0.0984 0.0623 -0.2006* -0.0061 0.0611 -0.2276** -0.0500 0.0175 
 (-2.4163) (1.2184) (0.9159) (-1.7402) (-0.0708) (0.8537) (-1.9672) (-0.5695) (0.2420) 
LEV 2.6596*** 2.2130** 2.2164*** 3.4549*** 2.1144* 2.0299*** 2.9518*** 2.0527** 1.9686** 
 (2.6495) (2.54310 (2.9458) (3.1394) (2.3054) (2.6210) (2.7507) (2.2339) (2.5068) 
MTB -0.0013 0.0068 0.0068 -0.0022 0.0078 0.0081 -0.0032 0.0078 0.0089 
 (-0.0837) (0.5229) (0.5360) (-0.1449) (0.5860) (0.6387) (-0.2075) (0.5967) (0.6931) 
PRO 1.0676 -0.1719 -1.4603 0.0896 0.3545 -0.6685 0.4964 -1.0577 -0.9258 
 (0.6258) (-0.1054) (-1.0473) (0.0488) (0.2043) (-0.4618) (0.2784) (-0.5767) (-0.6362) 
Log GDP -10.5438 -0.4492 -10.2350 -11.906 1.1607 -10.3342 -10.333 1.8611 -11.3495* 
 (-1.1830) (-0.0625) (-1.5684) (-1.3011) (0.1573) (-1.5635) (-1.1489) (0.2487) (-1.7059) 
Log SMR 2.2765 0.6224 4.2172** 2.4805 0.3451 4.2868** 2.3025 0.3115 4.4042** 
 (0.8747) (0.2833) (2.1542) (0.9311) (0.1532) (2.1612) (0.8766) (0.1369) (2.2072) 
CCI -0.0265 -0.0039 0.0280 -0.0333 -0.0019 0.0312 -0.0288 -00001 0.0311 
 (-0.8196) (-0.1510) (1.1837) (-1.0030) (-0.0735) (1.2983) (-0.8824) (-0.0014) (1.2923) 
TI    -0.2703 -0.4730 0.4179 -0.0057 0.1053 0.0729 
    (-0.3042) (-0.6477) (0.6668) (-0.0379) (0.8532) (0.6600) 
SEI     3.1839** -4.3733*** -1.4295** 0.2195 -0.5964*** -0.2938*** 
    (2.4159) (-4.0208) (-1.5880) (1.6245) (-4.7111) (-2.7766) 
NI    1.2460* 0.3605 -1.1423 0.2012 0.1190 -0.1836* 
    (1.8726) (0.6766) (-2.4524) (1.3997) (1.0977) (-1.9020) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.0830 0.0759 0.0460 0.1258 0.1149 0.0684 0.1018 0.1296 0.0730 
Incremental R2    4.28% 3.90% 2.24% 1.88% 5.37% 2.7% 
Observations 432 375 432 432 375 432 432 375 432 
Dep=0 368 118 155 368 118 155 368 118 155 
Dep=1 64 257 277 64 257 277 64 257 277 
Z-Statistics are reported in the parentheses and *, **, *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 236 
 
Appendix IV 
Result for the Relationship between Debt Financing and Leasing 
 
The table presents the regression result for debt financing (leverage) with three types of lease 
propensity (total lease share, finance lease share, and operating lease share). Our regressions are 
based on Model 1:𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀, Model 2: 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑃𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 and Model 3: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 . T statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
C 0.2261*** 0.2236*** 0.2083*** 
 (13.7721) (13.8966) (14.8182) 
Total Lease Share -0.0679**   
 (-2.3059)   
Operating Lease Share  -0.0659**  
  (-2.1816)  
Finance Lease Share   -0.0743 
   (-1.0379) 
Adjusted R2 0.1113 0.1105 0.1051 
Observations 623 623 623 
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Appendix V 
 
Regression Results for Debt Employment and CEO Optimism  
 
The table presents the regression result for debt employment (leverage) and CEO optimism. 
Our regressions are based on the regression model:
titiztiOIti ZCEOOILEV ,,,, )(    , T 
statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
C -0.6089 
 (-0.8492) 
Tax Loss Carried Forward -0.0652** 
 (-2.1787) 
Internal Fund 1.6106*** 
 (11.7762) 
MTB 0.0001 
 (0.1726) 
Profitability -0.5767*** 
 (-5.1617) 
Tangibility -0.0182 
 (-0.6236) 
Firm Size 0.0202*** 
 (4.1343) 
Uniqueness -0.0064 
 (-0.5072) 
Corporate Governance 0.0474 
 (1.0429) 
GDP -0.0024 
 (-0.0455) 
Stock Market Return 0.0389 
 (1.1184) 
CCI 0.0007 
 (0.6866) 
CEOOI 0.1018** 
 (2.2704) 
Industry dummies Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.3160 
Observations  631 
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Appendix VI 
 
Regression Results for Lease-Debt ratios and CEO Optimism  
 
The table presents the regression result for lease-debt ratios (total lease share/debt, finance 
lease share/debt, and operating lease share/debt). Our regressions are based on the regression 
model:
titiztiOIti ZCEOOIatioLeaseDebtR ,,,, )(    , T statistics are reported in parentheses and 
*, 
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:   
Total Lease Share 
Panel B:   
Finance Lease 
Share 
Panel C:  
Operating Lease 
Share 
C  4.4773  -8.7797  4.7113 
  (0.7321)  (-0.8105)  (0.7479) 
Tax Loss Carried Forward  0.4157*  0.9352**  0.2627 
  (1.6589)  (2.1786)  (1.0178) 
Internal Fund  -8.2037***  -7.5914***  -8.7355*** 
  (-6.8671)  (-3.7202)  (-7.0996) 
MTB  -0.0024  -0.0024  -0.0021 
  (-1.6199)  (-0.9791)  (-1.3938) 
Profitability  2.5553***  2.0723  2.6419*** 
  (2.7475)  (1.3296)  (2.7580) 
Tangibility  -1.6963***  -2.3740***  -1.6009*** 
  (-6.7379)  (-5.0416)  (-6.1740) 
Firm Size  -0.2799***  0.0506  -0.3069*** 
  (-6.7420)  (0.6869)  (-7.1758) 
Uniqueness  -0.6284***  -0.7273***  -0.5954*** 
  (-5.6986)  (-3.7550)  (-5.2422) 
Corporate Governance  -0.4204  -1.6738**  0.0002 
  (-1.0330)  (-2.3465)  (0.0005) 
GDP  0.3384  0.6275  0.3481 
  (0.7632)  (0.8042)  (0.7623) 
Stock Market Return  -0.2439  0.1491  -0.2874 
  (-0.8356)  (0.2893)  (-0.9563) 
CCI  -0.0064  0.0229  -0.0077 
  (-0.7466)  (1.5367)  (-0.8780) 
CEOOI  -0.6612*  -2.8317***  -0.6628 
  (-1.6630)  (-3.8859)  (-1.6184) 
Industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.3198  0.2336  0.3118 
Observations   594  501  594 
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Appendix VII 
INSTRUMENT DEFINITIONS AND CATEGORISATION 
Panel A: Foreign Exchange Transactions 
Spot 
Transaction 
 
Single outright transaction involving the exchange of two currencies at a rate agreed on 
the date of the contract for value or delivery (cash settlement) within two business 
days. The spot legs of swaps, and swaps that were for settlement within two days (i.e. 
overnight swaps, spot next swaps, and “tomorrow/next day” swap transactions) were 
excluded from this category. 
 
Outright 
Forward 
 
Transaction involving the exchange of two currencies at a rate agreed on the date of the 
contract for value or delivery (cash settlement) at some time in the future (more than 
two business days later). Also included in this category were forward foreign exchange 
agreement transactions (FXA), non-deliverable forwards, and other forward contracts 
for differences. 
 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Swap 
Transaction which involves the actual exchange of two currencies (principal amount 
only) on a specific date at a rate agreed at the time of the conclusion of the contract (the 
short leg), and a reverse exchange of the same two currencies at a date further in the 
future at a rate (generally different from the rate applied to the short leg) agreed at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract (the long leg). Short-term swaps carried out as 
“tomorrow/next day” transactions are included in this category. 
 
Currency 
Swap 
 
Transaction which involves the actual exchange of two currencies on a specific date at 
a rate agreed at the time of the conclusion of the contract and an agreement to exchange 
streams of interest payments in the currencies for an agreed period of time, followed by 
a reverse exchange at a pre-agreed exchange rate at maturity. 
 
Option 
 
Option contract that gives the right to buy or sell a currency with another currency at a 
specified exchange rate during a specified period. This category also includes currency 
swaptions, currency warrants, plain vanilla contracts and exotic foreign exchange 
options such as average rate options and barrier options. 
 
Panel B: OTC Interest Rate Derivatives 
Interest rate contracts are contracts related to an interest-bearing financial instrument whose cash flows 
are determined by referencing interest rates or another interest rate contract (e.g. an option on a futures 
contract to purchase a Treasury bill). 
This category is limited to those deals where all the legs are exposed to only one currency’s interest 
rate. 
Thus it excludes contracts involving the exchange of one or more foreign currencies (e.g. cross-
currency swaps and currency options) and other contracts whose predominant risk characteristic is 
foreign exchange risk. 
 
Forward 
Rate 
Agreement 
(FRA) 
Interest rate forward contract in which the rate to be paid or received on a specific 
obligation for a set period of time, beginning at some time in the future, is determined 
at contract initiation. 
 
Interest Rate 
Swap 
 
Agreement to exchange periodic payments related to interest rates on a single currency. 
Interest rate swaps can be fixed for floating, or floating for floating based on different 
indices. This category includes those swaps whose notional principal is amortised 
according to a fixed schedule independent of interest rates. 
 
Interest Rate 
Option 
 
Option contract that gives the right to pay or receive a specific interest rate on a 
predetermined principal for a set period of time. Included in this category are interest 
rate caps, floors, collars, corridors, swaptions and warrants. 
 
Source: BIS and Bank of England 
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Appendix VIII 
 
 
Weir Group Plc (Annual Report 2013) 
 
Derivative financial instruments & hedge accounting  
The Group uses derivative financial instruments, principally forward foreign currency contracts 
and cross currency swaps, to reduce its exposure to exchange rate movements. The Group also 
uses foreign currency borrowings as a hedge of its exposure to foreign exchange risk on its 
investments in foreign subsidiaries. Additionally, the Group uses interest rate swaps to manage 
its exposure to interest rate risk.  The Group does not hold or issue derivatives for speculative or 
trading purposes. 
 
Derivative financial instruments are recognised as assets and liabilities measured at their fair 
values at the balance sheet date. The fair value of forward foreign currency contracts is calculated 
as the present value of the estimated future cash flows based on spot and forward foreign exchange 
rates and counterparty and own credit risk. The fair value of interest rate swaps and cross currency 
swaps is calculated as the present value of the estimated future cash flows based on interest rate 
curves, spot foreign exchange rates and counterparty and own credit risk. Changes in their fair 
values have been recognised in the income statement, except where hedge accounting is used, 
provided the conditions specified by IAS 39 are met. Hedge accounting is applied in respect of 
hedge relationships where it is both permissible under IAS 39 and practical to do so. When hedge 
accounting is used, the relevant hedging relationships will be classified as fair value hedges, cash 
flow hedges or net investment hedges. 
 
Where the hedging relationship is classified as a fair value hedge, the carrying amount of the 
hedged asset or liability will be adjusted by the increase or decrease in its fair value attributable 
to the hedged risk and the resulting gain or loss will be recognised in the income statement where, 
to the extent that the hedge is effective, it will be offset by the change in the fair value of the 
hedging instrument. 
 
Where the hedging relationship is classified as a cash flow hedge or as a net investment hedge, to 
the extent that the hedge is effective, changes in the fair value of the hedging instrument will be 
recognised directly in other comprehensive income rather than in the income statement. When the 
hedged item is recognised in the financial statements, the accumulated gains and losses recognised 
in other comprehensive income will be either recycled to the income statement or, if the hedged 
item results in a non-financial asset, will be recognised as adjustments to its initial carrying 
amount. 
 
Hedge accounting is discontinued when the hedging instrument expires or is sold, terminated or 
exercised, or no longer qualifies for hedge accounting. At that point in time, any cumulative gain 
or loss on the hedging instrument recognised in other comprehensive income is kept in other 
comprehensive income until the forecasted transaction occurs. If a hedged transaction is no longer 
expected to occur, the net cumulative gain or loss recognised in other comprehensive income is 
transferred to net profit or loss for the period. 
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Appendix IX 
 
 
The FTSE 100 UK Firms’ Financial Hedging Behaviour (2000-2013) 
 
 
 
Panel A: Financial hedging by year: hedger or non-hedger 
 
Year Obs. Non- hedger % of  Non-hedger Hedger % of hedger 
2000 37 5 13.51% 32 86.49% 
2001 45 6 13.33% 39 86.67% 
2002 48 5 10.42% 43 89.58% 
2003 51 5 9.80% 46 90.20% 
2004 54 3 5.56% 51 94.44% 
2005 61 2 3.28% 59 96.72% 
2006 62 2 3.23% 60 96.77% 
2007 64 1 1.56% 63 98.44% 
2008 65 0 0.00% 65 100.00% 
2009 67 1 1.49% 66 98.51% 
2010 66 3 4.55% 63 95.45% 
2011 66 5 7.58% 61 92.42% 
2012 68 3 4.41% 65 95.59% 
2013 62 3 4.84% 59 95.16% 
Total 816 44  772  
Average   5.39%  94.61% 
 
Panel B: Financial Hedging: type of risk hedged  
 
Year 
Foreign 
Currency 
Derivatives 
(FCDs) 
% of firm 
uses 
FCDs 
Interest 
Rate 
Derivatives 
(IRDs) 
% of 
firm 
uses 
IRDs 
Commodity 
Derivatives 
(CDs) 
% of 
firm uses 
CDs 
Average 
type of 
derivative 
used  
2000 32 86.49% 26 70.27% 10 27.03% 1.84 
2001 37 82.22% 31 68.89% 13 28.89% 1.80 
2002 43 89.58% 35 72.92% 13 27.08% 1.90 
2003 43 84.31% 38 74.51% 16 31.37% 1.90 
2004 48 88.89% 44 81.48% 20 37.04% 2.07 
2005 56 91.80% 50 81.97% 21 34.43% 2.08 
2006 57 91.94% 51 82.26% 21 33.87% 2.08 
2007 59 92.19% 52 81.25% 22 34.38% 2.08 
2008 60 92.31% 54 83.08% 24 36.92% 2.12 
2009 62 92.54% 58 86.57% 26 38.81% 2.18 
2010 61 92.42% 54 81.82% 25 37.88% 2.12 
2011 61 92.42% 48 72.73% 28 42.42% 2.08 
2012 64 94.12% 48 70.59% 29 42.65% 2.07 
2013 58 93.55% 45 73.77% 26 41.94% 2.08 
Total 741  634  294   
Average  90.81%  77.70%  36.03% 2.03 
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Panel C: Financial Hedging: type of derivative contract used 
Year 
Forward
s 
Contract 
(FORC) 
% of 
firm 
uses 
Forward
s 
Contract 
Options 
Contrac
t (OPC) 
% of 
firm 
uses 
Options 
Contract 
Swaps 
Contrac
t 
(SWC) 
% of 
firm 
uses 
Swaps 
Contract 
Futures 
Contrac
t (FUC) 
% of 
firm 
uses 
Futures 
Contract 
Average 
type of 
derivativ
e 
contract 
used 
2000 30 81.08% 11 29.73% 25 69.44% 5 13.51% 1.92 
2001 34 75.56% 14 31.11% 31 68.89% 7 15.56% 1.91 
2002 39 81.25% 15 31.25% 35 72.92% 6 12.50% 1.98 
2003 40 78.43% 15 29.41% 38 74.51% 7 13.73% 1.96 
2004 44 81.48% 20 37.04% 43 79.63% 7 12.96% 2.11 
2005 50 81.97% 21 34.43% 51 83.61% 9 14.75% 2.15 
2006 51 82.26% 21 33.87% 54 87.10% 10 16.13% 2.19 
2007 54 84.38% 19 29.69% 58 90.63% 9 14.06% 2.19 
2008 57 87.69% 21 32.31% 59 90.77% 7 10.77% 2.22 
2009 60 89.55% 19 28.36% 61 91.04% 10 14.93% 2.24 
2010 56 84.85% 18 27.27% 59 89.39% 8 12.12% 2.14 
2011 59 89.39% 19 28.79% 55 83.33% 7 10.61% 2.12 
2012 60 88.24% 20 29.41% 57 83.82% 8 11.76% 2.13 
2013 56 90.32% 18 29.03% 51 82.26% 8 12.90% 2.15 
Total 690  251  677  108   
Averag
e  84.56%  
30.76
%  
83.07
%  
13.24
% 2.10 
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Appendix  X 
 
Additional Test (Total Derivatives Excluding SWAPS) 
CEO Personal Attributes and Financial Hedging Decisions (Magnitude Of Hedging) 
 
 Model II: CEO Personal Attributes Model III:  CEO Personal Attributes Indexes Model IV: CEO 
Optimism Index 
C -0.2502* -0.3205* -0.3523** -0.2793* -0.2604 -0.2646 -0.2632 -0.2657 
 (-1.8499) (-1.9202) (-2.1081) (-1.6604) (-1.5558) (-1.5794) (-1.5758) (-1.5930) 
Leverage -0.0184** -0.0168* -0.0184** -0.0189** -0.0148 -0.0165* -0.0171* -0.0179** 
 (-1.9720) (-1.8484) (-2.0139) (-2.0289) (-1.6148) (-1.8087) (-1.8501) (-1.9629) 
R&D -0.0560 -0.0427 -0.0620 -0.0651 -0.0621 -0.0693 -0.0756 -0.0776 
 (-1.0227) (-0.7841) (-1.1407) (-1.2038) (-1.1594) (-1.2897) (-1.4056) (-1.4468) 
Capital Expenditure 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 0.0007*** 0.0008*** 
 (2.9357) (3.4250) (3.4611) (3.0793) (3.0285) (3.2844) (3.2443) (3.3124) 
Firm Size 0.0036*** 0.0044*** 0.0027** 0.0036*** 0.0033*** 0.0028** 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 
 (3.3017) (3.2617) (2.4413) (3.3578) (3.1076) (2.5016) (2.7612) (2.7989) 
Cash Ratio -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0018 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0015 
 (-1.1356) (-1.0677) (-0.9860) (-1.1269) (-1.0140) (-0.9299) (-0.82460 (-0.8149) 
Dividend Yield 0.0018** 0.0020** 0.0022*** 0.0019** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0022*** 0.0022*** 
 (2.1445) (2.4400) (2.6439) (2.2437) (2.5028) (2.4383) (2.6492) (2.6294) 
Corporate Governance -0.0031 0.0033 -0.0048 -0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0011 0.0023 0.0028 
 (-0.2630) (0.2983) (-0.4293) (-0.0579) (-0.1695) (-0.0968) (0.2051) (0.2480) 
FSTS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.4354) (-0.4455) (-1.1028) (-0.3121) (-0.7420) (-0.6486) (-0.5385) (-0.4850) 
GDP 0.0228** 0.0248** 0.0291** 0.0238* 0.0224* 0.0235* 0.0217* 0.0219* 
 (2.4023) (2.0521) (2.4113) (1.9542) (1.8524) (1.9392) (1.7961) (1.8169) 
Stock Market Return -0.0113 -0.0097 -0.0104 -0.0114 -0.0111 -0.0113 -0.0108 -0.0109 
 (-1.4030) (-1.2245) (-1.2973) (-1.4109) (-1.3840) (-1.4059) (-1.3474) (-1.3527) 
CCI 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.1847) (0.6200) (0.0406) (0.2338) (0.2699) (0.0910) (0.2636) (0.2374) 
Age -0.0002        
 (-0.7468)        
Male CEO 0.0041        
 (0.6434)        
Married CEO -0.0020        
 (-0.5151)        
UK Nationality 0.0007        
 (0.2344)        
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MBA holder  -0.0110***       
  (-3.0637)       
PhD holder  0.0035       
  (0.8766)       
Founder  0.0084       
  (1.1796)       
Financial Literacy  0.0119***       
  (4.2674)       
Duality  0.0022       
  (0.3469)       
Tenure as CEO  0.0005       
  (0.3330)       
Emoluments  0.1498       
  (0.6720)       
Tenure with the firm   -0.0002      
   (-0.0810)      
Internal Promotion   0.0093**      
   (2.2844)      
External Directorships   0.0064***      
   (4.3054)      
Social Networking prestige   0.0023      
   (0.8313)      
Traits Index    0.0100   0.0093  
    (1.4313)   (1.3122)  
Skills and Experiences 
Index   
 
 
0.0304*** 
 
0.0258** 
 
     (3.0768)  (2.4539)  
Networking Index      0.0137*** 0.0084  
      (2.7779) (1.5942)  
Optimism Index        0.0402*** 
        (3.7705) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1080 0.1499 0.1354 0.1111 0.1199 0.1179 0.1239 0.1255 
Observations 754 754 754 754 754 754 754 754 
This table shows the result of the relationship between CEO personal attributes (traits, skills and experiences, and networking) with financial hedging magnitude (total fair value of 
the derivatives excluding swaps/ total assets) using panel OLS regression. Year and industry effects are included. Our regressions are based on our Model II:
, , , ,_ _ ( )i t pa i t z i t i tCHD CEO Personal Attributes Z        , Model III: , , , , .( )i t TI i t SEI i t NI i t z i tCHD TI SEI NI Z           , and Model IV:    tiztiOIti ZCEOOICHD ,,, )( ,  
where Z is the vector of control variables (firm, and macroeconomic factors and industries dummies). T-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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